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  6
Overview 
 
 This study explores the cultural policy thinking of three major French 
theorists. The introduction surveys relations between different types of research 
and cultural policy making both in the anglophone world and in France, and 
places the decision to focus on these three thinkers within a wider context of 
cultural policy research in France. Chapter one, which will cover a certain 
amount of ground familiar to specialists in the field, traces how the cultural 
policy reflection of these figures emerges against or negotiates the policy model 
represented by André Malraux. Chapters two to four, which constitute the main 
substance of the study, move across these three oeuvres with a sustained focus 
on their cultural policy implications and prescriptions. The summary and 
concluding remarks draw together the elements of a ‘triangulated’ framework 
for cultural policy reflection developed over the study as a whole. 
 
 Page references in square brackets refer to English translations, where 
available. Details of these translations are given in the bibliography at the end of 
this study. 
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Introduction 
 
Intellectuals and cultural policy 
 
Few would contest the assertion that intellectual practice has a political 
dimension. Indeed, for many analysts (notably in France), the concept of the 
‘intellectual’ as such (as opposed simply to the scholar, scientist, expert or 
teacher) involves precisely the exploitation of cultural capital in order to 
produce a range of effects in the political field. However, the relationship which 
intellectuals should or should not adopt with the specific apparatuses of public 
policy (the ‘politico-administrative field’) is a more contentious issue. This has 
been particularly evident as far as cultural policy in the anglophone world is 
concerned. Within the fields of cultural studies and the sociology of culture, 
there has been a vigorous ‘debate concerning the roles of intellectuals and the 
relationships they should adopt in relation to the bureaucratic and political 
processes through which cultural policies are developed and put into effect.’1 
Such debates have tended to oppose those advocating practical engagement in 
policy processes and those for whom such engagement implies the abdication of 
critical integrity on the part of the intellectual. Even when the poles of the 
‘critical’ and the ‘practical’ (or ‘technical’, or ‘administrative’) have not been 
dichotomised, they have tended to structure and propel the ongoing debate.2 Of 
course, not all anglophone cultural policy research falls under the framework of 
the ‘critical cultural policy studies’ branch of cultural studies or the sociology of 
culture. Mark Schuster, for example, in his extensive survey of the ‘research and 
information infrastructure’ set up across the world to generate ‘policy-relevant 
research’, makes scant reference to such domains. Schuster traces how a series 
of research units with greater or lesser proximity to government (notably in 
Canada, Britain, France, Germany and the Netherlands) negotiate the twin 
commitments of building a ‘knowledge base’ regarding arts and culture 
according to criteria of ‘pure social science inquiry’ and ‘adding value’ to 
processes of cultural policy-making concerned increasingly with ‘evidence-
                                                 
1 Tony Bennett, Intellectuals, Culture, Policy: The Technical, the Practical and the Critical, 
Pavis Papers in Social and Cultural Research (Milton Keynes: Faculty of Social Sciences, The 
Open University), no. 2, 2000, p. 1 
2 A helpful thread for an outside observer to follow in this respect is the extended ‘debate’ 
between Tony Bennett (working in Australia, and then Britain) and Jim McGuigan (working 
in Britain) over the last decade or so – see e.g. McGuigan, Culture in the Public Sphere 
(London & New York: Routledge, 1996); Bennett, Culture: A Reformer’s Science (London: 
Sage, 1998); Bennett, Intellectuals, Culture, Policy: The Technical, the Practical and the 
Critical; McGuigan, ‘Postscript 2000’ in J. Lewis and T. Miller (ed.), Critical Cultural Policy 
Studies: A Reader (Oxford, Blackwell, 2003), p. 39. 
 9
based’ strategies.3 However, the kinds of critical questioning that, in the 
anglophone world, have crystallized around the institution of cultural studies are 
pointedly absent in Schuster’s mapping document. 
 It might seem to many anglophone observers as though cultural theory in 
France (where there has been no institutionalisation of ‘cultural studies’ as such) 
has tended inexorably to form around the purely ‘critical’ pole of the dichotomy 
sketched out above. Keith Reader has described the ‘non-étatiste [non-Statist] 
view of politics’ adopted by many of the most publicly visible left-wing 
intellectuals, and the tenuous connection between much of their theoretical 
output and ‘the nuts and bolts of day-to-day [political] activity’ (putting to one 
side the relations between intellectuals and the Communist Party up until the 
1970s).4 While the writings of  Barthes, Foucault, Deleuze, and other prominent 
French exports clearly articulate forms of cultural politics, they do not as a rule 
link this up in any practical way with the apparatuses of public policy. 
 At a less visible level, however, there has evolved in France over the last 
forty years a highly developed cultural policy ‘research ecology’ (to use 
Schuster’s term), whose prime mover in many respects has been the research 
unit of the national Ministry of Culture (the Département d’Etudes et de la 
Prospective). One should not identify the overall work of this unit too readily 
with a function of politico-administrative subservience. Founded in 1963, it had 
to struggle over at least a decade for its continuing existence against hostility or 
indifference not merely outside but also within the Ministry of Culture. 
Moreover, the research it produces has often implicitly challenged prevailing 
policy orientations (Etienne Grosjean has spoken of a ‘patient and prudent 
provocation’). Philippe Urfalino has analysed its role in terms of a ‘secant 
marginality’: it has occupied a ‘marginal’ role in a number of worlds (academic 
research, cultural administration, political decision-making), but through that 
very ‘multipositionality’ has brought agents, concepts, and programmes together 
which otherwise would have remained apart. Similarly, Antoine Hennion has 
described how the tensions it has embodied between a ‘politico-administrative’ 
logic and a ‘research’ logic have not simply been limiting factors, but have 
enabled it to perform a positive ‘mediating’ function. The unit’s founding 
director speaks (in terms reminiscent of Michel de Certeau) of ‘using’ the 
                                                 
3 See Mark Schuster, Informing Cultural Policy: The Research and Information Infrastructure 
(New Brunswick, New Jersey: Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers, State University of 
New Jersey/Pew Charitable Trusts, 2002), pp. 15, 29, 21, 14. See also Oliver Bennett, ‘The 
Torn Halves of Cultural Policy Research’, forthcoming article in The International Journal of 
Cultural Policy. 
4 Keith Reader, Intellectuals and the Left in France since 1968 (Houndmills: Macmillan, 
1987), pp. 138, 22. 
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administrative structures in place, often with considerable ‘cunning’ and 
‘audacity’, in order to pursue particular objectives.5
 In Hennion’s view, the DEP has often played a ‘decisive’ role in 
mobilizing researchers around particular themes and programmes, and has 
gained a position as a ‘privileged interlocutor’ for academic researchers in their 
relations with ‘political powers and the State with regard to cultural questions’.6 
It has enabled, as Jean-Louis Fabiani has put it, researchers, administrators and 
cultural agents to ‘co-produce’ over time a set of intellectual ‘tools’ within the 
framework of ‘one of the finest expressions of our French singularity’.7 In the 
course of this process, a number of external researchers and research units have 
collaborated in more or less sustained manners and on specific problematics 
with the DEP – Augustin Girard cites notably the names of Michel Crozier, 
Pierre Bourdieu, Robert Francès, Paul-Henry Chombart de Lauwe, Joffre 
Dumazedier, Michel de Certeau, Raymonde Moulin, Pierre-Michel Menger, 
Ehrard Friedberg, Philippe Urfalino, Antoine Hennion…8 Such collaborations 
have played an important part in the elaboration of what one might call a 
nationally available critical cultural policy intelligence. 
 
 
                                                 
5 See respectively Etienne Grosjean, ‘La recherche comme “empêcheur de décider en rond”’, 
in Trente ans d’études au service de la vie culturelle, Table ronde organisée à l’occasion du 
départ à la retraite d’Augustin Girard, chef du Département des études et de la prospective 
du ministère de la culture de 1963 à 1993 (Paris: Ministère de la Culture et de la 
Communication, 1993), pp. 48-51 (p. 50); Philippe Urfalino, ‘Laboratoire d’idées et utopies 
créatrices’, ibid., pp. 77-81 (pp. 79-80); Antoine Hennion ‘Le grand écart entre la recherche et 
l’administration’ (Paris: Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication, Département des 
Etudes et de la Prospective, June 1996), pp. 1-3; Augustin Girard ‘Une dynamique pour 
l’avenir’, in Trente ans d’études, pp. 89-99 (p. 92). Hennion’s report provides a helpful 
overview of the DEP’s work. This can be supplemented by the retrospective accounts of 
Augustin Girard, the DEP’s director from 1963 to 1993, in ‘Un cas de partenariat entre 
administration et recherche scientifique’, in Menger and Passeron (ed.), L’Art de la recherche. 
Essais en l’honneur de Raymonde Moulin (Paris: La Documentation Française, 1994), pp. 
138-47, and V. Dubois & D. Georgakakis, ‘Sciences sociales et politiques culturelles: 
Entretiens avec Joffre Dumazedier et Augustin Girard’, Politix, 24, 4eme trimestre, 1993, pp. 
57-77 (pp. 67-77). Mark Schuster provides an overview of the DEP’s structure and activity in 
Informing Cultural Policy, pp. 59-73. 
6 Hennion, ‘Le grand écart’, pp. 3, 5. 
7 J.-L. Fabiani, A. Hennion, N. Herpin, P.-M. Menger, ‘Eléments de synthèse’, in O. Donnat 
& P. Tolila, Le(s) Public(s) de la culture: Politiques publiques et équipements culturels, vol. 2 
(on CD-ROM) (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2003), pp. 309-23 (p. 310); for an idea in 
English translation of this ‘coproduced framework’ see e.g. the interventions brought together 
in J. Ahearne (ed.), French Cultural Policy Debates: A Reader (London: Routledge, 2002). 
8 See Girard, ‘Un cas de partenariat entre administration et recherche scientifique’. and also 
Hennion, ‘Le grand écart…’. 
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Bourdieu, Certeau, Debray 
 
 The purpose of this study is not to propose an overview of that process as 
a whole. It proposes instead three case studies of prominent intellectual figures 
who have engaged in sustained fashion with strategic issues in cultural policy. 
As Tony Bennett has written of Raymond Williams, their work evinces ‘a real 
entanglement with those agendas of social, political and cultural reform which 
define the effective horizon of presently existing policy processes and 
concerns’.9 Certainly, these figures were not smoothly integrated into the 
mechanisms of cultural policy research, and were not simply experts in this or 
that sector of cultural policy implementation (indeed, Debray would disclaim 
any such specific expertise). Their work has spanned a wide spectrum of 
political and historical domains, and their cultural policy thinking is thus marked 
by a correspondingly broad range of reference. Nevertheless, these thinkers have 
also been involved to differing degrees in the day-to-day detail of the policy-
forming process. Pierre Bourdieu, who is best known for his hostility to undue 
State ‘interference’ in the cultural field (and whose very hostility sharpened his 
attention to the precise forms of State-driven cultural action) also collaborated 
on occasion with State apparatuses. Michel de Certeau was more or less 
constantly engaged between 1970 and 1985 in a series of cultural policy 
research and consultative projects centred largely around the research unit of the 
Ministry of Culture and the National Plan. Régis Debray has not collaborated in 
any sustained manner with the Ministry of Culture, but was a full-time advisor 
to President Mitterand over much of the 1980s. This experience, I suggest, 
sharpened his attention to an issue that has presented particular difficulties for 
cultural policy thinking, namely the relations between technological mutations 
and cultural-political programmes. 
 All three thinkers have developed comprehensive theories of cultural 
process with distinctive foci: Bourdieu’s ‘generative structuralism’ examines the 
formation of the ‘fields’ within which cultural institutions and works operate 
and take on meaning, and the ‘dispositions’ which cultural agents bring to their 
work; Certeau develops what one might call a cultural pragmatics that focuses 
on the often unpredictable re-employments to which users subject the cultural 
resources at their disposal; Debray explores the relations between cultural 
transmission and technological change. I shall look over this study not simply to 
juxtapose these perspectives, but to triangulate them so as to build up a broader 
framework for cultural policy thinking. 
 This triangular construction can also be linked to the stratified cluster of 
intellectual problematics and political challenges constituted by over four 
decades of cultural policy research in France. In order to demonstrate this, let 
me first quote two extended passages from Augustin Girard, looking back in the 
                                                 
9 Bennett, Culture: A Reformer’s Science,- p. 35. 
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mid-1990s over his three decades at the head of the research unit of the Ministry 
of Culture: 
 
 Above particular objectives, we must also articulate the general ends to 
be pursued […]. In France, the tendency has been to follow the doctrine 
of the ‘democratization of culture’, by homology with the democratization 
of education, or the doctrine of ‘cultural development’, by analogy with 
economic and social development. Now access to art and culture does not 
function like access to education, which is obligatory and necessarily 
universal. The cultural development both of the individual and society is 
not the object of great social demand, unlike for example the development 
of social benefits. These two ideologies of democratization and 
development, inherited from the Popular Front and the Resistance, 
through the intermediary of the popular education movements for the 
former and the 1960s belief in development for the latter, have been 
somewhat discredited by the experience of the last 30 years. Technology 
has changed people’s means of access to works, as well as artistic forms, 
has inextricably mixed up simple entertainment and culture, and has 
changed finally the scope and uses of leisure time. The end of the century 
is thus marked by a widespread jumbling of values and modes of practice 
that has shaken up established institutions and hierarchies as well as the 
forms of adhesion among the population that these once brought with 
them.10
 
And: 
 
The ideas advanced by the Ministry’s research unit in the 1960s […] have 
been shaken up by technology. Today, it is technology that directs the 
world, that guides weapons, that guides society through communications, 
and that constitutes the all-powerful force of businessmen. Now 
technology has changed a lot since 1960, since the creation of the 
Ministry.11
 
I would suggest that the triangulated structure of my study can be mapped on to 
the tripartite form of Girard’s retrospective assessment, which posits two broad 
doctrines of cultural policy at work in France (cultural democratization, cultural 
development) and one significant disruptive force (technology). Although Pierre 
Bourdieu is best known for his vigorous critique of Malraux’s original cultural 
democratization project, I will show how his final cultural policy position, when 
he is brought to proffer normative prescriptions, places him firmly in the 
                                                 
10 Girard, ‘Un cas de partenariat entre administration et recherche scientifique’  pp. 146-7. 
11 Girard, ‘Une dynamique pour l’avenir’, p. 89. 
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tradition of cultural democratization (he looks to make the ‘highest’ 
achievements of humanity effectively available to culturally dispossessed social 
groups). I will show how Michel de Certeau’s cultural policy reflection emerges 
in the context of the ‘cultural development’ debates of the 1960s and 1970s 
(‘cultural democracy’ would be a preferred term for many), whose guiding 
objective was to support and build up those cultures already to be found among 
the population. In a number of ways, his thinking recasts the terms of this 
doctrine and can thereby contribute to what Girard calls for in terms of a ‘new 
problematic of cultural development’.12 Finally, the persistent focus of Debray’s 
work (partly, no doubt, as a result of working through the very frustrations of his 
time at the Elysée) is the ways in which technology both resists and remodels 
cultural and political programmes. It is this sustained reflection on the efficacy 
of the technical as such within the political and cultural spheres that warrants his 
inclusion in this study. 
 A study such as this, focusing on substantial but individual bodies of 
work, perhaps runs the risk of presenting the thinkers in question as developing 
their reflection in heroic isolation. Certainly, the work of all three figures 
appears to me to be particularly innovative and probing. The remarks above, 
however, should indicate already how their work is to be inscribed into a more 
general but also nationally specific cultural-political context, and I will continue 
to refer to this broader context over the chapters that follow. Moreover, the 
reflection of these thinkers has been closely associated with particular schools or 
orientations of thought (the ‘critical sociology’ developed notably in Bourdieu’s 
journal Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, the extensive networks of 
Certeau’s ‘subterranean’ influence as charted in François Dosse’s monumental 
biography, the body of thought elaborated as part of a ‘team sport’ in Debray’s 
Cahiers de médiologie).13 While this second broad context falls largely outside 
the scope of my analyses, it is important to remain aware of it. More generally, 
the work of these thinkers might be productively placed as ‘moments’ in the 
process indicated above: the co-production, through conflict and collaboration, 
of a collectively elaborated critical cultural policy intelligence. 
                                                 
12 Girard, ‘Un cas de partenariat entre administration et recherche scientifique’, p. 147, and 
‘Une dynamique pour l’avenir’, p. 90. 
13 Bourdieu launched Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales in 1975; other key sites for 
the constitution of a Bourdieusian ‘school’ of sociology were the Centre de sociologie 
européenne (until 1968) and (from 1969) the Centre de sociologie de l’éducation et de la 
culture  at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales; on the less institutionally visible 
but nonetheless far-reaching associations and influence of Certeau (including his influence 
upon those in the Département des Etudes et de la Prospective such as Augustin Girard and 
Pierre Mayol), see François Dosse, Michel de Certeau: le marcheur blessé (Paris: La 
Découverte, 2002); the biennial Les Cahiers de médiologie (which study issues of technical 
mediation rather than media studies as conventionally understood) were published by 
Gallimard from 1996 until 2003, and subsequently by Fayard. 
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Chapter One. Thinking Against Malraux 
 
 
 André Malraux is commonly considered as the founding father of French 
cultural policy. He was appointed as France’s first ever Minister for Cultural 
Affairs in 1959, and was able to use his position as Minister over ten years to 
frame and implement a policy broadly congruent with a theory of art and 
aesthetics that he had developed over previous decades. The principal thrust of 
this policy is well-known: it looked to give people from all classes and regions 
access to the great works of culture (particularly French culture). The key 
vehicles for these projects were to be the Houses of Culture, designed to bring to 
the provinces examples of cultural excellence defined in opposition both to 
commercial mass culture and to all forms of ‘merely’ local and/or amateur 
activity. It is clear that this policy was also shaped by what one might call the 
will-to-existence of a new and precarious ministry, looking to define itself 
against the governmental bureaucracies responsible for education, leisure, and 
television, and against established templates for restricted governmental 
involvement in the ‘fine arts’.1  
 Malraux’s actions over the 1960s constituted the preeminent model of 
cultural policy. It was not, however, the only model. It imposed itself by 
sidelining, after an initial period of hesitation, the ‘popular education’ model 
embodied in many local associations and municipal associations across France 
(these were linked much more closely to local communities and amateur 
groups).2 There also developed over the 1960s at least two important critiques of 
Malraux’s policy. Indeed, these critiques have themselves become classic 
reference points in French cultural policy debates, justifying Philippe Urfalino’s 
notion of a ‘split foundation’ for French cultural policy, constituted both by 
Malraux’s founding policy and by these equally ‘foundational’ critiques. 
 Two of the thinkers addressed in the present study are closely associated 
with the crystallization of these two critiques. Pierre Bourdieu attacked the 
‘charismatic’ ideology of art at the heart of Malraux’s thinking, and argued 
instead for a ‘rational’ pedagogy of culture; Michel de Certeau gave cogent 
expression to certain inchoate demands and dissatisfactions associated with the 
                                                 
1 There are now many accounts of Malraux’s time in office: in English, see e.g. David 
Looseley, The Politics of Fun: Cultural Policy and Debate in Contemporary France (Oxford: 
Berg, 1995), pp. 33-48, and H. Lebovics, Mona Lisa’s Escort: André Malraux and the 
Reinvention of French Culture (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999); in 
French, see e.g. Girard, A. & Gentil, G. (ed.), Les Affaires culturelles au temps d’André 
Malraux (Paris: La Documentation française & Comité d’histoire du ministère de la Culture, 
1996) and P. Urfalino, L’Invention de la politique culturelle (Paris: La Documentation 
française, 1996), pp. 9-272. 
2 See Urfalino, L’Invention de la politique culturelle, pp. 101-59. 
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May 1968 protests, showing how the welter of ‘voices’ issuing from these 
events displaced the univocal and unidirectional notion of culture espoused by 
Malraux. Both writers were clearly thinking ‘against’ the dominant cultural 
policy model of the time, as represented most forcefully by Malraux. There is 
also a sense, however, in which their cultural policy reflection could 
dynamically ‘kick off’ against this model, as a swimmer might kick off from a 
rock in the sea. The model is formatively at work in their thought, even and 
especially as they react against it. By contrast, Régis Debray’s engagement with 
Malraux’s aesthetics and cultural policy thinking occurred well after Malraux’s 
period of office. He could, as it were, take these classic critiques of Malraux’s 
action for granted (though he also adds a critical perspective of his own), and 
was therefore at liberty to dwell on the admirable if erratic insights of Malraux. 
Indeed, I shall suggest how Malraux’s writings work to bring out the tensions in 
Debray’s own reflection, suggesting that Malraux’s thought retains a suggestive 
force, and should not be reduced to the status of a simple foil or inert 
‘foundation’ for subsequent cultural policy discourse. 
 
 
1.1  For a rational cultural policy (Bourdieu) 
 
 Brian Rigby has underlined the extent to which Bourdieu’s early writings 
on culture and education in the 1960s represented a response to a French 
tradition of cultural debate reaching back at least to 1936, and which had 
become particularly active with the official deployment of an explicit State 
cultural policy. Constituting an important pillar of that ‘split foundation’ evoked 
above, the critique articulated in these writings has become a classic reference 
point in French cultural policy debates.3 Its key targets were the ‘charismatic 
ideology of art’ (AA 90-1 [54]), according to which responsiveness to works of 
high culture was a matter of direct intuition, and the ‘ideology of cultural needs’ 
(AA 156 [106]), according to which individuals might hold within them an 
innate need for high cultural practice. Both these discourses tended to be linked 
to an ‘ideology of the gift’ according to which innately ‘gifted’ individuals 
might intuit with particular sensitivity the charism latent in a work of art (AA 17 
                                                 
3 The key books in question are: P. Bourdieu & J.-C. Passeron, Les Héritiers: les étudiants et 
la culture (Paris: Minuit, 1964), henceforth referred to as H; P. Bourdieu, L. Boltanski, R. 
Castel & J.-C. Chamboredon, Un art moyen: essai sur les usages sociaux de la photographie 
(Paris: Minuit, 1965), henceforth referred to as AM; P. Bourdieu & A. Darbel, L’Amour de 
l’art: les musées d’art européens et leur public (Paris: Minuit, 1969 [first ed. 1966]), 
henceforth referred to as AA. Useful analyses of these works integrating a cultural policy 
perspective can be found in Brian Rigby Popular Culture in Modern France: A Study of 
Cultural Discourse (London: Routlege, 1991), pp. 96-130; and Jeremy Lane, Pierre 
Bourdieu: A Critical Introduction (London: Pluto, 2000), pp. 51-7. 
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[4]). Bourdieu wanted to expose such representations as both sociologically 
naïve and politically ambiguous. He underlined how levels of high cultural 
practice and aspiration were overwhelmingly correlated with levels of formal 
education, which were themselves, of course, overwhelmingly correlated with 
social origins. Exploring the mechanisms responsible for these correlations, 
Bourdieu wanted to show how the apparently ‘direct’ intuition of a work of art 
was  actually mediated by a formal code whose practical mastery was instilled in 
certain individuals within their family milieu and through formal education. 
Only those subjects equipped (consciously or unconsciously) with such a code 
would feel a ‘need’ to invest in cultural practice. Bourdieu thereby looked to 
problematise all ‘direct’ modes of cultural action (AA 146 [99]) which looked, 
like the Houses of Culture, simply to place people in front of artworks. Such 
policies would be liable to benefit only those agents whose socio-educational 
history had prepared for such an encounter, while also reinforcing and seeming 
to justify the superior social status of such agents. 
 It would be fair to say that these arguments have become classic points of 
reference not just in France, but in wider international cultural policy debates. 
Rather than rehearse them again in full, I should like here to focus on some 
complexities in Bourdieu’s early work on culture that have hitherto received less 
attention. 
 Given the resolute hostility to State ‘interference’ in social science 
research agendas that became such a marked attribute of Bourdieu’s intellectual 
stance, it is interesting to note how his early work on culture developed in 
partnership with a governmental body. His research into museums and their 
visitors, culminating in The Love of Art, was commissioned by Augustin Girard, 
head of research at the Ministry for Cultural Affairs.4 He even published in 
advance a concise account of his findings, precisely in an endeavour to avoid 
delay and thereby overcome ‘one of the great obstacles to cooperation between 
researchers in the human sciences and those who commission investigations’.5 
One of the key objectives he professed in that account was to engage through his 
research in a ‘dialogue’ with those directly at grips with the issues in question 
(essentially museum directors), and he went so far as to propose an aid to 
cultural policy decision-making in the form of a ‘mathematical model enabling 
one to foresee what the public of museums will be in the hypothesis that such or 
such an action is undertaken on one or other of the determining factors’ (by no 
means an unreasonable description of what his research achieved).6 Curiously, 
                                                 
4 See Philippe Poirrier, ‘Présentation’, in La Naissance des politiques culturelles et les 
Rencontres d’Avignon 1964-1970 (Paris : Ministère de la culture et de la communication, 
Comité d’histoire, 1997), p. 31. 
5 P. Bourdieu, Le Musée et son public (Paris : Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Centre de 
Sociologie Européenne, Groupe de Sociologie de la Culture, 1964), p. 1. 
6 Ibid., pp. 4, 9. One should remember, of course, that the model is based on statistical 
probability. 
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however, despite Bourdieu’s evocation at the beginning of The Love of Art of 
the need for a veritable cinema-style sequence of ‘credits’ (AA 7 [vii]) to 
acknowlege all those who contributed to his research, the original sponsor of 
that research, the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, does not figure. This contrasts 
with Un art moyen, where a representative of the industrial firm Kodak, who 
sponsored the research, wrote the preface.7 Why might this objective 
collaboration with a governmental cultural policy research unit have become, 
deliberately or otherwise, effaced in Bourdieu’s writing? 
 Although Bourdieu’s theses would soon become massively influential in 
French cultural policy thought, they were not immediately digestible by those in 
positions of responsibility. Philippe Poirrier notes that when a summary of his 
research was circulated in 1965 at a meeting in Avignon organized by Jean 
Vilar, bringing together a number of leading actors in the cultural policy field, it 
does not seem to have sollicited a great deal of response.8 This is not really 
surprising. On a number of counts, Bourdieu’s research had led him in an 
opposite direction to that which was then giving a newly constituted cultural 
policy its momentum. He had come to see ritually evoked ‘direct’ modes of 
cultural action (free entry, extended opening hours, improved physical 
accessibility) as an ‘alibi’ (AA 145-6 [98]) for more effectively democratic 
measures. Survey results showed the new cultural policy’s flagship institutions, 
the Houses of Culture, to be functioning in precisely the same way, and catering 
to the same audiences, as the traditional panoply of existing fine arts institutions 
(AA 149-50 [101-2]). He saw existing cultural policy as a whole as at best 
‘palliating’ (superficially alleviating, but actually disguising) deep-rooted 
cultural inequalities (AA 151[102]). Finally, he considered that the only 
institutions that could really address these inequalities, by inculcating the skills 
and mindset required to engage voluntarily in high cultural practice, were 
schools (AA 154 [105]). This was at a time when the newly founded Ministry for 
Cultural Affairs in France had just secured a fragile autonomy with regard to the 
Ministry for Education, and did not want to be sucked back into its orbit. The 
architects of State cultural policy did not really register Bourdieu’s findings, for 
it was not in their interest to do so. At the same time, one can surmise that this 
instance of failed communication would induce Bourdieu to mark more 
insistently his distance with regard to the State. 
                                                 
7 AM 9-10 [not included in English translation]. In Libre-échange,  Bourdieu states that the 
sums involved were ‘derisory’, that he was interested above all in certain data that he could 
obtain from Kodak, and that this experience helped to alert him to the need to defend the 
autonomy of intellectual research against its very sponsors (P. Bourdieu and H. Haacke, 
Libre-échange (Paris: Seuil/Les presses du réel, 1994), p. 24 [p. 15]). 
8 Poirrier, ‘Présentation’, pp. 31-2. The text in question was based on a paper given by 
Bourdieu to a conference in Arras in 1965, which can be found in English in J. Ahearne (ed.), 
French Cultural Policy Debates: A Reader (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 62-9. 
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 Bourdieu’s writings on culture and education in the 1960s – particularly 
his study of university students’ attitudes to culture, Les Héritiers – have been 
seen as a prime influence in the wave of anti-State and anti-institutional protest 
that surged up in France in May 1968. It is not clear, however, that this influence 
was based entirely on a controlled understanding of Bourdieu’s books. For his 
work over this period was not simply ‘against’ the State, or anti-institutional - it 
was a critique of the State and its institutions as they then functioned. Les 
Héritiers showed how the very autonomy of higher education establishments  
allowed them to deploy evaluative criteria and hierarchies that acted objectively 
(not necessarily consciously) as social filters,  organising bands of ‘ability’ that 
correlated relentlessly with social class. All demands for increased autonomy, 
Bourdieu argued at this time, would only reinforce this process, allowing 
discriminatory factors to operate all the more freely (H 43-4 [27]).9 Clearly, the 
only force that could check this autonomy would be explicit political 
intervention on the part of the State. Similarly, Bourdieu argued that the 
implacable laws of cultural diffusion, by which cultural capital accrues most 
readily to those endowed already with cultural capital, operated even more 
relentlessly in the domain of non-academic or extra-curricular ‘free culture’ (la 
culture libre) than at school (AA 107 [68]), insofar as matters not covered at 
school (avant-garde music or painting, for example) were left to depend largely 
on the level of different families’ cultural capital. Again, by implication, only 
State-sponsored institutional reform could hope to exert any persistent effect on 
this state of affairs. Hence, in a collective document entitled ‘Suggestions for a 
policy of democratization’ published in the wake of 1968 by Bourdieu’s Centre 
for European Sociology, we read that ‘any democratic transformation supposes 
[…] that, from nursery school upwards, institutionalised mechanisms for action 
are put in place that are capable of  thwarting social mechanisms.’10
 These institutional mechanisms as Bourdieu conceived them revolved 
around the normative ideal of a ‘rational pedagogy’ in cultural matters. Jeremy 
Lane has shown how Bourdieu took over and adapted this notion from Emile 
Durkheim: 
 
Just as at the turn of the century Durkheim had argued for an education 
based on the narrow, partial interests of one revealed religion to be 
replaced with an educational system based on purely ‘rational’, hence 
‘universal’ principles, so sixty years later Bourdieu demanded  that the 
                                                 
9 The term 'autonomy' is not used here in the English translation. 
10 ‘Quelques Indications pour une politique de démocratisation’, Dossier no 1 du Centre de 
sociologie européenne, 6 rue de Tournon, Paris, included in P. Bourdieu, Interventions, 1961-
2001 : Science sociale et action politique, ed. Poupeau, F. & Discepolo, T. (Marseille: Agone, 
2000), pp. 69-72 (p. 69). This document was part of a series of collectively written 
thematically based documents issued by the Centre for European Sociology in the aftermath 
of May 1968 (see Interventions, p. 52). 
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teaching of art appreciation be ‘secularised’, organised along ‘rational’ 
principles rather than being left to the vagaries of social background or 
class determined habitus.11
 
Bourdieu was looking to institute a break with regard to traditional quasi-
religious approaches to culture. Malraux himself famously saw high culture as a 
substitute or successor for religion, supplying existential meaning for human life 
in a world dominated by the scientific viewpoint, and likened his Houses of 
Culture to secular ‘cathedrals’ for a godless age. For Bourdieu, the intuitive, 
affective ‘communion’ with the work of art celebrated by Malraux presupposed 
a practical mastery of the ‘codes’ according to which high culture operated 
(particularly when it came to more formally experimental work). For those who 
had not had the fortune to learn these codes by family immersion, school was 
the only recourse. It alone could carry out the repeated exercises and inculcation 
required to produce in an unprepared subject apparently instinctively appropriate 
responses to art. It alone could ‘develop in all members of society, without 
distinction, an aptitude for what are commonly considered the most noble 
cultural practices’ (AA 154 [105]). 
 Bourdieu’s rationalism in this respect certainly raises questions. Some of 
these questions will be addressed later in this study – for example what he would 
later see as his rather ‘intellectualist’ approach to high culture as constituting 
primarily an object to be deciphered, or the strictly segregative relation he 
posited between high culture and other cultural codes.12 For the moment, I want 
to consider simply the type of rationality in question, and its relationship to 
policy norms. For if we follow the quotation above, whereby the professed goal 
is to inculcate universally an ‘aptitude for those cultural practices commonly 
considered as the most noble’, it appears as a form of instrumental rationality.  It 
does not deliberate in open-ended fashion over ends and values. As Bourdieu 
conceives it in Les Héritiers, it brackets the question of what educational and 
cultural ends – or cultural contents - would best suit the interests of 
disadvantaged classes (H 99 [66]). Instead it  assumes a predefined content as 
given – broadly, the prevailing definition of  ‘legitimate’ culture – and 
deliberates on the most efficacious means for instilling this across a population. 
Certainly, there are moments where Bourdieu evokes the ‘arbitrary’ content of 
legitimate culture (we will see in chapter two how this would for a while 
become a central component of his cultural analysis). Over the 1960s, however, 
Bourdieu’s most consistent move is to challenge radically the style and methods 
                                                 
11 Lane, Pierre Bourdieu,  p. 56. 
12 On the first point, see Bourdieu, Les Règles de l’art: Genèse et structure du champ 
littéraire (Paris : Seuil, 1992), p. 431 [p. 313]. 
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of Malrucian cultural action, but not explicitly to question its contents or 
avowed ends – and certainly not to propose alternative ends.13
 This is not to say that the notion of an educational and cultural policy 
conveying different cultural contents in the pursuit of different ends did not 
figure in his thought. Alternative models do emerge, but it is clear that Bourdieu 
was not happy with them. It might seem that a ‘rational’ pedagogy should steer 
clear altogether of the mystificatory waters of culture, and offer disadvantaged 
pupils specialist, practical training corresponding to what they see as being in 
their own interest. Bourdieu argued forcefully that such a development would 
surrender the domain of culture even more totally to those unchecked laws of 
cultural diffusion evoked above (H 86-7 [154 n.2]) – and however arbitrary one 
might deem its content to be, he quite clearly saw culture as fulfilling  a function 
of social discrimination at the expense of the culturally dispossessed. A purely 
‘practical’ education would, then, disarm the culturally dispossessed even more 
thoroughly, further dispossessing them even of the consciousness of their 
dispossession. The other obvious alternative policy orientation of replacing the 
cultural content taught in school by the ‘parallel cultures’ to be found in 
disadvantaged classes was equally firmly rejected by Bourdieu (H 110 [72]). 
Bourdieu saw this option as based on a ‘populist illusion’ which celebrated  
cultures that owed many of their characteristics to the fact that they emerged 
from conditions of domination and exploitation. To ratify in this way the 
resulting cultures was to ratify also particular lacunae and deficiencies for which 
those conditions were responsible. 
 If Bourdieu over this period tended to ‘bracket’ the question of cultural 
ends, and intermittently to demonstrate an ambivalent attitude to legitimate 
cultural content, this was perhaps not simply the result of scientific neutrality, or 
even of a contradiction in his thought. He was instead, as I shall look to show in 
chapter two, in the process of building up a particularly complex and nuanced 
(multifunctional) view of the social existence of that legitimate culture. There 
are in these early writings dispersed considerations referring implicitly to 
questions of cultural content and finality. He argued notably that ‘it is not 
sufficient to observe that academic culture is a class culture, for to proceed as if 
it were only a class culture is to help it remain so’.14 In other words, ongoing 
discernment is required to perceive those elements of a culture that might satisfy 
more universal interests and desires. In Un art moyen, his study of the uses of 
photography, Bourdieu pinpointed the obverse fallacy to which middle classes 
were particularly prone of rejecting ‘without discernment’ all forms of popular 
aesthetics and embracing anything that might distinguish them from such an 
                                                 
13 See also Lane’s discussion of what he describes as ‘an inconsistency at the heart of The 
Love of Art, a contradiction between the radicalism of Bourdieu’s critique of the ‘arbitrary’ 
nature of legitimate culture and the reformism, even republicanism, of his proposals for 
change’ (Lane, Pierre Bourdieu, p. 57). 
14 H 110 [72 – trans. mod.]. 
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aesthetics (AM 103-4 [70-1]). Likewise, he noted that ‘photography offers a 
privileged opportunity to observe the logic of the search for difference for 
difference’s sake, or, to put it another way, of the snobbery that experiences 
cultural practices not in themselves and for themselves but as a form of one’s 
relation with the groups that pursue them’ (AM 73-4).15 The strong implication 
here was that there were uses of culture worth pursuing for their own sakes -  the 
challenge being, whether for individuals or architects of policy, to discern these 
in the thick of less edifying mechanisms, compulsions and desires. 
 Such positive indications (one can scarcely call them prescriptions) are 
rare in these writings. A ‘rational pedagogy’, Bourdieu wrote, was ‘still to be 
invented’ (H 111 [73]). The traditional conceptions of educational and cultural 
action were represented as both inefficient and socially discriminatory, but the 
‘content’ they conveyed could not be discarded ‘without discernment’. The 
working-class experience of culture could not be embraced as a normative ideal, 
but neither could it be disregarded. Indeed, in contrast to the ‘enchanted’ 
experience of culture (as well as the pretensions) characterizing those who have 
come to feel at home in it, Bourdieu came to think as he analysed the interviews 
and questionnaires from his survey of museum visitors that ‘the more culturally 
disinherited see, and express more often than the others, what seems to the 
observer to be the objective truth of the cultivated experience’ (AA 96 [59]). 
This had nothing to do with the notion of ‘cultural innocence’, according to 
which the untutored eye might respond with fresh vigour to the riches of art. On 
the contrary, for Bourdieu, the very disarray which these visitors described, 
often with considerable acuity, pointed to the essentially ‘mediated’ nature of 
cultural experience. As a worker from Lille put it, ‘Yes, love at first sight does 
exist, but for that you've got to have read stuff before, especially for modern 
painting’ (AA 91 [55]). The first step in the construction of a rational cultural 
action, one might conclude, would be to ratify such formulations, that is, to 
recognise in them the truth of the (high) cultural process. In the light of this, one 
can understand the policy suggestions made by Bourdieu as falling into two 
broad categories. On the one hand cultural institutions such as museums had to 
make it clear that people had a ‘right to be uninformed’ (AA 85 [49]). Their 
layout and design had to be ‘humanised’ so that people unfamiliar with the 
world of art would not feel out of place:16 Bourdieu suggested turning them into 
something resembling more a ‘garden’ than a church, with comfortable chairs, 
approachable guides, libraries, bars, soft music so visitors could talk to each 
other without being overheard, art teachers, etc. (AA 140-1 [95]). On the other 
hand, the priority for Bourdieu was for schools to address the underlying causes 
of that ignorance, and to instill in all pupils a basic mastery of the codes 
governing high culture. The slow process of equipping subjects with the 
                                                 
15 This passage does not figure in the adaptation on which the English translation is based. 
16 Le Musée et son public, pp. 20, 22. 
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requisite schemes of perception might be derided as mechanical by adherents of 
charismatic notions of art, but was infinitely preferable to the unhappy 
experience, described by another worker, of moving through cultural institutions 
as if through a ‘fog’ (AA 87 [52 – trans. mod.]). 
 While Bourdieu’s research had been commissioned by the Ministry of 
Culture, he showed himself by the time of its formal writing up in L’Amour de 
l’art to be outrightly critical of that Ministry’s policy, not only effacing any 
‘debt’ to the Ministry, but also treating in a directly satirical manner the 
Ministry’s head, André Malraux. Whereas Malraux saw culture as a means of 
‘humanising the world’, Bourdieu saw the current institutional deployment of 
that culture as itself in need of ‘humanisation’. For while claiming to give all 
citizens access to humanity’s heritage – Malraux’s ‘inheritance of the nobility of 
the world’ – it actually served to instill in many of those citizens only a sense of 
inferiority, the suspicion that, unable to respond to these works, they were 
perhaps not fully human.17 Insofar as it allowed ‘cultured people [to] believe in 
the existence of barbarism and persuade the barbarians within of their own 
barbarity’, ‘the sacralisation of culture and art, that “currency of the absolute” 
[monnaie de l’absolu] worshipped by a society enslaved to the absolute of 
currency, fulfils a vital function by contributing to the consecration of the social 
order’ (AA 165 [111- trans. mod.]). As Lane notes, the target of this barb would 
have been fairly clear to contemporary readers. The third volume of Malraux’s 
Essais de psychologie de l’art (1948-50) is entitled La Monnaie de l’absolu, and 
Bourdieu was thereby attacking not just contemporary policy, but also the 
aesthetic theories behind that policy.18
 Bourdieu had, as it were, ‘seceded’ from existing governmental 
institutions (though the condition of this ‘secession’ was, of course, a State-
funded research position). Whereas the stance adopted in the ‘pre-report’ Le 
Musée et son public had been one of critical cooperation, making suggestions 
for an ‘overall policy of cultural democratization’,19 he had become by the time 
of The Love of Art much more suspicious of the very principles behind the new 
                                                 
17 For the two preceding quotations from Malraux, see Bourdieu’s reference in La Distinction: 
Critique sociale du jugement (Paris : Minuit, 1979), p. 574 [599 n.19], and A. Malraux, 
‘Speech given on the occasion of the inauguration of the House of Culture at Amiens on 19 
March 1966’, in Ahearne (ed.), French Cultural Policy Debates, pp. 55-61 (p. 58). 
18 Interestingly, the desire to efface the relations between Bourdieu’s work and the Ministry 
seems to have been mutual. Raymonde Moulin notes how the head of the new (and still 
fragile) research unit at the Ministry, Augustin Girard, who had commissioned the research, 
was temporarily forced to ‘hide’ this work from administrators at the Ministry (see R. Moulin, 
‘Augustin Girard, acteur privilégié de la recherche sur la culture et les arts’, in Trente ans 
d’études au service de la vie culturelle, Table ronde organisée à l’occasion du départ à la 
retraite d’Augustin Girard, chef du Département des études et de la prospective du ministère 
de la culture de 1963 à 1993 (Paris: Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication, 1993), 
pp. 68-71 (p. 69)). 
19 Le Musée et son public, p. 23. 
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cultural policy. He overtly wondered what the real function of such inefficacious 
measures might be as long as everything had not been done to oblige the school 
system to do what it alone could properly do – to instil in people the capacity 
and durable disposition to engage in cultural practices (AA 154 [105]). Clearly, 
he considered that their function was largely mystificatory, serving to legitimate 
the existing social order along the lines indicated above. The most effective 
measure conceivable at the time, he argued, on the basis of his statistics, would 
have been to extend levels of schooling for the least educated (AA 155 [106]).20 
In this perspective, the very notion of a cultural policy as a separate outgrowth 
from educational policy seemed to be put in question. Thus, in the collective 
pamphlet ‘Suggestions for a Policy of Democratization’ issued by Bourdieu’s 
research centre in the aftermath of May 1968, we see that the main concern 
expressed for cultural policy institutions was to bring them into the gravitational 
pull of the school system: 
 
Everything must be done to bridge the gap between the marginal 
institutions of adult education or cultural diffusion (Houses of Culture, 
cultural animation, etc.) and the education system. The anti-educational 
ideology to be found among most of those responsible for running these 
organisations can only be combatted if their mode of recruitment is 
profoundly changed and if teachers are closely associated at all levels 
with these enterprises.21
 
We will see in chapter two how Bourdieu’s policy reports of the 1980s would 
articulate a rather less one-sided view of the ideal relations between different 
cultural and educational institutions. In the formulation above, however, one is 
struck by the extent to which the ‘gap-bridging’ exercise evoked might amount 
to a hostile takeover of all cultural institutions by, so to speak, an educational 
ideology. To steal a coinage that Bourdieu would make in a rather different 
context, one wonders whether his legitimate and necessary campaign for a 
rational pedagogy in cultural matters concealed also a more obscurely 
‘pedagogocratic’ ambition.22
 With regard to this insistently ‘pedagogocratic’ agenda for cultural policy, 
one might at this point raise two queries. Firstly, one of the examples Bourdieu 
cites in support of his case seems interestingly double-edged. He wants to 
underline how momentary encounters with cultural artefacts will not lead to a 
long-term engagement in the requisite practices if they are not supported by a 
                                                 
20  Legislation raising the school-leaving age from 14 to 16 had been introduced in France in 
1959, and was due to take effect in 1967. 
21 ‘Quelques indications pour une politique de démocratisation’, p. 72.  
22 The adjective ‘pedagogocratic’ is coined, to the best of my knowledge, in P. Bourdieu & J.-
C. Passeron, La Reproduction: éléments pour une théorie du système d’enseignement (Paris : 
Minuit, 1970), p. 178 [p. 148]. 
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previously instilled durable disposition (a secondary ‘habitus’ inculcated by 
school). Thus high cultural exhibitions taken to factories had little subsequent 
effects (AA 151 [103]) . He also recounts, however, how the first primary school 
teachers in Kabylia at the end of the nineteenth century would complain because 
their pupils seemed to ‘forget’ everything they had learnt in school as soon as 
they left (AA 153-4 [104]). Once they were back with their families and 
communities, they had no opportunity to ‘actualise’ what they had learnt, and 
thus to ‘incorporate’ it (make it part of their bodily and cerebral disposition) in a 
durable way. In other words, school by itself is not enough to create a secondary 
habitus. In a cultural policy perspective, it no doubt is, as Bourdieu argues, the 
necessary condition for the success of all other cultural policy institutions (AA 
155 [106]). But at the same time, as the example from Kabylia suggests, an 
existing network of such institutions constitutes the necessary condition for the 
durable success of the cultural education provided in school – to ensure that it 
does not simply fall away when pupils leave school. And it is not clear, as we 
shall see in chapter two, that this network will flourish to full effect if it is 
controlled monopolistically by ‘pedagogocratic’ interests. 
 Secondly, the quotation above is informed no doubt by Bourdieu’s 
suspicions of the ‘spontaneity’ celebrated over the May 1968 events. His 
subsequent analyses would show how those with greater levels of cultural 
capital were more likely spontaneously to speak up – and to do so, moreover, in 
manners that, while partaking in the May 1968 discourse of social generosity, 
were actually congruent with their own objective interests (though the laying 
bare of the latter does not amount, in Bourdieu’s thinking, to a simple 
denunciation of the former).23 Equally, we have seen his reservations with 
regard to unqualified celebrations of the spontaneity of dominated forms of 
culture. Nevertheless, Bourdieu in subsequent writings would express also his 
interest and, to a degree, his endorsement of the ‘anti-institutional’ spirit of the 
May events, the truth of their ‘laughter’, and the ‘extraordinary social 
experimentation’ that, for a few weeks, seemed to put everything in question and 
suspend all forms of routine belief.24 He would express his particular interest in 
those kinds of speaking up and speaking out that that bring back ‘the return of 
the socially repressed’.25 It is not clear, however, that the style of resolutely 
‘rational’ (or more precisely, academic) cultural policy thought pursued by 
Bourdieu over the 1960s could open a space for such a return of the repressed. 
For a critique that allows us to understand how May’s explosion of previously 
                                                 
23 For an analysis along these lines of the universe of French higher education, see P. 
Bourdieu, Homo Academicus (Paris: Minuit, 1984). 
24 From the column ‘Son opinion aujourd’hui’ in Lire, May 1983, included in Interventions, p. 
62. 
25 Pierre Bourdieu & Pierre Viansson-Ponté, ‘Un entretien avec Pierre Bourdieu, II, La 
culture, pour qui et pourquoi?’, Le Monde, 12 October 1977, p. 2 (also available at 
Interventions, p. 107). 
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suppressed speech shattered the Malrucian model of cultural policy (and at least 
challenged Bourdieu’s frames of reference), we must turn to Michel de 
Certeau’s first sustained engagement with cultural policy questions. 
 
 
1.2  Culture and voice (Certeau) 
 
 La Prise de parole [‘The Capture of Speech’], Certeau’s analysis of the 
May 1968 events, was originally subtitled ‘Pour une nouvelle culture’ [‘For a 
New Culture’]. In the text, Certeau argues that the ‘displacement’ wrought by 
these events was driven in the first place less by a ‘conception’ than by a new 
‘experience’ of culture.26 We might represent the displacement at work in his 
text as a formal inversion of the classical scheme according to which the 
experience of culture connotes primarily an encounter with the enduring 
(written) traces of human thought and imagination, necessarily mediated by 
contemporary interlocution of some kind. The events accentuate in Certeau’s 
thought a kind of switch, such that the experience of culture is represented 
primarily as an interlocutory process that is nonetheless necessarily mediated by 
writings of one sort or another.27
 Let me quote a passage that suggests the quality of this experience. 
Certainly, it is in this formulation somewhat set off from the directly political 
demands issuing from the events. However, the temporary social breakdown 
occasioned by the latter created the conditions in which the ‘utopian’ experience 
evoked by Certeau could occur: 
 
It is a fact that we can attest to for having seen and been participants: a 
throng became poetic… Everyone finally began to talk: about essential 
things, about society, about happiness, about knowledge, about art, about 
politics. A permanent drone of speech [une palabre permanente] spread 
like fire, an immense therapeutic nourished on what it delivered, 
contagious with every prescription and every diagnosis. It gave everyone 
access to … these debates that assailed both professional barriers and 
those of social milieus. It changed spectators into actors. (PP 42-3 [13]) 
 
                                                 
26 See Michel de Certeau, La Prise de parole et autres écrits politiques, ed. Luce Giard (Paris: 
Seuil, 1994)  (hereafter in this chapter PP), p. 43 [p. 13]. Certeau's analysis was first 
published as a book in October 1968  (La Prise de parole. Pour une nouvelle culture (Paris: 
Desclée De Brouwer, 1968)). 
27 This positing of oral exchange as a fundamental dimension of cultural experience can be 
seen in Certeau’s earlier pedagogical reflection (see e.g. M. de Certeau, ‘L’Ecole chrétienne 
dans la pastorale de l’église’, in Inter-collèges, 1, October 1965, pp. 19-34 (p. 32)). 
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This new experience need not in itself have modified a basic conception of 
culture. Culture was always supposed to constitute the frames of reference that 
would guide the subject’s response to such ‘essential’ matters – even if that 
suject were required, so to speak, to mortify himself so that those frames of 
reference could be preserved intact. Indeed, a characteristically delphic utterance 
by André Malraux provides an illuminating point of comparison. Marc Fumaroli 
argues that Malraux entertained an essentially visual conception of the cultural 
domain in which images (of universal culture) pitched battle against images (of 
mass culture) for the soul of humankind: thus the mute, unmediated, supposedly 
intuitive encounter between an uneducated peasant and a great painting 
provided, for Malraux, a kind of archetypal representation of direct ‘cultural 
action’.28 However, we can see in the following quotation how, for Malraux, the 
significance of culture also derived from a peculiar kind of interlocutory process 
(albeit a more unidirectional, more solitary, and more uncanny one than that 
envisaged above by Certeau): ‘If the word “culture” has a meaning, it is what 
responds to the face which a human being sees in the mirror when he 
contemplates the prospect of his death mask. Culture is what responds to man 
when he asks himself what he is doing on the earth.’29 There is, I think, more to 
such pronouncements than Malraux’s political detractors in 1968 would have 
allowed. There are obvious differences with regard to the resolutely social 
experience evoked by Certeau. Yet both writers seem to view culture as a kind 
of utterance (‘speech’, a ‘response’) that engages the meaning of an existence. 
Moreover, for neither writer does this utterance belong, strictly speaking, to a 
discernible speaker – it emerges as the other, inside or outside the self. The 
experience described by Certeau corresponds less to a ‘capture’ than to a 
‘liberation’ of speech, which emerges, as it were, into the open in such a way as 
to reorganize his vision of cultural process: ‘Something happened to us. 
Something began to stir in us. Emerging from who knows where, suddenly 
filling the streets and the factories, circulating among us, becoming ours but no 
longer being the muffled noise of our solitude, voices that had never been heard 
began to change us. At least that was what we felt.’ (PP 41 [11-12]). Those 
events foregrounded for Certeau the crucial ‘coefficient’ of utterance as such 
(PP 52 [21]), initially in a new experience of culture, but in due course also 
opening out onto a reconceptualisation of culture.30
                                                 
28 See Marc Fumaroli, L’Etat culturel: Une religion moderne (Paris : Fallois, 1992). 
29 André Malraux, ‘Discours prononcé à l’occasion de l’inauguration de la Maison de la 
Culture d’Amiens le 19 mars 1966’, in La Politique, la culture (Paris : Gallimard, 1996), p. 
323 ; in translation as ‘Speech given on the Occasion of the Inauguration of the House of 
Culture at Amiens on 19 March 1966’, in Ahearne, French Cultural Policy Debates, pp. 55-
61 (p. 57). 
30 For a subtle and properly uncanny analysis of the relations between ‘captured’ and 
‘liberated’ speech, compare Certeau’s study of a case of diabolic possession over the 1630s in 
M. de Certeau, La Possession de Loudun (Paris: Gallimard, 1970). 
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 How might the dynamics of utterance lead to such a reconceptualisation? 
To begin with, the act of taking hold of speech (la prise de parole) can modify, 
as it were, the weight and stakes of words otherwise prone to ‘float’ unattached 
in the middle distance. It brings more insistently into focus certain fundamental 
features of language now familiar to students of the linguistics of utterance: the 
place of speaker and listener(s); the ‘contract’ between them; the ‘here and now’ 
of speaking; the act of ‘appropriating’ a preexisting linguistic system, of making 
it signify in terms of the present situtation and interlocutory relationship.31 These 
features are not, of course, foreign to the demands of writing – it is simply that 
the movement of decontextualization that constitutes the force of writing is 
liable to occult them.32 A specifically oral exchange brings the speaker up more 
abruptly against the sense his or her speech can (or cannot) confer upon a given 
situation. It brings the cultural models informing that speech up against the 
social and political (micro-)structures with which they putatively engage. I want 
to suggest that this experience, cast into relief by the events of May 1968, raked 
through the entire field of culture and transformed for Certeau the key vectors of 
its development. 
 A secondhand anecdote recounted by Certeau gives a sense of what is at 
issue – though one should note that his text does not endorse the absolute value 
of unmediated spontaneity that, on the face of it, the anecdote seems to convey:  
 
A young elevator operator from the Samaritaine department store who 
was being interviewed by a journalist responded: ‘I really don’t know 
what to say, I’m not cultured [je n’ai pas de culture].’ A comrade who 
was on strike interrupted her: ‘Don’t say that! Knowledge is finished. 
Today, culture, well, it’s all in what we say!’33
  
One should not suppose that the striking comrade, impetuous and eager to 
interrupt, is simply speaking for Certeau. An attentive reading of his text shows 
that, for him, the events of May 1968 signified anything but the consignment of 
knowledge as such to the dustbin of history. There are, for example, things one 
needs to know if one is to speak effectively in a given situation. It may be that 
the young elevator operator knew better than her comrade what she wanted 
                                                 
31 See, for example, Emile Benveniste, ‘Man and Language’, in Problems in General 
Linguistics, trans. M. Meek (Miami: University of Miami Press, 1971 [1966]), pp. 193-246. 
On the fundamental role that ‘utterance’ (énonciation) would assume as a category in 
Certeau’s thought, see e.g. Louis Marin, ‘L’aventure sémiotique, le tombeau mystique’, in  L. 
Giard (ed.), Michel de Certeau (Paris: Centre Georges Pompidou, 1987), pp. 207-23, esp. 
207-14. 
32 Cf. Walter Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (London: 
Routledge, 1988 [1982]), pp. 132-3 and 176-7. 
33 PP 37 [9 – trans. mod.]. Certeau’s source for this anecdote was Philippe Labro, Ce n’est 
qu’un début (Paris: Ed. premières, 1968). 
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before she was ready to speak. Speech, moreover, is not necessarily an end in 
itself, but refers (more insistently, in Walter Ong’s view, than does writing)34 to 
situations that are more than verbal and that it may transform. What this 
anecdote does illustrate, however, as it figures in Certeau’s writing, is the 
emergence of a dominant axis of reflection that would shape his subsequent 
cultural policy thinking. Culture is thus conceived in the first instance as a 
function of an interlocutory process, which refers in turn to more than just 
culture. Hence his prime cultural policy preoccupation will be not the supports 
(books, monuments) that encode and preserve culture (necessary as these are), 
but rather the disparate groups of speaking subjects who appropriate and 
incorporate its frames of reference. It is at this level that the key question 
becomes for Certeau, in the language of the time, not what to create, but rather 
how subjects might ‘create themselves’.35
 While the ways in which a culture was ‘voiced’ transformed the way in 
which in was experienced, it was above all the plurality of those voicings that 
would bring Certeau to ‘reconceptualise’ culture. He argues that cultural process 
had traditionally always been understood in terms of an ‘elite-mass’ model. Elite 
groups had always been seen as the essential motor of cultural change – whether 
that change was understood in terms of a hegemonic programme of alienation, a 
‘trickle-down’ of enlightenment, or campaigns of popular liberation in which the 
masses were mobilised by avant-garde revolutionary cells. Malraux’s cultural 
policy was clearly deployed in terms of such a model, aspiring as it did to 
monopolize initiative by bringing peremptorily defined forms of culture to a 
provincial ‘desert’. Certeau notes how commentators on May 1968 also sought 
to employ this fundamental model. Whether hostile or sympathetic to the events, 
the tendency was for these commentators to posit elite ‘groupuscules’ of 
activists behind the masses that would otherwise have remained passive. For 
Certeau, these interpretations were unconvincing. The events invalidated this 
fundamental model, and ‘insofar as the event resists being sifted through this 
conceptual grid, it obliges us to revise that grid and thus works its way into our 
representation of the real by reorganising it.’36 For as Certeau had perceived the 
                                                 
34 See Ong, Orality and Literacy, pp. 176-7. 
35 See Certeau PP 86 [48]. One could compare this formulation with, for example, Raoul 
Vaneigem’s invocation of ‘creativity’ in his then influential Traité de savoir-vivre à l’usage 
des jeunes générations (Paris: Gallimard, 1992 [1967]), esp. pp. 245-62; and The Revolution 
of Everyday Life, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (London: Rebel Press/Left Bank Books, 
1993), pp. 190-203; or, in a rather different perspective, the argument of Bourdieu and 
Passeron that the prime objective of university students should be to ‘create themselves’ (se 
créer) as agents fit to carry out certain activities and produce certain objects (in Les Héritiers, 
pp. 84-5). 
36 ‘L’architecture sociale du savoir’, in M. de Certeau, La Culture au pluriel (Paris: Seuil, 
1993 [1974]), pp. 141-64 (p. 143), referred to hereafter as CP [pp. 83-100 (p. 85) - trans. 
mod.]. This chapter originally figured as chapter 4 of La Prise de parole  in the first 1968 
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events, imagination and initiative had not been restricted to a select few centres 
of decision-making, rippling out to crowds of people reducible to mere numbers. 
Instead, these numbers ‘began to live, to destroy, individual by individual, the 
myth of their abstract inertia’.37 The events, whatever their political efficacy, 
had given ephemeral but dazzling visibility to an anonymous and dispersed 
creative potential that was simply unrepresented in prevailing political and 
conceptual models. The challenge articulated by Certeau was to develop the 
‘practical and theoretical consequences’ of this ‘request for a democratic 
creativity, or for the active participation of all in common representations’.38 We 
will see in chapter three how his cultural policy thinking addressed this 
challenge.  
 
 
1.3  Art: an impossible religion (Debray) 
 
‘The bombast of the minister for Cults has been sufficiently 
derided, along with his crusading tones. Let us begin by celebrating 
what there is in him to admire.’39
 
 We have seen how the policy thinking of Malraux provides a foil against 
which both Bourdieu and Certeau develop their own virtual cultural policy 
frameworks. Indeed, the critiques they produced would paradoxically combine 
with the founding project of Malraux to produce what Philippe Urfalino has 
called the ‘split foundation’ of cultural policy discourse in France: subsequent 
debate would  adopt as recurrent references both Malraux’s ‘invention’ of 
cultural policy and, so to speak, its foundational critiques. By the 1990s, a 
thinker like Régis Debray could take for granted that Malraux’s policy thinking 
(symbolised essentially by the Houses of Culture) would be read through the 
prism of such critiques. What, by contrast, could he find in Malraux to admire? 
 Bourdieu and Certeau take as their principal object Malraux’s thinking 
insofar as it was translated into a ‘doctrine’ for policy action by the principal 
agents of his ministry.40 Debray, by contrast, is clearly interested in the aesthetic 
                                                                                                                                                        
edition of that book, but was removed from the posthumous edition to avoid reduplication 
with La Culture au pluriel. 
37 L’Archibras, 4, special edition, ‘Le surréalisme le 18 juin 68’, p. 2, quoted at CP 150 [90]. 
38 CP 141 [83 – trans. mod.]. 
39 R. Debray, Vie et mort de l’image. Une histoire du regard en Occident (Paris: Gallimard, 
1992), p. 268 (henceforth referred to as VMI ). 
40 On the transition from a ‘philosophy of the aesthetic State’ as found in the 1960s writings 
of Malraux and Gaëtan Picon, his close collaborator, to the formulation of a policy ‘doctrine’ 
by the leading administrators in the new Ministry for Cultural Affairs, see Urfalino, 
L’Invention de la politique culturelle, pp. 31-99. 
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theory that Malraux had already developed prior to being appointed Minister in 
1959. This revolved essentially around the notion of an ‘Imaginary Museum’ as 
instituted by the increasing availability of ever-improving photographic 
reproductions of artworks. In Malraux’s view, this technological development 
was the equivalent for the plastic arts of  the transformation produced in the 
written word by the spread of the printed press.41 The inescapable 
reconfiguration of aesthetic perception that ensued transformed the identity of 
any given work of art, or by the same token the contents of any given physical 
museum or collection. These now took on significance as a function of their 
place in the entire set of photographically reproducible works (cave-paintings, 
icons, sculptures, portraits, decorative engravings...) gathered together in the 
twentieth century as ‘art’. The virtual site thereby generated was what Malraux 
called the ‘imaginary museum’. An immaterial construct that englobed the 
perception of all physical works, it gathered together ‘the most immense domain 
of images that humanity has known’, and for Malraux called for the creation of a 
‘sanctuary as the supernatural once called for the creation of cathedrals’.42  
 When Debray comes to evoke Malraux’s vision of a virtual ‘world 
culture’ (and implied policy) in Vie et mort de l’image, he is careful to 
differentiate it from more superficial visions of international art as a high-level 
lubricant for exchanges in a globalised economy (he quotes from a ‘Manifesto 
for a Global Society’ published as part of a World Arts Summit mounted in 
Venice in 1991 under the auspices of the World Economic Forum, according to 
which ‘art is the language of culture, the one form of creative expression that 
allows us to communicate and to build real world-bridges’).43 There is a 
refractory violence in Malraux’s encounter with the images peopling his work 
that prohibits this representation of a free-flowing world culture as both symbol 
and instance of a free flow of economic goods in a neo-liberal world order. 
These mute figures take effect for Malraux against a backdrop of 
incommunicability (they have become detached from their original function and 
context); they work nearly always in his account to bring the subject up against 
his own death and finitude. Herein lies no doubt an initial and quasi-existential 
principle of ‘admiration’: for Debray too, at an anthropological level, the image 
was ‘born of death’ (the ‘recomposition’ produced by the image was a response 
to the decomposition of the living body (VMI 27)) and implicitly carries this 
referent with it as a fundamental signification.44 The ‘secular spirituality’ 
                                                 
41 André Malraux, Le Musée Imaginaire (Paris : Gallimard (Folio-essais), 1996 [reproduces 
1965 edition]) , p. 16. 
42 Le Musée Imaginaire, 253. 
43 VMI 265 (quoted in original English) 
44 See notably VMI 15-41 (chapter entitled ‘La naissance par la mort’); and compare also the 
contrast developed over the book by Debray between perceptual regimes where images are 
encountered as more or less rare presences or goods, and the contemporary regime of the 
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(spiritualité laïque) (VMI 267) underpinning Malraux’s policy vision is not, as is 
most common, derided or passed over diplomatically by Debray, but is rather, in 
the first instance, read seriously on its own terms. 
 At another equally fundamental level, the mediologist in Debray could 
admire Malraux’s capacity to correlate the putatively separate domains of 
technological development and the ‘spiritual’ experience of art. Like Benjamin 
before him, Malraux does not ask whether the comparatively new technique of 
photography is or is not an art; instead he explores how it has contributed to the 
transformation of our entire understanding of ‘art’. Unlike Benjamin, he argues 
not that the techniques of mass reproduction have reduced the power of art by 
stripping it of its aura; instead, he argues that they have both subjected these 
effects to a powerful ‘metamorphosis’ and made them virulent (via the 
constitution of an all-englobing ‘imaginary museum’). The ‘cultural action’ 
envisaged by Malraux, at least in his writings, is therefore less direct than some 
of his critics have argued. The mediation performed by the englobing sphere of 
the imaginary museum transforms the very objects (images, sculptures) it 
mediates. This retroaction of cultural media upon the objects they transport 
corresponds likewise for Debray to a fundamental cultural fact. 
 Debray notes that Malraux, unlike most intellectuals, was actually given 
the chance to convert an ‘intimate meditation into a responsible public policy’ 
(VMI 268). In Vie et mort de l’image, Debray presents the ensuing 
institutionalisation as a positive breakthrough. Malraux made ‘culture’ into an 
autonomous ministerial domain by replacing the old Fine Arts sub-department in 
the Ministry of Education. Art thereby ceased to be represented in government 
as a matter of decorative distinction for the cultivated classes; it became rather 
something ‘essential ... that the Republic must transmit to each citizen, though it 
was up to the citizen to make it bear fruit’ (VMI 268). At this point, then, 
Malraux is presented as extending the republican project of public 
enlightenment to the aesthetic domain. At the same time, however, just like the 
rationalist republican Debray, Malraux was sceptical about the capacity of 
Reason as such to found and cement a political order.45 He appears to recognise 
what Debray describes in Critique de la raison politique as the ‘unreasonable’ 
law of politics: if a collection of individuals or groups are to cohere 
‘horizontally’ among themselves, they can only do so by common reference to a 
‘vertically’ transcendant principle that stands above them all. Insofar as it stands 
above them, this principle becomes a super-stition, and its discrediting weakens 
the social body that it brings together.46 In 1959, with the Fourth Republic in 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘visuel’ where a hyperabundance of images induces an anaesthetised or purely calculatory 
response to images (visionnage). 
45 Cf. Le Musée imaginaire, p. 29 
46 See Debray, Critique de la raison politique, ou l’inconscient religieux (Paris: Gallimard, 
1981). For Debray’s endeavour to negotiate this challenge to rational republicanism, see e.g. 
his construction of the republican principle of laïcité  itself as a generalised transcendent 
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tatters and the Algerian crisis still dividing the country, the nascent Fifth 
Republic badly needed such principles of cohesion. De Gaulle proposed, 
famously (and with considerable efficacy) a ‘certain idea of France’.  Malraux 
proposed the nation’s artistic inheritance, and in particular its inheritance of 
images. Debray notes, again with reference to the ‘unreasonable’ law described 
above, that images are more efficacious than concepts as principles of group 
cohesion (VMI 268-9). They have a greater force of attraction and are prone to 
elicit a greater affective investment (Debray refers elsewhere to the care taken 
by the protagonists of the French Revolution to embody their rationalist 
principles in suitably mobilizing images). In its conception, then, the republican 
political project issuing from Malraux’s aesthetic theory might be considered 
prima facie as satisfying the non-rational requirements that, for Debray, a 
rational political strategy must fulfil if it is to become an effective force. 
 But of course, as we have already seen in this chapter, Malraux’s cultural 
policy did not become an effective social force. The secular ‘cathedrals’ of this 
aesthetic cult did not gather together a faithful people. At an initial level, Debray 
echoes and endorses the diagnosis of Bourdieu (‘Alas, art awakens only the 
awoken, and most people do not possess the code for deciphering Goya or 
Clouet’ (VMI 270)). Malraux is thus charged with failing to take into account 
the ‘socio-cultural constraints of transmission’ (ibid.). However, unlike 
Bourdieu (and to some degree Certeau), Debray’s criticism does not attach to 
the residually religious language and structuration of Malraux’s secular project. 
As we have seen, Debray sees the consitution of a vertical form of 
‘transcendence’ as a necessary precondition for maintaining the ‘horizontal’ 
cohesion of a social group (it protects an organisation against entropic 
dispersal). He thus views the cultivation of some kind of ‘religion’ as an 
ineluctable constraint of government (‘religion’ signifying here, in a sociological 
sense, not necessarily belief in deity, but a binding discourse, an organised set of 
mythically expressed values through which a society represents itself). 
Certainly, Malraux appears in Le Musée imaginaire to build on an analogous 
position. Schematically put: for Malraux, the abolition of the Monarchy left a 
void in the self-representation of French society that republicans looked initially 
to Reason to fill. This principle would prove of insufficient force to prevent the 
effective domination of nineteenth-century French society by the powers of 
capital and technology. Over this time, Malraux argues, an unprecedented event 
took place: ‘true artists ceased to recognise the values of the powerful.’47 Instead 
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(Paris: Gallimard, 1991), pp. 353-6. Compare also, more recently, Debray’s submission to the 
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47 Le Musée Imaginaire, p. 28. 
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of illustrating and diffusing the principles of transcendence required by rulers 
(the Church, the absolute monarchy...) to govern their subjects, modern art 
constituted itself, for Malraux, by breaking away from the demands of such 
‘representation’, and evolving instead its own purely artistic criteria. Those 
painters, for example, symbolized by Manet, who ‘refused any value foreign to 
painting itself’ looked to art as a ‘domain for which life was simply a primary 
material.’48 Malraux’s project, in a nutshell, was effectively to annex this 
autonomously constituted isolate and to turn it into a repository of socially 
binding transcendent values. 
 This latter operation appeared ill-founded to Debray. An autonomous art 
cut off from the social body and preoccupied exclusively with abstracted 
‘volumes and shapes’, to paraphrase Malraux, could offer little purchase as a 
tool of government. One might contrast its social existence with the historically 
embedded infrastructure of shared narratives, rituals, and modes of inculcation 
that underpin the apparently immediate efficacy of religious or political icons. 
As Debray puts it: 
 
An image does not draw its power from itself but from the community of 
which it is or was the symbol, and which, through it, speaks with itself or 
hears the echo of its past (VMI 270) 
 
One could argue, of course, that Malraux tried precisely  to turn art, through his 
cultural policy, into such a sociologically and historically embedded symbolic 
resource. But high art, as a material, was refractory to such a project. This was 
not necessarily the ‘fault’ of that art. The function of art as constituted over 
modernity has tended to be precisely to challenge the culture (the shared 
schemes of perception and thought) in which it develops. This function is 
inherently ‘anti-religious’, at least in the sense defined above. It is more likely to 
bring commotion and rupture than it is to bind and cement.49 As one who 
remains unconvinced about the ‘necessity’ of shared superstition within a social 
body (or unwilling to turn a commonly observed fact into a universal or even 
normative principle), this function of ‘commotion’ seems to me eminently 
valuable within a political order. But however that may be, it certainly did work, 
as Debray argues, to make Malraux’s ‘religiously’ conceived project for art 
impossible. 
 
 Debray evinces a certain ambivalence in his approach to Malraux. We 
saw above how in Vie et mort de l’image the founding of the Ministry of Culture 
through a secession from the Ministry of Education was presented as a positive 
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breakthrough. In L’Etat séducteur, by contrast, the same event is presented as a 
symptomatic moment in the decline of education-based values in modern 
France. Malraux is seen here as perverting the republican educational tradition 
in France, originating with Condorcet over the Revolution, propelled notably by 
Jules Ferry’s reforms of 1879-82, and moving officially over the Popular Front 
(1936) beyond the spread of school education to questions of access to culture: 
 
The pedagogical genealogy of the ‘Cultural State’, under subcontraction 
to the educational State, links up, via the Popular Front, the ideal of 
‘Culture for Everyone’ to that of ‘Education for everyone’. Malraux was 
at once its inheritor and gravedigger, introducing the first intellectual and 
administrative break between the two worlds. Until he took office, the 
world of taste was officially subordinate to that of knowledge. It was 
thought not only that sensibility can and must be educated, but that it 
represents itself a means of education (and thus of redemption).50
 
In Debray’s mediological framework, the 1960s corresponded in France to a 
period of transition between a social system whose dominant symbolic medium 
was print, the dominant institution for the transmission of which was the 
national school system, and a social system whose dominant symbolic medium 
was the electronic image, the dominant institution for the transmission of which 
was the national television network. In the technical terms to be deployed more 
fully in chapter 4, it corresponded to the transition from the ‘graphosphere’ to 
the ‘videosphere’.Within this framework, one could see Malraux’s Houses of 
Culture, effectively institutions for the transmission of Culture, as occupying a 
peculiar interstitial position. Debray notes how Malraux emphatically 
demarcated these institutions from the ambit of the national education system. In 
Malraux’s famous words: ‘The University is there to teach people. We are here 
to teach people how to love.’51 Explanations in the aesthetic domain could for 
Malraux be ‘eminently useful’, but would not improve anyone’s understanding 
of a work.52 In this respect, Malraux’s was simply one more voice in the 
swelling chorus of those devaluing the intellectual operations that for Debray 
enjoyed preeminence under the graphosphere (abstraction, detachment, 
objective explanation).53 At the same time, however, Malraux could not be 
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represented, if we were to extend Debray’s analysis, as a straightforward 
symptom of the coming videosphere. Certainly, he appears to give preeminence 
to the image over the abstract elaboration of writing; he appears to encourage an 
immediate subjective response to the image that does not pass through writing; 
but at the same time, the ultimate purpose of his strategy is to mount a resistance 
to ... images: 
 
Now, never has the world known dream-factories like ours, never has the 
world known such a power of the imaginary realm, never has the world 
seen such a deluge of idiocy [...]. These extremely powerful factories 
bring with them the most nefarious oneiric instruments in existence, 
because the dream-factories are not there to raise men up, but very simply 
to make money. Now, the most productive kinds of dream when it comes 
to selling theatre and cinema tickets are naturally those that appeal to the 
deepest, most organic and, in short, most terrible elements in a human 
being, and, above all, of course, sex, blood and death.54
 
Malraux is not looking to images as the most economic way of rallying an 
audience via the gratification of immediate bodily instinct (a tropism that for 
Debray will characterise the videosphere). Instead they are designed precisely as 
a mediation between such instincts and the abstract ‘laws of the world’.55 
Malraux’s images of predilection - abrupt, stark, isolated, shot through always 
with their unknowability - are not those of an ambient, reassuring or titillating 
televisual flux. 
 Debray tends to see the weaknesses in Malraux’s intellectual and political 
constructions as arising from a failure to think through questions of mediation. 
We have seen how Bourdieu and Certeau, in different perspectives, make a 
similar diagnosis. For Debray, the fate of the Houses of Culture proved that ‘the 
genius of intermediaries was not that of our national magician’ (VMI 270), while 
he suggests that in Le Musée Imaginaire, Malraux separated excessively ‘the 
domain of forms from the domain of techniques’ that condition and mediate 
these forms.56 Such objections appear both to be well-founded (as regards 
certain glaring omissions in Malraux’s reflection) and debatable (as regards 
major innovative insights in that same reflection). An overarching perspective in 
Le Musée Imaginaire, for example, is the question of how given technical 
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innovations rake through and transform the entire domain of ‘art’. Clearly, the 
introduction of photographic reproductions, first black and white and then 
colour, is of central importance here. But Malraux attends also to more minor 
‘technical’ considerations: the camera angles deployed, whether the 
reproductions appear with or without their original frame, with or without a 
margin, the effect of enlargements, the extent to which the technique of 
photography ‘reveals’ the technique of oil-painting as such (as a kind of 
historically ‘finished’ object)... One should not let Malraux’s blindspots in 
matters of social mediation obscure his considerable insights as regards the 
technological mediation and constitution of culture. The construct of the 
‘imaginary museum’ foregrounds a whole panoply of material mediations that 
interpose themselves between a subject and a work of ‘art’, and that tend to pass 
unperceived. 
 Likewise, it has become clear over this chapter that, as institutions 
dedicated to the transmission of culture, the Houses of Culture were, so to speak, 
a resonant failure. We should not take this to mean, however, that their 
architects simply bypassed the question of mediation. Extended thought and 
debate went into the material construction of these edifices - it was never a 
question of confronting the population with works of art in the most convenient 
empty hangar that happened to be available. Nor were technical questions lost 
from sight altogether in a humanistically inspired cultural haze. Caught 
historically, as suggested above, between the heavyweight apparatus of the 
graphosphere’s education system and the high-performance technology of the 
videosphere, they too were designed as cultural ‘machines’. In the words of 
Gabriel Monnet, director of one of the first Houses of Culture: 
 
The House of Culture must be a house where people encounter what is 
great and exemplary; a great machine to combat machines, particularities, 
and dilletantish curiosity; a machine to open people’s hearts, eyes and 
ears so as to renew relations between human beings.57
 
A kind of prosthetic sensorium, bringing together what appeared as the principal 
aesthetic media at the time of their conception - theatre, opera, concerts, 
lectures, plastic arts exhibitions, cinema, book and record libraries - their 
architects imagined them as something like a meticulously orchestrated grand 
Medium or Machine that would transcend its component parts. Considerable 
attention was given to topographical issues with a view to ensuring that punters 
lured in by one attraction would come into contact with another.58 Indeed, one is 
reminded of Debray’s characterisation elsewhere of those mediological 
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‘matrices’ (such as literary salons in pre-revolutionary France) that reorganise 
public space: ‘The user does not leave these sites in the same state as he entered 
them’.59 In this perspective, the Houses of Culture do not appear simply as a 
failure to take account of mediation. Instead (and the difference is significant), 
they appear as an experiment in mediation that failed. Experiments that fail are 
as a rule instructive. In this case, one might argue that close attention to 
modalities of the material and technical mediation of cultural experience was not 
accompanied by sufficient attention to the organisation of human intermediaries 
(the Christian Church’s ‘living stones’) required for the succesful transmission 
of a cultural system.60
 
 The different critiques of Malraux developed by Bourdieu, Certeau, and 
Debray revolve around questions of mediation. Bourdieu argued that the only 
means by which cultural inequalities could be effectively addressed was through 
the rational integration of the cultural democratization project into the 
institutional processes of certified education. These alone could provide the 
mediation between the primary habituses of social subjects and the dispositions 
required for high cultural practices. Certeau, for his part, underlined how the 
enduring works and reference points of human cultures are, in their social 
existence, mediated by interlocutory exchange. In particular, he foregrounded 
the creativity evidenced by a swarm of ‘uncertified’ voices coming to interpose 
themselves between cultural resources and their authorised interpreters. Finally, 
Debray focuses not just on issues of social and political mediation, but also on 
the technical mediations that interpose themselves between subjects and cultural 
works, and indeed constitute human beings in a fundamental sense as cultural 
subjects. In this respect, however, Malraux can be seen as much as a pioneering 
precursor as an object for critique.61 In the chapters that follow, I will explore 
how these thinkers pursue their reflection in their own terms, coming not just to 
refine their critical perspectives, but also to develop frameworks for positive 
policy prescription. 
                                                 
59 T 179 [113 – trans. mod.]. 
60 Urfalino’s analysis suggests that an unreasonable burden was placed on the directors of the 
Houses of Culture, drawn generally from the world of theatre, and supposed to embody in one 
person the requisite capacities for artistic creation and direction, financial and personnel 
management, and public outreach (see Urfalino, L’Invention de la politique culturelle, pp. 
185-205). 
61 See e.g. R. Debray, Introduction à la médiologie (Paris: PUF, 2000), p. 99. 
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Chapter Two. Pierre Bourdieu 
 
 
 If one surveys Pierre Bourdieu’s work as a whole, one can discern within 
it (along with an array of other issues and topics) various strands of cultural 
policy thinking. At first sight, it seems difficult to reconcile these various strands 
with each other. Culture is seen both as a prime generator of illusion and as a 
preeminent instrument of mental emancipation. Bourdieu looks to expose its 
contents as ‘arbitrary’, and yet defends vigorously the ‘autonomy’ of cultural 
producers in the definition of those contents. The State is represented as the 
instrument of powerful class interests, and is described also as a precarious and 
precious institution whose prerogatives (including the capacity to define a 
cultural policy) have to be vigorously defended. That cultural policy is described 
as both protecting and smothering cultural production. And so on. There are, of 
course, various strategies analysts can deploy to negotiate such apparent 
contradictions. One is to distribute their elements as successive moments in 
time: Bourdieu thought A, then B; or he emphasized X, then Y. Certainly, such 
an approach can help us to understand the evolution of Bourdieu’s thought, and I 
will on occasion have recourse to it. Another strategy, however, is to build up a 
further point of view from which two apparently opposing positions can be seen 
both to be true at the same time. That is, in general, the approach I propose to 
adopt here, pursuing each of the strands in question – present in varying degrees 
throughout Bourdieu’s oeuvre – as far as Bourdieu pushes them, while also 
pointing to the types of linkage that enable them to be brought together as 
elements in a coherent body of thought. This will occasionally mean challenging 
certain formulations of Bourdieu, who has a tendency to absolutize (detach from 
what he also holds to be true) certain lines of argument. Overall, however, I will 
look to show how Bourdieu’s oeuvre as a whole provides us with a complex and 
nuanced cultural policy framework, emerging from an analysis of what one 
might call the ‘multifunctional’ or overdetermined social existence of culture. 
 
 
2.1  Cultural policy and dominant ideology 
 
 As is well known, Malraux departed as Minister of Culture in the year 
after the events of May 1968. In any case, it had become clear before these 
events that the Houses of Culture were not operating as had been hoped, failing 
notably to draw in audiences from new social classes. For a while after 
Malraux’s departure, the future of the Ministry as an autonomous body was by 
no means ensured. It was widely held, both within and outside this body, that a 
new ‘philosophy’ for cultural policy was required. It was in this context that the 
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notion of ‘cultural development’ came to the fore. This was a term originally 
developed by Joffre Dumazedier as an extension to the objectives of economic 
and social development pursued by the then influential strategic national 
planning agency (‘The Plan’). Whereas the Malrucian philosophy of ‘cultural 
action’ was predicated on a fairly narrowly prescribed notion of what constituted 
culture (traditional high culture plus cinema), ‘cultural development’ looked to 
build on the diversity of leisure practices pursued by the population, and to raise 
the ‘level’ of these practices rather than abruptly replacing them with something 
else. Part of the appeal of the notion in the wake of 1968 was this very breadth, 
which allowed it in ecumenical fashion to accommodate (or conceal) the 
conflicts splitting the cultural field into so many fractions. Its elevation to the 
guiding rubric of cultural policy occurred most notably through the discussions 
of the Commission for Cultural Affairs of the Sixth Plan (1969-1971), whose 
diverse working groups were charged with devising a new blueprint for cultural 
policy that would take account of the apparently seismic shock of May 1968. Its 
discourse and some of its measures would be taken up by the administration of 
Jacques Duhamel (1971-1973), who has been credited with consolidating the 
politico-administrative existence of the Ministry, ensuring that it would become 
an enduring feature of the French political landscape.1
 Pierre Bourdieu was asked to present a paper in May 1970 for the  ‘Long 
Term’ working group of the Commission for Cultural Affairs of the Sixth Plan. 
This may seem surprising, given the turn taken by the previous research he had 
undertaken for the ministry.2 Bourdieu would later argue that such commissions 
derived added legitimacy precisely from the occasionally incongruous voices 
they allowed into their official midst (we will see in chapter three how Michel 
de Certeau also became involved, somewhat more extensively, in the same 
working group, and Edgar Morin had presented a paper for the group’s previous 
session).3 If Bourdieu accepted this invitation, it was perhaps due in part to the 
specificity of the context – the original Malrucian notion of cultural action no 
longer prevailed, and for a while all options seemed to be up for a discussion. 
Moreover, the working group in question was itself open to wide-ranging 
                                                 
1 For an account of these developments see P. Urfalino, L’Invention de la politique culturelle 
(Paris: La Documentation Française, 1996), pp. 207-72, or, for a succinct overview, J. 
Ahearne, ‘Introduction’, in Ahearne (ed.), French Cultural Policy Debates : A Reader 
(London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 1-35 (pp. 12-18). On the Sixth Plan, see Laurent Gayme, ‘La 
Commission des Affaires Culturelles du VIe Plan (1969-1971)’, in G. Gentil and A. Girard 
(ed.), Les Affaires culturelles au temps de Jacques Duhamel, 1971-1973 (Paris: La 
Documentation française, 1995), pp. 57-82. 
2 See my discussion of Le Musée et son public and L’Amour de l’art in chapter one of the 
present study. 
3 For Bourdieu’s point, see P. Bourdieu and L. Boltanski, ‘La production de l’idéologie 
dominante’, in Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, no. 2-3, June 1976, pp. 3-73 (p. 
11), henceforth referred to as PID. The content of the working group’s discussions are 
discussed more extensively in chapter three of the present study. 
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debate, for its brief was very general, and it could exert no constraining 
influence over government (it thus ran the danger of course, as Certeau would 
see, of becoming a compensatory talking shop for intellectuals). 
 Although the purpose of the group had by this time become the 
formulation of long-term objectives (‘finalités’) for cultural policy, Bourdieu 
does not really engage in his paper in such positive deliberations. He would later 
say that, when faced with an audience, his guiding principle was generally to tell 
it what it least wanted to hear, and one is tempted to see this paper as a case in 
point.4 His first move was to challenge both of the apparently opposing models 
then shaping cultural policy debate. He defines as ‘populist’ any ‘policy of 
cultural diffusion tending to consecrate the culture that can actually be found in 
the popular classes, and thus to attribute to it the status of an authentic culture.’5 
He saw this as a tendency that could be found in more or less masked forms in a 
range of existent cultural enterprises. We have already seen Bourdieu’s principal 
objection to this – in ratifying as such a culture produced in a context of 
domination, such enterprises tended also to ratify the characteristics it owed to 
the limitations imposed by that domination. However, Bourdieu also castigated 
what to his listeners might have seemed the obvious alternative to ‘populist’ 
policies, which would have been to ‘take official culture, legitimate culture as it 
is, and to diffuse it among those classes or categories who are dispossessed of 
it’.6 Bourdieu ironically denigrated this latter ambition as ‘populicultural’ – as 
agri-culture looks to cultivate the fields (ager + cultura), so the populiculturists 
looked to cultivate ‘the people’ as found in their natural (weed-infested) state. 
For this elite culture owed many of its characteristics to the fact that it served to 
legitimate and reproduce the position of the dominant classes – and could not 
therefore be deployed en bloc to emancipate those it had helped to dominate. In 
other words, Bourdieu’s key objection to these opposing but also 
complementary models was that they were based on a shared ‘ignorance of the 
fundamental fact that, in any given social structure, both the dominated and the 
dominant culture owe their characteristics to the structural relation that they 
maintain with each other.’7
 Bourdieu’s critique here is not simply criticism in the sense of fault-
finding (though it certainly is that). It is also critique in a modified Kantian 
sense: it looks to lay bare the (social) a priori schemes of perception that 
                                                 
4 See the extracts from an interview carried out in 1989 in Tokyo and reproduced in P. 
Bourdieu, Interventions, 1961-2001. Science sociale et action politique, ed. F. Poupeau & T. 
Discepolo (Marseille: Agone, 2002), p. 74. 
5 ‘Exposé de Pierre Bourdieu’ (13 May 1970), Commission des Affaires Culturelles, 6ème 
Plan, Groupe de travail ‘Long terme’, Sous-groupe ‘Finalités’ (from the archives of the 
Ministry of Culture’s Département d’Etudes et de la Prospective, 6th Plan 1971-1975, 
Dossier XXII ‘Long Terme’), p. 1. 
6‘Exposé de Pierre Bourdieu’ , p. 2. 
7 Ibid. 
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constitute and limit what is thinkable in a given domain. This was more clearly 
the case in the second broad move he carried out in his presentation. Those 
around the table would no doubt have assumed that the issue at stake in their 
deliberations concerned a cultural strategy for the nation as a whole. Without 
disputing this directly, Bourdieu  looked to provide another perspective on their 
debates. What was also at issue, he contended, was the outcome of a struggle 
between different fractions of the dominant class concerning, so to speak, the 
legitimate or preeminent principle of domination. Members of different 
‘fractions’ of that class would carry with them different categories of perception 
determining what for them constituted models of cultural excellence. In a sense, 
such cultural policy forums offered artists and intellectuals (usually ‘dominated’ 
fractions of the dominant class) a temporary symbolic revenge over the other 
fractions (economic managers and the politico-administrative elite) that more 
often held sway. Having said that, this revenge was not unqualified, and those 
with differently structured portfolios of cultural capital (economic and/or 
politico-administrative know-how, academic standing, avant-garde artistic 
reputation, etc.) continued to vie with each other for the most favourable ‘rates 
of exchange’ (to pursue the metaphor as Bourdieu would later do). All this, 
Bourdieu conceded, might have seemed somewhat crude to his audience, as he 
contended that the history of art, literature, or philosophy could also be 
conceived as the history of the conflicts between the fractions of the governing 
classes.8 But the point (scarcely taken up by his listeners) was this: there was a 
sense in which such debates about cultural policy had nothing to do with the 
people about which they were ostensibly concerned, and everything to do with 
the ongoing power struggles for resources and symbolic capital among the 
fractions of the dominant class. To understand the positions taken up by 
intellectuals (concerning the importance of such or such a type of cultural 
content and practice), one had to carry out a sociology of intellectuals; and that 
led necessarily to a sociology of the relations between intellectuals and power 
(as Bourdieu put it at the time).9
 Unsurprisingly, given the manifestly confrontational content of his 
interaction, Bourdieu’s paper did not lead to an ongoing collaboration with the 
working group (his prime concern being, as we shall see, to assert the autonomy 
of intellectual practice with regard to State power). But we need not consider his 
contribution here as purely destructive. Firstly, such critique can exert a 
positively emancipatory effect. To put it paradoxically: the best way to prevent 
cultural policy debate being entirely a squabble between fractions of the 
dominant class jockeying for position may be to recognise to what extent it is, 
inevitably, just such a squabble. Hence apparently reductive comments of the 
type cited above may performatively exert anti-reductive effects, creating 
                                                 
8 Ibid., p. 7 
9 Ibid., p. 6. 
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greater room for manoeuvre. Moreover, rather than yield to the easy option of 
dismissing Bourdieu as ‘reductive’, it seems to me more fruitful to hold on to 
the considerable truth behind such propositions, and then, using Bourdieu’s 
work, to integrate it into a more complex overall framework. We will see in 
subsequent discussion how the relationship between group interests and 
universal interests need not always be one of mutual opposition. 
 Bourdieu would exert a further turn of the critical screw in the extended 
article ‘The Production of the Dominant Ideology’, co-written with Luc 
Boltanski, and published in his emphatically non-governmental journal Actes de 
la recherche en sciences sociales.10 Here, he turned his attention not simply to 
the categories of thought informing policy models, but to the sites where those 
categories were forged, fostered and transmitted. These included various 
politico-economic forums and circles, the higher education ‘schools of power’ 
where the French governing elite were educated (and where leading political 
figures, civil servants and company managers taught), and also, especially, the 
various commissions of the Plan.11 Bourdieu saw such sites, located at the 
intersection of the intellectual field and the field of ‘power’, as serving to 
produce the ‘logical and moral integration of the dominant class’ through a 
process of ‘negotiation and bargaining’ between the fractions of that class.12 
This work of ideological adjustment and adaptation was organised by the high-
level bureaucracy of the State, which constituted a point of equilibrium (PID 60) 
within the field of the dominant class (that is, between those fractions with high 
economic capital and those with high cultural capital). 
 This process of adjustment (‘aggiornamento’) was particularly intense, 
Bourdieu argued, because an old-style ‘primary’ conservatism had given way to 
a ‘reconverted’ conservatism that needed to legitimate itself. Paradoxically, by 
contrasting itself with that ‘primary’ conservatism, the new (neo-liberal) 
conservatism could appear as progressive. Its professed project was a process of 
‘modernisation’ steered by ‘neutral’ and ‘competent’ circles of economic and 
political managers. Its watchwords were openness, flexibility, adaptability, 
progress, technological advance, and the end of political ideologies – hence its 
‘liberal’ appellation. It was itself a form of political ideology, in Bourdieu’s 
account, because it both masked and promoted the interests of the dominant 
                                                 
10 See above, note 3. 
11 Elite pupils in France do not as a rule attend universities, but what are called ‘grandes 
écoles’; and what Bourdieu terms the different ‘fractions’ of the dominant class (managers, 
the politico-administrative elite, engineers, academics) generally each attend different types of 
‘grande école’, thus precociously becoming relatively segregated from each other (there is 
some crossover, but comparatively little in the case of the training grounds for academic 
intellectuals). 
12 PID, pp. 6, 4, 35. Bourdieu would later analyse the relations between the intellectual field 
and the politico-administrative field (as well as the economic field) within an englobing ‘field 
of power’ that their respective struggles constituted (see Bourdieu, La Noblesse d’Etat. 
Grandes Ecoles et esprit de corps (Paris: Minuit, 1989), pp. 371-486 [261-339]).  
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class. It adapted to (and indeed accelerated) certain ongoing mutations in the 
international system of economic production (notably moves to more flexible 
modes of accumulation and more intense recourse to the artificial creation of 
scarcity value). But it adapted to these in such a way as to preserve the interests 
of the already dominant classes  – hence its ‘conservative’ label (PID 42-3). 
 We have seen how Bourdieu had himself taken a limited part in the 
deliberations of the Plan, and he noted in his 1975 article how ‘aesthetic’ (i.e. 
cultural policy) considerations loomed relatively large in the ideology being 
fashioned by the network of institutions evoked above. He argued that this was 
in part an aspect of the strategy of adapting in order to preserve. Rather than risk 
a return of the traumatizing upheavals of May 1968, graduates from the ‘schools 
of power’ (notably the Ecole Nationale d’Administration and Polytechnique) 
had ‘understood that they should adjust their sights by reintroducing all the 
things that the spokespeople for the excluded were demanding, which is to say 
beauty, happiness and imagination’ (PID 51). To concede a little such symbolic 
gratification would, as it were, lubricate the mechanisms of productivity, cost 
relatively little, and provide a sop for discontented intellectuals. Indeed, 
Bourdieu suggested that the prominence of aesthetic concerns in this new 
discourse could be explained not simply because it added an appearance of 
‘soul’ (un supplément d’âme) to technocratic programmes, but also because 
cultural education programmes could provide a secularized equivalent to 
‘spiritual exercises’ that might rechannel the disturbing violence and 
contestation that had emerged over the May events (PID 44) . In other words, in 
the aftermath of those events, certain political circles (Bourdieu refers here in 
particular to the writings of Jacques Duhamel’s cabinet director, Jacques 
Rigaud) saw in ‘cultural development’ a programme that could ‘reeducate’ 
people to abandon their old mindsets and to embrace the demands of the new 
economic environment. As Duhamel himself had said, ‘resistance to change 
even more than material deprivation is what impedes development.’13 What 
capital (or productivity targets) objectively required was for people to become 
flexible, adaptable, mobile, as well as to desire things that they did not really 
need. In this perspective, cultural development policy was not concerned 
primarily with emancipating people. Its footsoldiers, the cultural and socio-
cultural animateurs, took their place among the expanding professions of ‘soft 
management’ (encadrement doux) (PID 51): looking to remodel people’s 
aspirations, at worst they would defuse the tensions associated with the changes 
outlined above; at best they might lead people to embrace these changes, 
flexibly changing their work practices as required and hankering after the 
primarily symbolic goods that would now drive the economy… 
                                                 
13 J. Duhamel, ‘The Age of Culture’ [1972], in Ahearne (ed.), French Cultural Policy 
Debates, pp. 83-90 (p. 89). 
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 All this is, of course, relentlessly suspicious. It is not that Bourdieu 
suggests that this was a carefully calibrated and orchestrated plot of some kind. 
His sociology confirms the observation that people routinely drift, un- or semi-
consciously, to positions that objectively suit them. It is quite feasible that the 
kinds of politico-administrative groups being discussed by Bourdieu would 
routinely filter out cultural policy programmes that unsettled them, and would 
finally settle on a model that unsettled them the least, particularly if some 
elements might fit in with more insistent concerns. Nevertheless, it might seem 
that a high degree of instrumental efficacy was being attributed to activities like 
cultural animation by certain architects of this policy orientation (out of 
proportion to what might have been happening across the country with motley 
clusters of people in village halls and municipal facilities). Indeed, the 
prominent place given to ‘cultural development’ or aesthetic issues in this 
emergent neo-liberal discourse would soon fade (those driving neo-liberal 
programmes having grown sceptical no doubt about claims that cultural 
development could defuse and educate as they would desire). In 1974, the 
Ministry of Culture even ceased to exist as such, being demoted by Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing’s government to a mere ‘Secretariat’ for Culture. Even when 
the Ministry was reestablished as such in 1977, the same neo-liberal dynamic 
analysed by Bourdieu in ‘La production de l’idéologie dominante’ would now 
cut back on any ‘superfluous’ cultural spending on the part of the State, reducing 
cultural policy to a minimal heritage protection package combined with political 
endorsement of the expanding cultural industries. Interestingly, we shall see that 
when Bourdieu would come some twenty years later to engage again with a now 
massively dominant neo-liberal orthodoxy, it would be not to attack any 
particular State intervention in culture, but to defend the very possibility of such 
intervention. 
 
 Bourdieu was thus unwilling to adopt the role, as he saw it, of the token 
‘exotic’ individual whose input would finally be diluted beyond recognition, but 
who would give added legitimacy to the official State commissions where a 
cultural policy consonant with the requirements of a dominant ideology was 
elaborated. Instead, he would use a site outside the politico-administrative field 
to develop a critique not just of particular cultural policy options, but, one is 
tempted to say, of the whole cultural policy game.14 He noted in a 1977 
interview that there was a tendency of politicians to believe and persuade people 
that there was ‘no policy,  no political solution, and no political agreement 
possible outside those lofty summits frequented by sovereign minds alone’.15 
                                                 
14 The professed point of founding his journal Actes de recherche en sciences sociales in 1975 
was to reinforce the autonomy of sociology produced independently of State and industrial 
demands. 
15 P. Bourdieu and P. Viansson-Ponté, ‘Entretien avec Pierre Bourdieu’, Le Monde, 11 
October 1977, pp. 1-2 (p. 2) (also in Interventions, p. 104). 
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Later he would note a similar tendency among those in the political microcosm 
to consider that ‘anything that has not been through the mill of official 
apparatuses, congresses, programmes and platforms did not exist.’16 In 
opposition to such politico-administrative takeovers of politics as such, 
Bourdieu considered that it was possible to exert substantial symbolic effects 
(and much of politics comes down to symbolic effects) from independent 
platforms elsewhere in the field of power. It would thus be as an autonomous 
intellectual that he would launch his critique of the cultural policy game – itself 
based on his broader deconstruction of what Brian Rigby has called the ‘cultural 
game’. And that critique has indeed been massively influential. 
 
 
2.2  The cultural policy game 
 
 Brian Rigby writes of Bourdieu’s classic study Distinction. A Social 
Critique of the Judgement of Taste that ‘however much this is masked by its 
“scientific” procedures, the work is fundamentally a Rousseauist and 
Proudhonesque exposure and refusal of the cultural game as played by the rules 
laid down by the powerful and cultured classes.’17 This is undoubtedly true – 
though before going on to develop this, it is worth underlining that the overall 
perspective on culture (and cultural policy) that emerges from Bourdieu’s work 
cannot be reduced to an ethical denunciation of the mystifications and pretence 
informing the world of arts and culture. For Bourdieu notes that attitudes close 
to Proudhon’s vehement denunciation of the self-absorption of artists and the 
artworld were to be found particularly among the governing fractions of the 
French communist party. This was for Bourdieu understandable when referred 
to the popular and petit-bourgeois class ethos of these fractions, which made 
them particularly alert to certain truths of the cultural game, but it led directly on 
to ‘Zhdanovite’ cultural policy inclinations – in other words the direct 
subordination of all aesthetic expression and exploration to predefined political 
and propagandist purposes.18 We shall see how, after neo-liberalism, 
‘Zhdanovism’ in its obvious and less obvious guises would become the principal 
                                                 
16 ‘Retrouver la tradition libertaire de gauche’, interview with R. Pierre and D. Eribon 
published in Libération, 23 December 1981, and republished in Bourdieu, Interventions, pp. 
165-9 (p. 168). 
17 Brian Rigby, Popular Culture in Modern France (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 111. 
18 The Russian politician A. A. Zhdanov (1896-1948) developed in the immediate post-war 
period a policy of rigorous ideological control of artistic and cultural life. For Bourdieu’s 
reference to the cultural attitudes of those directing the French Communist Party, see  La 
Distinction. Critique sociale du jugement (Paris: Minuit, 1979), p. 52 [p. 566 n.40], 
henceforth referred to as D. For his hostility in a cultural policy perspective to both direct and 
indirect forms of ‘Zhdanovism’, see e.g. Les Règles de l’art. Genèse et structure du champ 
littéraire (Paris: Seuil, 1992), pp.  389, 471 [281, 347], henceforth referred to as RA. 
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adversary of Bourdieu’s cultural policy reflection. Indeed, the term would come 
to operate in his writing as a kind of code for any direct political prescription of 
cultural production. 
 Nevertheless, Bourdieu did over his work accumulate an overwhelming 
battery of critical perspectives on the world of art and culture – to the extent, as 
he himself acknowledged, that he risked coming across as himself ‘barbaric’ in 
his refusal to play by the rules, and as ‘philistine’ in his readiness to perceive 
quasi-instinctual patterns of self-promotion and class segregation within the 
impeccably ‘disinterested’ realm of culture.19 I should like here to perform, as it 
were, a more condensed type of barbaric operation by bringing together those 
perspectives and insights that are dispersed across Bourdieu’s writings, and that 
can be deployed as so many principles for suspicion of any cultural policy 
project.20 Bourdieu argues in The Rules of Art that a controlled (‘scientific’) 
understanding of cultural works requires us to perform ‘a sort of epoche 
[suspension] of the belief commonly granted to cultural things and to the 
legitimate ways of approaching them’ (RA 260 [185]). More than a simple 
‘methodological’ reversal, he presents this as a ‘veritable conversion’ in 
thinking about intellectual matters. Certainly, it seems likely that some of the 
belief ‘suspended’ for the purposes of understanding may not return, and that the 
‘credit’ accorded to the things of culture may thereby be diminished. In this 
sense, we will be exploring here how Bourdieu’s writings work to dis-credit 
(take belief from) cultural policy projects of all kinds. Before embarking on this 
tide of critique, it is worth reminding ourselves that it is not the whole story 
(Bourdieu, in what he would subsequently evoke as ‘needless excesses’, 
sometimes writes as though it is).21
 
 The caustic quality of Bourdieu’s intelligence exerts its scouring effects 
on the object of cultural policy (the culture that is deemed worth transmitting), 
that policy’s agents (the politico-administrative elite, the cohorts of animateurs, 
artists), and its supposed and unavowed effects. 
 The principal object of cultural policy, a society’s ‘legitimate culture’, is 
described as overwhelmingly ‘arbitrary’. It has a historical raison d’être, but as 
a structured entity, it is largely independent of any logical, biological or 
geographical necessity. So too are those ‘popular cultures’ sometimes advocated 
                                                 
19 See e.g. D 110 [99-100], 574 [599 n.18]. 
20 This aggressive dismantling of the social workings of culture (that also yields positive or 
‘scientific’ results) is more marked in some works than others. I have drawn for this section 
particularly on P. Bourdieu & J.-C. Passeron, La Reproduction: éléments pour une théorie du 
système d’enseignement (Paris: Minuit, 1970), henceforth referred to as R; La Distinction; La 
Noblesse d’Etat, henceforth referred to as NE; and Les Règles de l’art, particularly Part I, ch. 
3, ‘Le marché des biens symboliques’. 
21 On his ‘needless excesses’ (outrances inutiles), and the grounds for them, see RA 260 
[185]. 
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as substitute objects for cultural policy, for they are similarly ‘arbitrary’, making 
up with legitimate culture a ‘system’ of cultural arbitrariness (R 38 [23]). There 
would thus seem to be no absolutely compelling grounds for transmitting one 
culture rather than another, or for replacing one culture with another. Indeed, 
regardless of their content, the works of legitimate culture seem to function 
above all as pretexts, positional devices in class-related strategies of ‘distinction’ 
and symbolic ‘capital’ accumulation (D VI, VIII, 320 [5, 7, 282]). Both the 
production and reception of culture are driven by an apparently vain mechanism 
of ‘pretension and distinction’, or ‘action and reaction’ (RA 181-2 [126]), which 
agents internalise as an obscurely compelling ‘instinct’ (D 585 [499]). This blind 
or pre-reflexive hankering after distinction is not simply an ‘incidental’ aspect of 
the ‘aesthetic disposition’ (D  32 [31]). Culture, commonly represented as the 
path to enlightenment, thus constitutes the terrain par excellence of 
‘misrecognition’ (D 94 [86]). Essentially social categories are sublimated as 
purely cultural categories (D 578 [493]). The value of artworks is supposed to be 
immanent in the works themselves, whereas these works function as ‘fetishes’: 
the collective belief guaranteeing their value, which is also a collective 
‘misrecognition’, is maintained by an elaborate network of institutions whose 
agents themselves have vested interests in maintaining that value (D 31 [30-1], 
RA 243-5 [171-3]). There is, in short, an ‘idolatry’ at the heart of cultivated 
pleasure, and its most virtuoso connaisseurs live in a state of ‘possessed 
possession’, to say nothing of those (petit-bourgeois) souls persuaded of the 
need to accomplish the requisite rites without mastering the rules of the game (D 
584-5, 370 [499, 321-3]). 
 All this was presumably not calculated to win over those who had 
invested their identity in the tasks of, say, protecting the artistic heritage or 
bringing culture to the people. Indeed there is a tendency, already noted, for 
Bourdieu to intensify the causticity of his texts by ‘absolutizing’ his position. 
The collective belief that attributes value to art, for example, does not simply 
involve misrecognition – it becomes in the heat of writing ‘only’ misrecognition 
(RA 244 [172]). With the repeated insistence throughout La Reproduction that 
legitimate culture simply ‘is’ arbitrary, it is easy to forget the note 
(afterthought?) in its preface that the notion of pure arbitrariness is a logical 
construction without empirical referent that is necessary for the construction of 
the argument (R 11 [xi])  (somewhat like Rousseau’s ‘state of nature’). Be that 
as it may (and sometimes one has to know how to make one’s point), Bourdieu’s 
texts do chisel away at the beliefs to which the architects, employees and 
beneficiaries of cultural policies would like nothing better than to cling. It is 
worthwhile, at the very least, to meditate on the extent to which the rites of 
culture are purely ‘negative’ (i.e. segregational) (NE 155 [111]) and its pleasures 
‘vain’ (D 573 [491]). 
 We have already seen the grounds for Bourdieu’s suspicion regarding the 
architects of national cultural  policy. Presenting their programmes as a ‘public 
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service’, they were actually the result of an ongoing squabble between the 
fractions of the dominant class.22 Moreover, the bargaining in question would 
generally be resolved in the name of an ‘organic solidarity’ (NE 558 [388]) 
between these competing fractions who nonetheless shared a dominant position 
in their respective fields. In fact, the elaboration of cultural policy discourse 
could play a part in the ‘logical and moral integration’  (PID 4) of these diverse 
fractions (the industrial sponsor lying down with the avant-garde artist, so to 
speak). More generally, it could spread recognition of legitimate culture’s 
legitimacy – an essential condition if the superior status of its most adept 
practitioners (the dominant class) was itself to be recognised. 
 This suspicion with regard to the interests in play in the cultural policy 
game extended also to the cohorts of cultural and socio-cultural animateurs 
responsible for its implementation on the ground. Bourdieu represented these in 
the 1970s as just one section of a growing class of  ‘cultural intermediaries’ 
positioned between the production of goods and their consumption. This 
category included marketing and advertising consultants, stylists, interior 
designers, etc., as well as those working in subordinate positions within the 
expanding bureaucracies of cultural production (newspapers, magazines, 
television companies, etc.). The new posts emerging in these domains were 
ideally suited to the growing number of middle-class graduates produced by the 
education system whose qualifications were not sufficient to secure careers in 
more established domains. And of course, it was only human nature that the 
occupants of these posts should talk up the importance of their new-found 
careers. Thus Bourdieu speaks of the persuasive ‘coups de force’ (D 170-2 [153-
4])  through which such agents instilled in others a ‘need’ for their services (thus 
also playing their part in an economic logic whereby matters of style and 
marketing had to take precedence over production  in the traditional sense). 
They would, so to speak, drive a wedge between how people were and how 
people were brought to feel they ought to be. In this perspective, ‘cultural 
animation’ functioned as just one more ‘euphemism’ (D 397 [345]) for the 
symbolic action by which a need was artificially created and a profession was 
invented.23 At the same time, this self-serving strategy could be presented as a 
‘public service’ for which State resources should be deployed (D 415 [359]). 
Bourdieu does not note that, over the 1970s, State resources for such animation 
would by and large dry up. This by no means invalidates the account sketched 
out above, but does indicate that, whether because of their subversiveness or 
their ineffectualness, the agendas of local animateurs at this stage did not always 
mesh neatly with the agenda of policy’s national architects. Indeed, we shall see 
                                                 
22 On the strategic uses of the term ‘public service’, see e.g. NE 541 [378]. 
23 For a detailed case-study of this process of professionalisation, see Vincent Dubois, ‘The 
dilemmas of institutionalisation: from cultural mobilizations to cultural policies in a suburban 
town (Bron, 1970-1990)’, International Journal of Cultural Policy, forthcoming. 
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in the next section how Bourdieu could also interpret very differently the 
artificial creation of cultural aspiration. 
 Artists, like cultural animateurs, and, in their own way, like the architects 
of national policy, had a clear interest in cultural policy because it created for 
them a market. Bourdieu suggests in his 1970 presentation for the Plan 
discussed above that any enterprise of cultural diffusion – such as the Houses of 
Culture – can also be conceived as a campaign to conquer a cultural market.24 
Given the workings of the ‘market for symbolic goods’ (RA 201-45 [141-73]), 
artists cannot expect the value of their works to radiate forth from those works 
alone. They require an institutionalised battery of celebrations and celebrants, 
exhibitions and commentators, to guarantee the credit of the work, and to 
maintain the apparently self-evident belief that the cultural game as a whole is 
interesting (D 279-80 [250]) (the game becomes, of course, more interesting as 
the ‘interests’ invested in it increase). Artists thus require a cultural policy 
apparatus to preserve the value of their ‘fetishes’ – or more precisely, to produce 
the ‘symbolic alchemy’ (RA 241 [170]) that transforms the objects they produce 
into desirable fetishes. What suits them even more is when those responsible for 
this policy (such as Bourdieu’s bugbear, André Malraux) also consolidate their 
‘professional ideology’ (D 574 [491-2, 599 n.19]) according to which they are 
free-floating ‘creators’ detached from the world of material interests, 
bureaucratic apparatuses, and markets. 
 It is perhaps because Bourdieu was willing to go ‘too far’ in his exposure 
of the cultural game – and by extension, the cultural policy game - that he could 
nail so many otherwise sacrosanct targets.We have seen how he eroded the 
credit of both the object and the principal agents of cultural policy. At the same 
time, he sought to lay bare the problematic but unrecognised effects of cultural 
policy programmes, and to expose their proclaimed effects as ineffectual. 
 While cultural policy institutions may have been relatively autonomous of 
directly political agendas (like the education system as analysed in La 
Reproduction), Bourdieu suggests that they served to ‘legitimate’ that cultural 
order that in turn legitimated the social order (in which those who governed 
society seemed to do so by rights because of their greater degree of cultivation). 
In other words, cultural policy fulfilled an effective if indirect function as  a cog 
in those ‘long and complex circuits of legitimating exchanges’ (NE 554 [386]) 
that maintained the symbolic strength of social hierarchies. In the same way, it 
could serve indirectly to ‘delegitimise’ further already ‘illegitimate’ cultures – 
Bourdieu notes how the ‘therapeutic’ campaigns aimed at the working classes 
could actually have a ‘demoralising’ effect, eroding the last residues in 
dominated classes of a capacity for positive autonomy, that is setting down the 
values by which one chooses to live (Bourdieu was thinking particularly of 
traditional models for working-class males, based on physical strength, virility, 
                                                 
24‘Exposé de Pierre Bourdieu’ , pp. 14-15. 
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etc.) (D 447-8 [384]). More perverse were the effects as they figure in 
Bourdieu’s work on what one might call the designated victims of cultural 
policy. These were the petit-bourgeois classes prone to aspire to the cultural 
practices of their superiors, but without really mastering them. In Bourdieu’s 
terms their relation to dominant culture, both ‘avid’ and ‘anxious’, was 
characterized by allodoxia, or recognition without understanding 
(reconnaissance sans connaissance) (D 370 [321-3]). Driven by the need to 
distinguish themselves from those below them, they would typically mistake 
vulgarisation for science, and operetta for high classical music. Extrapolating 
from Bourdieu’s analyses, the facilities provided by cultural policy, endorsing 
the value of legitimate culture without supplying the means really to understand 
it, let alone challenge it, were liable to lock these people ever tighter into the 
unhappy and inauthentic straitjacket of cultural ‘pretension’ (D 420 [363]). 
Pursuing their liberation, they would fall ever deeper into subservience and 
alienation. 
 All this is, so to speak, a worst-case scenario. Again, discussion of 
Bourdieu’s other work will complicate these matters. It suggests, for example, 
that the path to emancipation may well have to pass through specific forms of 
alienation. Moreover, the analyses above represent the State as a kind of ‘central 
bank of credit’ which can be deployed to exercise a ‘monopoly on legitimate 
symbolic violence’ (NE 538-9 [377]). The resulting effect of ‘state magic’ (NE 
538 [376]), instituting an ‘eminent’ if not exclusive perspective, can both 
‘certify’ and ‘decertify’ types of cultural practice. Once again, arguments 
developed elsewhere by Bourdieu will challenge without invalidating this 
perspective. In Les Règles de l’art, notably, he traces how from the middle of 
the nineteenth century, the workings of the artistic field imposed a new principle 
of legitimacy. This was defined precisely in opposition to the State’s claims to 
legislate over artistic value. Against the monopolistic institution of State magic 
(the Academy), leading artists (Baudelaire, Flaubert, Manet…) set in motion an 
‘institutionalisation of anomie’, that is a field in which artists autonomously vied 
to impose their own differing aesthetic norms. Furthermore, this field of  
‘legitimate’ culture, along with its attendant institutions, could be represented in 
many contexts as as much the beleagured victim of governmental programmes 
as their functional collaborator.25 Certainly, this does not exclude the notion that 
they occupy a place in a ‘long and complex circuit of legitimation’ – but it does 
once again remind us of their ambivalent or multifunctional status. 
                                                 
25 On the discourse of beleaguerment, see Oliver Bennett, ‘Cultural policy in Britain: 
collapsing rationales and the end of a tradition’, International Journal of Cultural Policy, 1/2 
(1995). For a critique of the notion of ‘legitimacy’ in Bourdieu’s cultural analysis, see Jean-
Louis Fabiani, ‘Peut-on encore parler de légitimité culturelle?’, in O. Donnat and P. Tolila, 
Le(s) Public(s) de la culture. Politiques publiques et équipements culturels (Paris: Presses de 
Sciences Po, 2003), pp. 305-17. 
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 We have seen in chapter one how Bourdieu’s early analyses in the 1960s 
worked to discredit Malrucian cultural policy by demonstrating its very 
ineffectualness, and these analyses would not change significantly when applied 
to analogous cultural enterprises. The apparent generosity of cultural 
democratization programmes was shown to mask a ‘refusal to communicate’ at 
the heart of its very communication (D 36 [34]). The clearest example of this 
was the free entry offered by avant-garde museums that nevertheless provided 
no indication of the ‘code’ necessary for understanding adequately the works 
exhibited (R 67 [51-2]). More generally, Bourdieu tended to portray cultural 
policy initiatives as furnishing the sociology of culture with so many ready-
made ‘experiments’ that were revealing precisely because of their 
ineffectiveness – whether it was putting culturally dispossessed classes directly 
in front of high culture (the Houses of Culture), experimental and avant-garde 
culture (Beaubourg), or looking to reach wide audiences for certain cultural 
experiences via television (D 34-5 [33]). Indeed, there was a sense in which the 
gifts bestowed by cultural policy were devalued by the very act of giving: 
insofar as the ‘value’ of a corpus of cultural works (that is, here, the social credit 
to be derived from its ostended consumption) was dependent on its rarity, its 
divulgation would diminish that value. It is for this reason, as well as on account 
of the allodoxia described above, that, as Bourdieu put it, the melodies of Fauré 
and Duparc would cease to be what they were if ‘the development  of suburban 
and provincial Conservatories caused them to be sung, well or badly, in petit-
bourgeois living rooms’ (D 377 [327-8]). The cultivated classes would shift the 
object of their attention, ensuring that the structural attributes of socio-cultural 
hierarchies remained in place, even if the substantial ‘properties’ attaching to 
their respective echelons mutated. 
 Consideration of this dynamic led Bourdieu to question his ‘rational 
pedagogy of culture’ as formulated in the 1960s. For it was all very well to 
‘arm’ individual members of  the culturally dispossessed classes with the 
instruments giving access to ‘legitimate culture’ as defined at a given moment. 
Certainly, this might serve those members, but one could not identify the 
interests of those classes as a whole with the interests of individuals who, 
through their own mobility, would soon cease to belong to them (R 69 [53-4]). 
Moreover, if sufficient proportions of those classes were to master the rudiments 
of that (‘arbitrary’) culture, then the cultivated classes would quasi-instinctively 
adopt another set of contents and/or manners that would continue to ensure their 
distinction. At one level, this observation seems incontrovertible, and it is surely 
unrealistic in any case to imagine that any cultural policy could abolish a 
dynamic that is so deeply ingrained in the dispositions of all those with a stake 
in the cultural game. However, it is surely overhasty simply to reduce the 
‘substantial’ contents of a culture (the particular texts, ideas, skills) with which 
social groups may engage to the relational position of those contents within a 
given socio-cultural hierarchy at a given time. When we look across the range of 
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Bourdieu’s work, we see that he did not ratify such a reduction. Nor did he 
abandon his commitment to a rational pedagogy in cultural matters. When asked 
by another government to provide conceptual frameworks for its education 
programmes, he gave careful thought to what cultural contents were most 
worthy of vulgarisation. 
 
 
2.3  Advising the State 
 
 In a 1984 interview, Bourdieu mentions that he had once considered with 
Michel Foucault producing a ‘white paper’ that would formulate, in association 
with several other specialists, ‘a rigorous critique of a certain number of political 
measures, concerning notably educational and cultural matters’.26 Michel 
Foucault’s untimely death had prevented this project from coming to fruition, 
but earlier that year, Bourdieu had become involved in an enterprise designed 
not simply to criticise existing policy, but positively to propose a framework for 
measures that might be adopted in the future. President Mitterand had written in 
February 1984 to the administrator of the Collège de France, the most 
prestigious of France’s academic institutions, where Bourdieu had had a chair 
since 1981, asking its professors to formulate what they saw as the ‘fundamental 
principles’ that should inform future educational programmes.27 The report was 
duly prepared, and was published in 1985. Bourdieu would subsequently say 
that it did not really respond to the specific demand formulated by Mitterand, 
but in saying this he was perhaps looking to defend his reputation for intellectual 
‘autonomy’.28 For the report does address the principal indications expressed in 
the President’s letter – the integration of artistic/literary culture with scientific 
knowledge, the consideration of technological and social change, the equipping 
of pupils with modern instruments of thought, etc. Indeed it seems that Bourdieu 
played the principal role in the elaboration of this report. Not only, as he put it, 
was it a ‘point of honour’ to ensure its rigour, given that his academic reputation 
rested in good measure on his specialist analyses of the French education 
system. It is also clear that he identified with the detail of the report, defending 
unreservedly in interviews both its prescriptions and omissions, and not 
                                                 
26  ‘Université: les rois sont nus’, interview with Didier Eribon, in Le Nouvel Observateur, 2-8 
November 1984, pp. 86-10, included in Bourdieu, Interventions, pp. 189-98 (p. 195). 
27 Mitterand’s letter is included at the beginning of the final report, published as Propositions 
pour l’enseignment de l’avenir élaborées à la demande de Monsieur le Président de la 
République par les professeurs du Collège de France, Paris: Collège de France, 1985 
(referred to hereafter as PPEA). 
28 ‘Le rapport du Collège de France: Pierre Bourdieu s’explique’, interview with Jean-Pierre 
Salgas, in La Quinzaine littéraire, August 1985, no. 445, pp. 8-10, included in Bourdieu, 
Interventions, pp. 203-10 (p. 203). 
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contradicting his interviewer when he was addressed as its ‘author’.29 It seems, 
therefore, entirely appropriate to trace in the report how Bourdieu’s cultural 
policy thought negotiates the transition from critique to positive proposition. 
Nevertheless, at another level, Bourdieu was keen to underline that he was not 
the sole author of the report. He thought that it was an important and welcome 
political development that the President of the Republic had addressed his 
request not to an isolated individual but to a recognised academic body.30 For 
Bourdieu, this implied a recognition of the institutional autonomy of the 
academy, and of the corresponding rights of educational professionals to 
legislate collectively over their activities. Needless to say, Bourdieu would be 
critical of the way in which the report would serve Mitterand’s political self-
projection. He saw it as figuring, as cultural policy considerations had in the 
programmes of the Plan in the early 1970s, as a ‘supplément d’âme’ in the 
President’s ‘Letter to the French People’ in 1988.31 Even so, he regarded the 
report also as laying down an important ‘buffer’ (‘une espèce de butoir’) that 
might make it harder for certain political regressions and abuses to take place.32 
Thus, when Mitterand’s Minister for Education, Lionel Jospin, asked Bourdieu  
in late 1988 to co-chair a commission reflecting on the contents of the 
educational curriculum, he was prepared to continue his collaboration with the 
(socialist) State.33
 We have seen already how one of the principal thrusts of Bourdieu’s 
thinking in the 1960s was to bring cultural policy institutions more directly into 
the orbit of the education system. It will not, therefore, be surprising  to find 
recommendations relevant to broader cultural policy within what are nominally 
reports for the State education system. In fact, the interest of the Collège de 
France report for us will lie to some degree in the way the relations between 
schools and cultural policy institutions are significantly reconstrued. There are 
other differences between these reports and Bourdieu’s previous social scientific 
analyses. He himself notes that the Collège de France report is explicitly 
normative rather than purely critical – it actually, unlike his books, states what 
‘must’ be done.34 This is in part because it is expressing a collective line (that of 
the Collège de France), and is therefore a more directly political document. As a 
result, it also attends more closely than do Bourdieu’s books to the question of 
                                                 
29 ‘Le rapport du Collège de France: Pierre Bourdieu s’explique’, in Interventions, p. 209. 
30 ‘Université: les rois sont nus’, in Interventions, p. 195. 
31 See Interventions, p. 186. 
32 ‘Le rapport du Collège de France: Pierre Bourdieu s’explique’, in Interventions, p. 210. 
33 The report of the commission, which Bourdieu co-presided with François Gros, was 
published as  Principes pour une réflexion sur les contenus d’enseignement (Paris: Ministère 
de l’Education nationale, de la jeunesse et des sports, March 1989). The text of the report can 
be found in Bourdieu, Interventions, pp. 217-226. The report is referred to hereafter as PRCE, 
followed by page references to its publication in Interventions. 
34 ‘Le rapport du Collège de France: Pierre Bourdieu s’explique’, in Interventions, p. 203. 
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what might and might not be politically possible. Bourdieu seems proud in 
commenting on this text to assert (is he making a virtue out of necessity?) that 
certain terms one would have expected to see – reproduction, democratization – 
simply do not figure.35 For, he argues, the education system is set up and 
embedded within social relations in such a way that it is virtually impossible to 
expect it not to reproduce the social order. The most one can hope is that 
devices, levers and stratagems might be instituted that counteract in some 
measure this secular dynamic. The worst one could do would be to make 
dramatic promises whose failure would simply reinforce the disinvestment of 
those who profit least from that system. Thus we see Bourdieu formulating a 
quasi-Stoic understanding of public policy: 
 
What is in play, and what ordinary discussions on politics never get at, is 
the very idea of what political action can be and do – what used to be 
called ‘government’. Politicians should meditate on the Stoic distinction 
between what depends on us and what does not depend on us. The great 
principle responsible for error, as is well-known, lies in the ignorance of 
one’s limits.36  
 
All public policy can do (but it is an important function) is, accordingly, is to 
control ‘softly and imperceptibly’ forcefields whose dynamics have a strong 
degree of inertia; it is more akin to ‘the art of using people’s passions’ rather 
than changing those passions.37 Certainly, as we have seen, the field of public 
policy does not, in Bourdieu’s thinking, exhaust the realm of politics. He evokes 
also an ‘everyday political invention’ dispersed across the social body that 
demonstrates more resourcefulness and imagination than ‘two years of work 
carried out by a commission for the Plan’.38 We will see in the next chapter how 
Michel de Certeau, in particular, turned that inventivity itself into an object of 
both analysis and policy reflection. Let us first, however, consider how Bourdieu 
channelled the unchecked tide of critique into the narrow limits of the politically 
feasible. 
 
 Given their explicitly normative rather than purely critical intent, one 
might wonder what norms these reports seek to institute, and therefore, by 
extension, what types of cultural content they seek to prescribe. Unsurprisingly, 
the Collège de France report begins by proposing as a key norm the critical 
disposition itself. The notion of cultural arbitrariness, deployed in Bourdieu’s 
previous work as a critical instrument ‘against’ legitimate culture, is proposed 
itself as a fundamental positive component of their programme: 
                                                 
35 See the quotation from an interview carried out in Tokyo in 1989 in Interventions, p. 186. 
36‘Université: les rois sont nus’, in Interventions, p. 197. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., p. 198. 
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The only universal foundation that one can give to a culture lies in the 
recognition of the degree of arbitrariness it owes to its historicity: it would 
thus be a question of bringing this arbitrariness to light and developing the 
necessary instruments (supplied by philosophy, philology, ethnology, 
history or sociology) for understanding and accepting other forms of 
culture. (PPEA 14) 
 
The discourse devised as a critique of a given cultural curriculum was thus 
proposed as an essential part of any future curriculum. Recognising a culture’s 
degree of ‘arbitrariness’ – the extent to which it need not be as it is – could 
diminish the reign of automatic acceptance and unconscious reproduction, and 
strengthen ‘the logic of conscious choice’ (PRCE 221). The purpose of instilling 
such a critical disposition was not to generate hordes of academic commentators, 
but rather to provide people with an essential means of self-defence (the text 
uses Bourdieu’s favoured metaphor of the martial arts). Armed with this 
disposition, future citizens would be able to protect themselves more effectively 
against the ‘abuses of symbolic power’ deployed in the worlds of advertising, 
politics or religion (and also, Bourdieu would have written in another context, 
the academy itself…) (PPEA 13). 
 More generally, the Collège de France report argued that the State must 
establish a ‘common cultural minimum’ whose transmission to every pupil it 
would guarantee (PPEA 27). The reflection on this ‘minimum’ in the two 
reports displaces Bourdieu’s critical cultural policy thinking in interesting ways. 
Firstly, it is clear that this ‘minimum’ is not to be understood in a minimalist 
way as what pupils might need simply to get by in life. Rather, it is proposed as 
the ‘core of fundamental and obligatory knowledge and know-how’ that pupils 
would require to continue to learn and develop over the rest of their lives. The 
key point for our purposes here is Bourdieu’s emphasis on the need to create 
needs within the pupils that they do not spontaneously have. For ‘those who are 
deprived of this minimum do not know that they can and must claim it, as they 
do with the minimum wage. Cultural alienation tends to exclude the 
consciousness of that alienation.’39 We saw in the previous section Bourdieu’s 
irony and suspicion with regard to those cultural animateurs who ‘artificially’ 
induced cultural ‘needs’ in their target populations. Bourdieu himself, however, 
would come later to assert forthrightly that this state of unconscious privation 
was a very important factor for any cultural policy to take into account, and that, 
in many cases, ‘cultural action must produce the need for its own product’.40 
                                                 
39 ‘Le rapport du Collège de France: Pierre Bourdieu s’explique’, in Interventions, p. 208 
40 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Contre les divisions scolastiques’, in L’Université au défi de la culture. 
Actes des assises culturelles de l’Université de Toulouse-le-Mirail (29 et 30 octobre 1990) 
(Toulouse : Association pour le Développement de la Documentation et de la Communication 
Culturelles en Midi-Pyrénées, April 1991), pp. 31-57 (p. 36). 
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Indeed, in the same talk, he would denounce the educational ‘back to basics’ 
campaign conducted by the Socialist Minister of Education Jean-Pierre 
Chevènement between 1984 and 1986, and it is worth citing in full the terms of 
Bourdieu’s criticism, as it articulates in particularly clear-cut form an essential 
component of his cultural policy position: 
 
[People such as Chevènement] propose an educational policy that gives 
the people, in a sense, what it wants, with a little bit of civics as a bonus, 
and which takes as its basis a previous and outdated mode of pedagogical 
action in order to give the people, with its agreement and support, an 
education that tends to imprison it in its state of cultural dispossession. 
Such folk have all the appearances of democracy on their side, and they 
can thus count on the support of all those who, having learnt in the old-
style primary schools only to read, write and count, are deprived of their 
deprivation, and who are ignorant not only of the extent of their 
ignorance, but also of everything of which their schooling deprived them, 
for example all the modern techniques and modes of thought, and who 
therefore are happy in all good faith for their children to be similarly 
deprived. If I could really control the meaning I should like to give the 
term, I would call this form of populism ‘national-socialist’. There’s a 
way of flattering the people in its deprivation, and in its unawareness of 
its deprivation, which is one of the most tragic forms of demagogy, that 
populist demagogy […] that is one of the permanent temptations of what 
is called the Left.41
 
Having directed his thinking in the 1960s against the discourse of (innate) 
cultural ‘needs’, Bourdieu would thus come to see the ‘artificial’ production of 
(acquired) needs as a first step in any cultural policy process. 
 As regards the specific contents attaching to this ‘common cultural 
minimum’, the reports did not really attach themselves to the cataloguing of 
particular themes. This was not their brief, as they were charged explicity with 
articulating fundamental ‘principles’ which would inform subsequent 
curriculum deliberation. They do, however, caution against the dangers of 
‘encyclopedism’, i.e. trying to cram in as much information as possible into the 
heads of pupils. For the key  issue appeared to be the relation of pupils to such 
information. And here too, we can point up an interesting comparison  with 
Bourdieu’s previous critical work. For there he had argued that the real problem 
with traditional cultural education lay in its privileging of a certain ‘relation’ to 
culture over the content of that culture itself.42 That is, a certain ‘natural’, 
assured, elegant, rhetorically ‘distinguished’ relation to the cultural contents 
                                                 
41 Ibid., pp. 35-6. 
42 See e.g. R 160, 163, 235 [138 n.29, 128, 198]. 
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distributed by school were more important than the effective mastery of those 
contents (and an important element of that relation to academic culture was that 
it should not seem too academic…). But Bourdieu did not propose, as this 
previous work might have implied, to create a context in which ‘culture could be 
dissociated from one’s relation to culture’ (R 160 [138 n.29]). Instead, the 
reports designated what one could describe as a range of instruments allowing 
pupils from different social backgrounds to enter into a more controlled and 
confident relation with regard to cultural contents they might subsequently come 
across. These are represented in particular by the explicit inculcation of certain 
‘modes of thought’: 
 
Education must privilege all types of teaching that are well-suited  to 
providing modes of thought endowed with general validity and 
applicability, over and above types of teaching that propose forms of 
knowledge that can be learnt just as effectively (and sometimes more 
agreeably) by other means […]. One must resolutely give priority to those 
types of teaching charged with ensuring the conscious and critical 
assimilation of the fundamental modes of thought (such as the deductive 
mode of thought, the experimental mode of thought, or the historical 
mode of thought, and also the reflexive and critical mode of thought, 
which ought always to be associated with them). (PRCE 219) 
 
The previously expressed hope whereby one’s ‘relation’ to culture as an issue 
might fall away is recast insofar as the prescribed norm becomes the instilling in 
all pupils of an ‘art of thinking’ that would allow them to enter into a controlled, 
creative and emancipatory relation to any particular cultural content. 
 This did not simply take up the more instrumentalist agenda evoked in 
Bourdieu’s work of the 1960s of trying to diffuse more universally traits 
constitutive of the dominant relation to culture. For Bourdieu would suggest that 
the dominant relation to culture is, in a number of ways, also a ‘mutilated’ 
relation to culture that is unconscious of its own mutilation or ‘deprivation’.43 
This was most clearly apparent in the dichotomous relation between ‘literary’ 
and ‘scientific’ culture that structured it. As part of a more generalised 
endeavour to link up (articuler) the diverse modes of thought indicated above, 
the reports repeatedly evoke the need to ‘reconcile the universalism inherent in 
scientific thought and the relativism taught through the historical sciences that 
attend to the plurality of modes of life and cultural traditions’ (PRCE 224). That 
relativism is perhaps none other than the ‘historical’ mode of thought evoked 
                                                 
43 ‘Contre les divisions scolastiques’, p. 42 
 60
above – or what Bourdieu would theorize and refine in his own scientific work 
as ‘the relational mode of thought’.44
 Bourdieu thus proposed a policy orientation that would look not simply to 
distribute more equitably the products of legitimate culture, but that would also 
work to reconfigure that culture itself - particularly via the system of 
‘classification’ that constituted it. Dominant cultures (and this trait is 
particularly marked in France) tend to impose clear hierarchies of cultural 
excellence, in which different aptitudes (manual, practical, analytical, 
theoretical…), subjects (metalwork, engineering, languages, mathematics, 
philosophy…) and genres occupy clearly defined positions. In this respect, while 
some pupils will gain an exorbitant (and itself mutilated…) sense of their own 
importance, most will at some stage or another have a sense of being ‘relegated’ 
to the position ascribed to them. They will be condemned to a ‘more or less 
unhappy experience both of the culture they have received [their ‘natural’ 
aptitudes] and of the academically dominant culture [that relegates those 
aptitudes]’ (PPEA 17). Bourdieu argues not for an abolition of hierarchies 
(sociologically improbable and indeed politically undesirable). Instead he argues 
for their ‘multiplication’, via a diversification of  ‘the socially recognised forms 
of cultural excellence’ (PPEA 17). This, one might say, would be a constructive 
use of that ‘State magic’ evoked above: the education system’s power of 
certification, criticised elsewhere by Bourdieu, could be harnessed to this task of  
readjusting, or at least inflecting, the rates of exchange between different types 
of cultural capital. Practically, this meant raising the profile of practice as such 
within the curriculum. Without discrediting the theory that can usefully be 
brought to ‘inhabit’ practice,45 the overriding goal for all areas of education 
becomes to bring pupils to ‘make things’ (a film, a newspaper, a chemical 
experiment, a diagnosis...). Arts education itself, for so long so undervalued, 
underresourced and narrowly defined in French education, becomes in this 
perspective a pivotal matter: 
 
Arts education, conceived as the in-depth teaching of a given artistic 
practice (music, painting, cinema, etc.), freely and voluntarily chosen 
(instead of being, as it is today, indirectly imposed), would assume again 
                                                 
44 Cf. e.g. Bourdieu, Le Sens pratique (Paris : Minuit, 1980), p. 11 [4] : ‘The philosophical 
glosses which, for a time, surrounded structuralism have neglected and concealed what really 
constituted its essential novelty – the introduction into the social sciences of the structural 
method, or, more simply, of the relational mode of thought which, by breaking with the 
substantialist mode of thought, leads one to characterize each element by the relationships 
which unite it with all the others in a system and from which it derives its meaning and 
function.’ 
45 Cf. the discussion in ‘Contre les divisions scolastiques’, pp. 50-52, where the invention and 
use of theoretical instruments is itself described as being an ‘art’ that is learnt through 
practice, over which a capacity for pre-reflexive ‘intuition’ can be acquired. 
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an eminent position. In this domain more than any other, discourse must 
be subordinated to practice (that of an instrument, or even composition, 
drawing or painting, the design of one’s living space. etc.). The revocation 
of prevailing hierarchies should entail here also, especially at elementary 
levels, the teaching not just of the fine arts but also, and just as much, of 
the applied arts, which are extremely useful in everyday life – for example 
graphic arts, the arts associated with publishing and advertising, industrial 
aesthetics, audio-visual arts, and photography. (PPEA 19). 
 
Here as elsewhere, Bourdieu’s reflection on aesthetic matters has shed some of 
the ‘intellocentric’ bias that characterised his earlier reflection. As he would 
indicate later in some suggestive remarks on a ‘non-cartesian pedagogy’ (an 
interesting development/critique of his ‘rational pedagogy’), generative practice 
rather than methodological ‘first principles’ is what must come first.46 He came 
to theorise intellectual inquiry itself, in its practical rather than purely exegetical 
mode of existence, as a skill, an ‘art’ in the sense of an acquired dexterity: like a 
well coached footballer instinctively following his footballing brain, a well 
trained researcher would acquire ‘automatically’ critical turns of thought and 
would come to intuit ‘pre-reflexively’ (thinking without thinking that he was 
thinking) new patterns and connections. Rather like his professed mentor, Blaise 
Pascal, Bourdieu begins his critical thought by breaking with all forms of 
cultural ‘habit’ (exposed as arbitrary and discriminatory). Having done this, he 
returns to the question of ‘habit’ and pre-reflexive ‘automatism’, but, as Pascal 
would put it, with a different idea behind it all (une pensée de derrière).47 And 
the problem facing cultural policy (to pursue a little provocatively the parallel 
with Pascal) becomes, firstly, to convince folk that they do indeed need 
‘salvation’ and, secondly, to instill in them the habits that will take them to 
greater felicity and understanding. Bourdieu had exposed the ruts along which 
particular types of academic or artistic ‘habitus’ were set up to run – but did not 
suppose that the remedy for this in a policy perspective was to give free reign to 
people’s spontaneity (this would simply have given free reign to the inclinations 
and ‘privations’ of their primary habitus). Rather, he looked to schooling as the 
cultural institution through which ‘emancipatory disciplines’ could be imposed 
and, through an emphasis on repeated practice, ‘habituses of invention, creation 
and liberty’ could be inculcated.48
 As an institution, schools exist among a network of other cultural 
institutions. Indeed, we have seen how Bourdieu had previously proposed, in a 
rather abruptly ‘pedagogocratic’ manner, that those cultural institions should be 
purged of their ‘anti-academic ideology’ and brought into the orbit of the 
                                                 
46 See ‘Contre les divisions scolastiques’, pp. 47-53. 
47 Cf. Blaise Pascal, Pensées, number 336 (Brunschvicg edition). 
48 ‘Contre les divisions scolastiques’, p. 52. 
 62
education system.49 It is striking, particularly in the Collège de France report, 
that the relation between the education system and the other cultural institutions 
that make up a nation’s overall cultural policy would come to be interestingly 
reconfigured. The report stressed that school did not have a ‘monopoly’ in the 
transmission of knowledge, and that other types of institution – television, 
theatre, cinema, youth centres (maisons des jeunes et de la culture), etc. – were 
more effective with regard to certain types of transmission. Far from seeking to 
dominate these other institutions, the action of academic institutions could 
become more productive ‘if it were to integrate itself consciously and 
methodically into the universe of modes of cultural action exerted by other 
means of [cultural] diffusion’ (PPEA 41). Certainly, within this overall field of 
cultural action, there were certain tasks to which schools were best suited – 
essentially, as we have seen, the ‘inculcation of general and transposable 
dispositions that can only be acquired through repeated practice and exercises’ 
(PPEA 42). But the report clearly recognised that a properly maintained network 
of cultural institutions, including for example an adequately resourced source of 
quality television programming, were necessary to ‘create around school a 
cultural environment that is indispensable to the generalised success of the 
educational enterprise’ (PPEA 38). 
 The integration of schools within this wider universe of cultural action 
had to take place not simply via external relations between institutions but, 
notably, through the penetration of other modes and vehicles of cultural action 
within school itself. An obvious example is, again, the supply of quality 
programming, or the exploitation of ordinary media products within school 
(PPEA 37-9, 42-3). More revealing for our purposes is the notion that cultural 
‘creators’ (researchers, artists, writers) and intermediaries (publishers, 
journalists, curators) should be brought into schools. Interestingly, the report 
does not mention any ‘anti-academic’ bias that such external agents might bring; 
instead, it evokes, as well as the technical, financial and bureaucratic 
impediments to these ventures, the ‘psychological resistance’ that obstructed the 
participation of non-academic figures in the academic world (PPEA 42). Indeed, 
Bourdieu would later suggest that academic institutions might also be conceived 
as existing in a state of ‘unconscious deprivation’. Addressing an audience at the 
university of Toulouse-le-Mirail, he evokes a previous discussion among his 
listeners of how more artists might be brought into the university, and observes 
that before any artists were brought there, nobody missed them.50 Cultural 
deprivation, one might conclude, runs through the cultural field, and is relational 
through and through. The effect of integrating his educational reflection within a 
global cultural policy framework (rather than spelling out a purely sectorial 
                                                 
49 See ‘Quelques indications pour une politique de démocratisation’, Dossier no 1 du Centre 
de sociologie européenne, 6 rue de Tournon, Paris, included in Bourdieu, Interventions, pp. 
69-72 (p. 72), and the discussion in chapter one of the present study.  
50 ‘Contre les divisions scolastiques’, p. 43. 
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programme) was not now to bring all other institutions under the domination of 
educational criteria. Rather, by articulating as such the ‘universe of modes of 
cultural action’, each type of action could be brought, as it were, consciously to 
‘miss’ the other. 
 
 The Collège de France report repeatedly stressed the need to provide 
quality educational programming, and even advocates the creation of the 
dedicated State ‘cultural channel’ that would indeed soon after come into 
existence (PPEA 27, 46).51 It is not surprising that Bourdieu should look over 
the 1980s also to make direct propositions to the Socialist government 
concerning the defense and development of public television. For those 
acquainted with the history of French television over the 1980s, this will be even 
less surprising. In the space of a few years (essentially between 1984 and 1987), 
France had moved from a television system owned and run (and largely 
censored and stifled) entirely by the State, to one overwhelmingly in hoc to 
commercial interests. This had happened via the creation of three privately 
owned channels and, crucially, the privatisation of France’s leading public 
channel (TF1), leaving just two weakened public channels who themselves had 
to compete in the advertising market with the other channels for a substantial 
proportion of their income. We will see in chapter four how Régis Debray 
analyses the cultural policy implications of the fact that France’s principal 
cultural medium was now firmly ‘in the hands of the advertisers’. Bourdieu, for 
his part, associated himself with representatives of other sectors in the cultural 
field and directly addressed the Socialist government that had returned to office 
in 1988 (and that had inaugurated the privatisation process in 1984).52 As in his 
educational reports, the mood is again directly imperative: 
 
 It is a question of deciding whether the television viewer must be 
nourished or force-fed, whether advertising must be accepted or imposed, 
whether those making television programmes must represent for their 
viewers magicians, confidants, informants, teachers, animateurs, in short, 
people who create bonds, or simply vendors at the service of sacrosanct 
Ratings, there just to provide a frame for sequences of advertising.53
 
                                                 
51 The Franco-German cultural channel LA SEPT, later to become ARTE, was launched 
(initially only on cable) in 1986. 
52  Bourdieu’s proposals for State television were published as articles co-signed by Ange 
Casta (a television producer), Max Gallo (writer and journalist), Claude Marti 
(communications consultant), Jean Martin (a lawyer), and Christian Pierret (a Socialist 
member of the National Assembly). They appeared as ‘Que vive la télévision publique’, Le 
Monde, 19 October 1988, p. 2, and ‘Pour une télévision publique sans publicité’, Le Monde, 
29-30 April 1990, pp. 1 & 9. The quotation comes from ‘Que vive la télévision publique’. 
53 ‘Que vive la télévision publique’. 
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Again, like the educational reports, the articles directly address the State with 
detailed policy propositions: 
 
We have not been content just to ‘analyse’ the situation of the audiovisual 
domain as a whole – who hasn’t done that? We have studied the figures 
closely, brought together different kinds of expertise, given a voice to 
good sense, and worked out some concrete, clear and simple propositions. 
We addressed the politicians, those that hold power in ministerial cabinets 
and administrations, and the highest authorities of the State.54
 
In this case, the proposal was based on the notion of a ‘culture and 
communication’ tax to be levied on all media advertising transactions, the 
revenue of which would revert directly to public television channels. Their 
revenue would thus rise, according to the 1990 article, from 2.5 to around 4 
billion francs. At the same time, the proposal was presented as politically 
digestible insofar as the tax would be ‘reasonable’ and carefully modulated 
across the advertising market, and to the extent that the commercial channels 
would in some measure be compensated by the withdrawal of the public 
channels from that market (they would no longer have the right to carry 
advertising). The group even went so far as to lay down a draft outline for a law 
(one of their members was a member of parliament) – but to no avail. 
 Unlike Bourdieu’s educational reports, these propositions had not, of 
course, been sollicited by government. They were autonomously proposed. And 
while the articles rightly credited the socialist governments since 1981 with 
having freed television from direct governmental control, they were very critical 
of the ‘incoherencies’ in policy by which control over television had effectively 
been ceded to the powers of commerce. They made it clear that the 
independence of public television could not be achieved simply by the 
withdrawal of the State: it was up to parliament, having ‘freed’ public television 
from political control, to free it – via a different kind of political control – from 
the exclusive sway of financial interests.55 We can thus see these articles 
rehearsing what would become a familiar dialectic in Bourdieu’s cultural policy 
thinking. On the one hand, the cultural field requires State support if it is not to 
be overrun by the logic of an englobing economic field. On the other hand it 
must resist the very State power it also needs and demands – hence the reference 
in these texts for the imperative, should their proposition be accepted, for a 
‘separation between broadcasting and programme production’, and for a 
‘plurality in programming matters, to be ensured by a decentralisation of 
decision-making and a multiplication of the sources of creation and 
                                                 
54 ‘Pour une télévision sans publicité’, p. 1. 
55 ‘Pour une télévision sans publicité’, p. 9. 
 65
production’.56 Bourdieu was not content to offer his disinterested expertise to 
the State as and when it was required. Instead, engaging with the apparatus of 
State in a detailed and demanding manner, he would also critically step back 
from it as he formulated what would finally amount to a cultural policy 
campaign for creative ‘autonomy’. 
 
 
2.4  Autonomy in the Cultural Field 
 
 We have seen how, after the critical engagement of his 1960s work, 
Bourdieu came over the 1970s to adopt an attitude of resolute suspicion with 
regard to the State and its cultural policies (which initially looked in Gaullist 
fashion to use culture to neutralise or mask conflict, and then, after Giscard 
d’Estaing’s election in 1974, moved to a more markedly neo-liberal position of 
State withdrawal and the embrace of market forces). One might have expected 
Bourdieu to welcome the advent of a socialist government in 1981, especially 
given the unprecedented support and prominence it gave to its new-look cultural 
policy.57 To some degree, Bourdieu was certainly more prepared to cooperate 
with left-leaning administrations – as is evidenced by the educational reports 
discussed above. However, towards the end of the socialists’ extended period in 
office (1981-6; 1988-93), Bourdieu expressed his wariness with regard to the 
extensive networks of State cultural sponsorship that had been developed by 
Jack Lang. Comparing their softly-softly style of influence with the harsher and 
more explicit cultural censorship policy of the traditional American Right, he 
even went so far as to suggest in a conversation with Hans Haacke that ‘attacks 
on [cultural] autonomy are in a sense more dangerous when they come from a 
government which, like the socialist government in France, has leant on the 
weaknesses and fault-lines of the literary and artistic fields - that is, on the least 
autonomous (and least competent) creators - to impose its solicitations and 
seductions.’58 While to external observers this might appear like a case of those 
in the cultural professions biting the hand that fed them, Bourdieu diagnosed in 
the very generosity of these patrons of the arts an insidious form of Zhdanovism. 
Admittedly, it demonstrated none of the brutality or rigidity of the syndrome’s 
hard-line exemplifications. But it still amounted, in Bourdieu’s assessment, to a 
structure in which those with less artistic and/or cultural competence were able 
to impose their agenda on those with more such competence. It was more 
dangerous (though surely only in some respects…) because it was more 
                                                 
56 ‘Que vive la télévision publique’. 
57 For a comprehensive overview of this programme, see David Looseley, The Politics of 
Fun: Cultural Policy and Debate in Contemporary France (Oxford: Berg, 1995), pp. 69-245. 
58 P. Bourdieu & H. Haacke, Libre-échange (Paris: Seuil/Les Presses du Réel, 1994), pp. 22-3 
[p. 13 – trans. mod.], referred to hereafter as LE. 
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winning: via its blandishments and inducements, it could insinuate its way into 
the workings of the cultural field.59
 But if he wanted independence from all undue interference of the State in 
the cultural field, he also wanted independence from the agendas of the cultural 
and media industries. These industries pursued ‘cultural policies’ of their own 
(RA 208 [146]), and, as they had become ever larger, ever more vertically and 
horizontally integrated, and ever more transnational, these effective cultural 
policies had become ever more difficult to resist. These policies were based on 
criteria of maximal short-term profit, and ran directly counter to the principles 
governing autonomous cultural fields.60 They were elaborated in sites removed 
from democratic control, and looked to impose their neo-liberal conditions on 
the directions taken by State educational and cultural policies.61
 One could construct on this basis something like a cultural policy ‘field’ 
comprising all those strategic forces looking to model the cultural field, and/or 
to instrumentalize that field for their own purposes (the augmenting of financial 
capital, the creation of political consensus and belief, etc.). Clearly, the 
dominant poles of such a field would be constituted by the transnational cultural 
industries and individual nation States (the latter perhaps increasingly 
functioning as ‘dominated dominators’). Into this field – if one accepts the 
construction – we can see Bourdieu looking to project a supplementary position. 
He looked to institute (or at the very least, consolidate) sites that might function 
as federated platforms for a kind of cultural counter-policy. He worked 
particularly over the 1990s to mobilize international intellectual and cultural 
groupings around a range of issues, and to endow these groupings with a 
politically effective symbolic force. Reflecting in 1994 on the possible uses of 
an international writers’ parliament, he proposed as its first principle an 
 
independence with regard to political, economic and media powers, and 
also with regard to all forms of orthodoxy. The vocation of the 
Parliament’s action must be to defend wherever it is threatened the 
autonomy of creation and thought, to return to writers the full control over 
their means of production and the definition of their work, and to define 
                                                 
59 For another analysis of the problematic aspects of a policy where cultural creators depended 
on direct political patronage, see Jean Caune, ‘The power of creation or power to the 
creators?’ [1992], in Ahearne (ed.), French Cultural Policy Debates, pp. 157-61. 
60 P. Bourdieu, ‘Questions aux vrais maîtres du monde’, paper given on 11 October 1999 at 
Canal+/MTR conference, in front of assembled directors of major media groups, published in 
Le Monde, 14 October 1999 and Libération, 13 October 1999, and included in Bourdieu, 
Interventions, pp. 417-24 (p. 419). 
61 Bourdieu, ‘Les chercheurs et le mouvement social’, paper given in Athens in May 2001, 
published in Interventions, pp. 465-9 (pp. 465-7). 
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itself a ‘policy of creation’ that is independent of States’ ‘cultural 
policies’ and indifferent to the pressures of the market or the media.62
 
He even goes on to propose a kind of counter-administration, comprising 
secretariats, commissions, plenary and regional meetings. Unsurprisingly 
perhaps, it was difficult to impose such a bureaucracy, the condition of any 
sustained effective action, on a dispersed body of writers, and Bourdieu became 
disenchanted with this particular instance of mobilization. This was not the case, 
however, with other more enduring groupings that he helped institute.63 And the 
general point is perhaps this: within an essentially bipolar cultural policy field, 
Bourdieu looked to introduce an organised supplementary third pole that could, 
at the very least, unsettle the two others. Given the commercially homogenising 
and neo-liberal thrust of the cultural industries, given the tendency of State 
cultural policies to overt or disguised forms of ‘Zhdanovism’, given also the 
effective combinations of the two (think of America’s implicit cultural policy), 
Bourdieu looked to give shape to a third pole constituted by a self-conscious 
body of cultural producers. 
 The odds, clearly, would always be against such a potentially nebulous 
pole, liable always to rescatter, and whose only substantial capital is cultural and 
symbolic. Framed in this way, however, one is perhaps reminded of Bourdieu’s 
analysis of the nineteenth-century artistic field in France. He evokes the 
‘particular horror’ inspired in the most able and innovative artists of the time by 
‘the cultural atmosphere of the Second Empire’ (RA 91 [59]). On the one hand, 
this atmosphere was defined by the cultural strategies of Napoleon III, 
multiplying festivals, commissions and pensions for the most compliant of 
artists and intellectuals, and thereby exerting direct control over the literary and 
artistic fields (RA 77-9 [49-50]). On the other hand, the period saw the 
increasing ‘industrialisation’ of literary values via the commercial expansion of 
the press, based to a considerable degree on the serialisation of novels defined 
for the purpose (RA 82-4 [53-4]). The interests of these two poles overlapped to 
a considerable degree (though other studies show how Napoleon’s regime of 
press censorship also delayed the subsequent explosion of the popular daily 
                                                 
62 P. Bourdieu, ‘Un parlement des écrivains pour quoi faire?’, Libération, 3 November 1994, 
republished in Interventions, pp. 289-92 (p. 289). 
63 As examples of such groupings one might cite the programmatically ‘autonomous’ journal 
founded by Bourdieu in 1975, the Actes de Recherche en Sciences Sociales; the Association 
for Reflection on Higher Education and Research (ARESER), launched in 1992,  and the 
International Committee of Support for Algerian Intellectuals (CISIA), launched in 1993 (on 
these, see Interventions, pp. 293-5); and Raisons d’agir, launched in the mid-1990s as a 
‘collective grouping designed to put the analytic competence of researchers at the service of 
those movements resisting neoliberal policies, as a counterweight to the influence of 
conservative think tanks’ (editors’ comment, Interventions, p. 331). See also Peter Collier’s 
analysis of the initially cross-national publishing venture Liber in ‘Liber: Liberty and 
Literature’, French Cultural Studies, 4/3, October 1993, pp. 291-304. 
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press). Moreover, artists also had a sense of inhabiting a kind of political end-
game, in which all possible moves (the liberal Monarchy of 1830-48, the 
revolution of 1848, the Second Republic of 1848-1852, not to mention the 
Second Empire) had become derisory. Bourdieu traces how, faced with this 
predicament, the most innovative and recalcitrant artists of the period (notably 
Baudelaire, Flaubert, and Manet) worked to invent and consolidate a new 
position in the cultural field. They refused the values both of the Academy and 
the bohemian counter-culture, whose ‘social art’ they adjudged to be artistically 
incompetent; they fell into line neither with the ‘philistine’ taste of the 
governing class, nor (when their private income allowed) with the demands of 
the press. They ‘seceded’ from all existing authorities, recognising no ‘law’ but 
that of their own artistic projects. They thus created the seeds of an ‘empire 
within an empire’ (RA 90 [59]). Certainly, this fragile empire was in its 
formative phase ‘radically elitist’ (RA 464 [341]) and hostile to any political 
engagement. Nevertheless, Bourdieu shows how, by an unintended ruse of 
history, that ‘empire’ came within a few decades to constitute a quasi-
institutional platform from which political campaigns could be launched 
challenging the prerogatives of the political and financial elites. In a 
homologous fashion, Bourdieu could be seen as seeking to help into being a new 
position in the cultural policy field that could alter the play of forces within that 
field. 
 
 Engaged in an increasingly explicit polemic with the twin adversaries of 
neo-liberalism and governmental ‘Zhdanovism’ (and these orientations could 
combine in various ways), Bourdieu was brought to define in more forthright 
terms just what he was looking to defend. This represents a contrast to the 
scientific ‘neutrality’, or quasi-Flaubertian irony, for which he strives in his 
sociological studies (where individual positions in a field are neither condemned 
nor embraced, but understood in terms of the conflicts and interests defining the 
field). Bourdieu was conscious of this contrast, proclaiming the need to take up 
an explicitly ‘normative position’ (RA 461 [339]) in order to advance what we 
might call his cultural counter-policy agenda. The object of his concern is thus 
defined abruptly as ‘the rarest acquisitions of human history’ (LE 77 [72 – trans. 
mod.]), or ‘the highest productions of humanity’, such as ‘mathematics, poetry, 
literature, and philosophy’, which all represent things that ‘have been produced 
against the equivalent of audience ratings, against commercial logic’.64 The 
metaphor of elevation would recur – Bourdieu evokes also the ‘highest 
conquests of humanity’ (LE 77 [72 – trans. mod.]) – and contrasts strikingly 
with the irony directed at the worship of high culture that also runs through 
                                                 
64 Bourdieu, Sur la télévision (Paris : Liber, 1996), p. 29 [p. 27 – trans. mod.]. One should 
note that ‘acquis’ can signify in French acquisitions, but also rights and entitlements (in the 
sense that Trade Union struggles have over history acquired rights and entitlements that need 
to be defended). 
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Bourdieu’s work. As he deploys it in its ‘normative’ and self-consciously 
prescriptive sense, this metaphor seems designed to connote not just the 
arduousness of the process leading to these diverse cultural breakthroughs, but 
also the potential universality of their reach and their status as points of 
reference that ‘stand above’ the human activity to which they can give sense and 
direction. This discursive shift may also be due to changes in the social 
existence and status of traditional ‘high’ cultural corpuses. Discredited on one 
flank by the technocratic and managerialist culture of the economically 
dominant classes, and on the other by a popular anti-intellectualism increasingly 
ratified by a populist media, it is no longer clear whether those traditional 
corpuses are more the instruments or targets of ‘symbolic violence’.65 In such a 
context, a purely ironical description of those cultures’ workings may have come 
close to flogging a dead horse. 
 This is not to say that Bourdieu advocated a simple return to the worship 
of high culture. This would have amounted to a revocation of the insights gained 
as a result of his own sociological work, which helps us, as I have suggested, to 
see culture in its social existence not as a monolithic bloc, but as 
‘multifunctional’. Yet Bourdieu, in his ‘normative’ considerations, was not 
obliged to endorse all the functions that he saw legitimate culture as having 
traditionally fulfilled. Indeed, his understanding of those functions allowed him 
to specify more precisely not just the cultural resources but also, especially, the 
uses of culture that he was looking to defend: 
 
Those I am addressing here are not all those who conceive of culture as a 
patrimony, a dead culture to be made into an obligatory cult of ritual 
piety, or as an instrument of domination and distinction, cultural bastion 
and Bastille, to be erected against the Barbarians within and without (who 
these days often seem to the new defenders of the West to be one and the 
same), but rather those who conceive of culture as an instrument of liberty 
that itself presupposes liberty, as a modus operandi allowing the 
permanent supersession of the opus operatum, i.e. a culture reified and 
closed. (RA 461-2 [339-40 – trans. mod.]) 
 
Lest the scholastic terms disconcert, it is worth recalling Bourdieu’s observation 
elsewhere that discussions of modus operandi (ways of proceeding) and opus 
operatum (the work actually produced) nearly always leave out the essential 
issue – the ars inveniendi, the art of inventing or discovering things.66 In any 
case, the thrust of his message is clear. People do not need specific cultural 
resources to be free, but engagement with such resources, with the most 
                                                 
65 On the rise of technocratic and managerialist culture as a terrain for social distinction, to 
which Bourdieu had long been alert, and the subsequent displacement of ‘humanist’ culture, 
see e.g. D 361 [315]and NE 302-5, 484 [212-14, 337]. 
66‘Contre les divisions scolastiques’, p. 51. 
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searching achievements of humanity, can increase their degree of liberty. And it 
can emancipate them, notably, from the ‘ritual pieties’ and the strategies of 
‘domination and distinction’ that might be put upon them in the names either of 
traditional culture or the technocratic and managerialist discourse that has 
supplanted its preeminence. 
 All that is very well, but begs the question of who decides upon which 
human achievements are indeed the highest. The answer, for Bourdieu in 
normative mode, lies within the workings of the cultural field itself. If there is to 
be a chance that the most universally valuable achievements are to be positioned 
as the ‘highest’, then the requisite filtering process must be independent both of 
purely commercial calculations and also of political instrumentalization. 
Cultural producers must be able to set down their own laws – they must be auto-
nomous (nomos, in Greek, signifying ‘law’). Of course, not all cultural 
producers will agree as to  what laws should prevail, and there will be a vigorous 
conflict among them. In Bourdieu’s terms, a healthy cultural field is defined by 
the absence of any single centrally defined law – it ‘institutionalizes anomie’.67 
But out of the struggles which constitute that field, particular hierarchies will 
emerge, laying down particular laws (they exert a ‘nomothetical’ effect). Our 
trouble is, of course, that due in part to Bourdieu’s own work, we will be 
suspicious of those norms (cultural producers have their own compulsions and 
interests, and they are particularly adept at disguising these as purely universal, 
democratic, or artistic interests). But at least, in a field where the principle of 
anomie reigns, we have the right to voice those suspicions, and to integrate them 
into the filtering process. In Bourdieu’s perspective, a cultural field with a high 
degree of autonomy is more likely to bring to the top of its hierarchies those 
works most worthy of being universally transmitted than a cultural field in hoc 
to the ‘heteronomous’ principles of short-term profitability or political 
expediency. 
 What Bourdieu really wants to defend, therefore, are autonomous cultural 
fields themselves – and in particular the ‘ecological’ conditions that enable them 
to endure.68 We have seen above all the reasons he adduces for being suspicious 
of these fields. They perform the ‘symbolic alchemy’ through which value and 
belief are invested in the ‘fetishes’ of the cultural world. All the inhabitants of 
that microcosm have vested interests in maintaining that belief via their rituals 
of celebration and contestation (their very arguments suggesting that something 
important is at stake) (RA 241-2, 318-9 [170, 229]). Bourdieu does not revoke 
these analyses, which designate decidedly non-euphoriant truths about the 
                                                 
67 On the institutionalization of anomie, see RA 93-103 [60-8] (with regard to literature); or 
‘Manet and the Institutionalization of Anomie’ [1987], in Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural 
Production, ed. R. Johnson (Cambridge: Polity, 1993), pp. 238-53. 
68 See ‘Questions aux vrais maîtres du monde’, in Interventions, p. 420 (Bourdieu refers to 
Ernst Gombrich). On the question of the ‘ecological’ conditions of given cultural spheres, cf. 
also the discussion of Régis Debray in the present volume (below, 4.4). 
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network of institutions maintained notably by State educational and cultural 
policy. Yet it is as though the normative constraints imposed by Bourdieu’s 
cultural policy engagements themselves imposed on him a kind of filtering 
process, obliging him to confront more directly what was and what was not 
worth defending. We see this in the text of what must have been a rather 
incongruous paper that Bourdieu gave in 1999 to the assembled heads of the 
world’s leading transnational media enterprises, and entitled, lucidly enough, 
‘Questions for the real masters of the world’.69 Bourdieu is forced to spell out 
the conditions that might make it possible for cultural producers not to follow 
the short-term profit criteria of commercial cultural policies (if one assumes that 
human beings are not routinely self-sacrificing and heroic, and that they require 
incomes and recognition). In so doing, Bourdieu is brought to defend, as a 
precious but threatened ‘ecosystem’, the very battery of institutions and agents 
that he described elsewhere as engaged in a collective process of misrecognition 
(RA 244 [172]). For if Paris had been able to foster so many lasting works, if it 
has often acted as a kind of headquarters for a ‘literary, artistic and 
cinematographic Internationale’, this was because it had concentrated, for 
historical reasons, a ‘microcosm of producers, critics and knowledgeable 
consumers’.70 And of course, it takes a long time, and suitably resourced cultural 
and pedagogic institutions, to create not only those creators that might not 
simply respond to mass demand, but also the ‘social spaces of producers and 
consumers within which they can appear, develop, and succeed’.71 The thrust of 
Bourdieu’s paper was to persuade the ‘masters of the world’ that it was in their 
long-term interest to protect, or at least not destroy, these cultural ecosystems 
that could in due course deliver substantial demand for symbolic goods. In a 
sense, this may well be casuistry (such harmony between the interests of media 
entrepreneurs and autonomous cultural producers seems improbable). But 
underlying this rhetorical move was Bourdieu’s belief that the universes of 
cultural production that had conquered their autonomy over the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries had now entered a phase of ‘involution’, overrun by the 
demands for short-term profit and appeal imposed by heteronomous authorities. 
 Bourdieu wanted in the first instance to defend autonomous cultural fields 
for their own sake, insofar as the goods they produced were, to a greater or 
lesser extent, ultimately of universal worth. We have also seen, however, how 
the autonomy of a cultural field, once constituted, can serve as a platform for 
political campaigns directed at those outside the field. The classic example here, 
which Bourdieu analyses as inaugurating in France the figure of the 
‘intellectual’, is the Dreyfus Case.72 Agents in the cultural field can use the 
cultural and symbolic capital (expertise and recognition) they have acquired 
                                                 
69 See note 60 above. 
70 ‘Questions aux vrais maîtres du monde’, p. 423. 
71 Ibid., p. 422. 
72 See RA 185-9 [129-31]. 
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there to exert effects in the universe of political decision-making. We have seen 
how Bourdieu pursued this practice with regard to cultural policy strategies, and 
will see a further instance of this below, concerning the cultural implications of 
the GATS trade talks. He adopted, as it were, a two-pronged strategy. When 
faced with political or commercial pressures (the latter often mediated through 
the categories that journalists bring to their work), he would defend 
uncompromisingly the autonomy of the cultural field.73 When operating within 
that field, he would urge his colleagues collectively to defend that autonomy, but 
also to ‘engage’ the resources it secured in wider political struggles (the ultimate 
purpose of his prescriptions was not simply to create an ivory tower). The 
resources thus engaged could be, for example, the expertise of the intellectual, 
or properly artistic techniques for the production of aesthetic effect. Bourdieu is 
clearly fascinated by the work of Hans Haacke, whose formal artistic 
experiments do not take him away from the political and economic worlds, but 
lead him directly to challenge people’s perceptions of those worlds (applying 
shock treatment, as it were, to their habitus).74 The cultural counter-policy 
evoked above, if it were to exist politically, would be the result of this engaged 
autonomy. 
 
 In what I have construed as a multipolar field of cultural policy, there are 
several competing principles of domination (nomoi). In the light of this, it is not 
surprising that Bourdieu’s cultural policy reflection should encounter what he 
calls ‘antinomies’, resulting from conflicts between these principles that are not 
always resolvable in any absolute sense.75 For, to give the most obvious 
example, those in the cultural field are forced to depend upon what they must 
also oppose. As Bourdieu puts it, ‘there are a certain number of conditions 
regarding the existence of a critical culture that can only be assured by the State. 
In short, we [in the cultural field] must expect (and even demand) from the State 
the instruments through which we can acquire our liberty in relation to the 
powers-that-be –  economic powers, but also political powers, i.e. as regards the 
State itself’.76 He expresses here a kind of recalcitrant dependency on the State, 
drawn into a relation that he also contests. He would also, however, vigorously 
defend the ‘official’ definition of the republican State as the ‘guarantor’ of the 
                                                 
73 On journalistic categories, see Sur la télévision, 18-22, 54 [19-22, 47] (and passim). 
74 See Libre-échange, notably the reproductions and glosses of Haacke’s work on the 
connections in the USA between right-wing fundamentalism, corporate affairs, and the 
National Endowment for the Arts; in Europe between the world of high art and corporations 
tainted ethically by their work for Nazi Germany, apartheid South Africa, and the arms 
programme of Saddam Hussein; and his (unsuccessful) design for the courtyard for the 
French National Assembly, on which the eminently French republican principles of ‘Liberty, 
Equality, Fraternity’ would be inscribed in Arabic. 
75 For his reference to ‘antinomies’, see LE  23, 74, 77 [13, 69, 71]. 
76 LE 77 [71-2 – trans. mod.]. 
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‘general interest’ (LE 77 [72]) as itself an ‘extraordinary historical invention’ 
that constitutes a valuable ‘acquisition of humanity, just like art or science’.77 
For amongst other things, this official definition, as a real discursive entity, is 
one of the things that allows the State to be held to account, and to be 
manoeuvred into living up to its professed identity. But nowhere was Bourdieu’s 
positive attachment to the prerogatives of the republican State more apparent 
than when he had to defend it against the impositions of the transnational and 
commercially driven cultural policies (or anti-cultural policies) pursued by 
powerful politico-commercial lobbies through such institutions as the World 
Trade Organisation. In an address to the ‘Summit of the Peoples’ held in Quebec 
in 2001, he listed some of the domains which the GATS negotiation was set to 
‘open up’ to the laws of free trade. In addition to health and education, these 
amounted to a catalogue of those sectors that constitute a nation’s cultural policy 
as traditionally understood, comprising notably ‘services like libraries, the 
audiovisual sector, archives and museums, and all the services linked with 
entertainment, the arts, performance, sport, theatre, radio and television, etc’.78 
For Bourdieu, the real thrust of these negotiations was to destroy the State’s 
‘immune system’ in cultural affairs, by treating ‘as “obstacles to commerce” the 
policies that look to safeguard national cultural particularities’.79 In this context, 
Bourdieu threw his weight resolutely behind the defense of the nation-State – 
both that of France and of more vulnerable countries – against the steamroller of 
transnational economic powers. 
 
 Bourdieu’s apparently alternating positions as presented above – against 
the State, for the State, and a variety of points in between – should not be 
understood too hastily as contradictions. Instead, we can conceive them as 
moments leading to a largely coherent practice of negotiating the inevitable 
antinomies of cultural policy. We have seen how Bourdieu’s reflection on 
culture is subtle enough, when taken as a whole, to integrate the multiplicity of 
functions assumed by ‘legitimate’ culture in its social existence (it alienates and 
liberates; performs at the same time ‘magical’ and rational operations; develops 
both vested and universal interests; mystifies, but provides the instruments of 
demystification; imprisons the mind and generates invention; imposes symbolic 
violence, and is the target of symbolic violence, etc.). Bourdieu’s cultural policy 
                                                 
77 P. Bourdieu, ‘Notre Etat de misère’, interview with Sylvaine Pasquier, L’Express, 18 March 
1993, pp. 112-15, republished in Interventions, pp. 245-52 (pp. 245-6). It is worth recalling 
again that ‘acquis’ in French can also mean ‘right’ or ‘entitlement’. 
78  P. Bourdieu, ‘Pour une organisation permanente de résistance au nouvel ordre mondial’, 
text published in Interventions, pp. 461-4 (pp. 461-2). For an example of France’s official 
stance with regard to the cultural ramifications of the GATS talks, see Catherine Trautmann, 
‘Cultural Diversity and the Cultural Exception’ [1999] in Ahearne (ed.), French Cultural 
Policy Debates, pp. 206-11. 
79 ‘Pour une organisation permanente de résistance au nouvel ordre mondial’, p. 462. 
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reflection, when taken as a whole, is similarly nuanced. It allows us to construct 
a ‘multipolar’ vision of a cultural policy field as sketched out above. Given the 
conflicting, incompatible and labile forces in play, those wanting to defend a 
given position (say, cultural and creative autonomy) will have to adopt different 
strategies in different contexts. At one moment, or in one historical conjuncture, 
cultural producers will have to use what symbolic leverage they might have to 
impose their independence with regard to governmental agendas. At another, 
they will have to cultivate an alliance with the apparatus of government in order 
to overcome a structural subordination to national or transnational market 
forces. Having said that, one does wonder sometimes whether the momentum of 
Bourdieu’s polemical intent leads him to unhelpful rigidities of position. In a 
rare concession, he recalls in Les Règles de l’art Zola’s contention that ‘money 
has emancipated the writer, money has created modern literature’.80 For, 
notwithstanding romantic notions of the virtues of aristocratic patronage, the 
‘industrialisation’ of the book trade also allowed some cultural producers to 
build up a platform enabling them to remain independent of political powers, 
and that would incite the economic powers to leave them be. Of course, this 
amounted in a sense to playing with fire (and the volume of Zola’s sales did 
make him an object of suspicion to some in the artistic field). But this example 
does show, in a manner that Bourdieu does not conceptualise as such, how 
symbolic leverage for an autonomous cultural field may be derived from 
diverting the resources of the ‘industrial’ as well as the ‘political’ pole of the 
cultural policy field. By contrast, Bourdieu certainly does conceptualise the way 
in which cultural producers may ‘divert’ or subversively ‘misappropriate’ the 
resources of the State in the development of their cultural and/or political 
programmes (NE 556 [387]). However, he consistently seems allergic to the idea 
that cultural producers might actually work within the bureaucracy of the State, 
interpreting this as a sure sign that they have failed to gain the recognition of 
their peers and have had to fall back on a less demanding market from which, 
moreover, they will exert undue ‘Zhdanovist’ pressure on their former 
colleagues. This seems an unnecessarily ‘pedagogocratic’ position. Hans Haacke 
noted in conversation with Bourdieu that a management apparatus was a 
necessary component of a complex society, and that he had ‘no doubt that we [in 
the cultural field] would stand to gain by the presence of intellectuals in 
management bodies [in cultural and cultural policy institutions]’ (LE 74).81 
Certainly, he admitted that people’s thinking tended to change substantially on 
accepting cultural management responsibilities. But he seems to be expressing 
here the fruits of many years’ experience of dealing with cultural 
administrations with a view to developing challenging artistic programmes. 
Interestingly, however, Bourdieu does not even seem to register this 
                                                 
80 Cited at RA 136 [91 – trans. mod.]. 
81 LE 74 [68 - trans. mod.]. 
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observation. Prepared to endorse alliances between the cultural and State 
‘bureaucratic’ fields conceived as two separate bodies, he does not seem ready 
to envisage the notion that a degree of interpenetration of the two fields, or even 
of ‘infiltration’ of the latter by the former, might be a welcome development. 
We will see in the next chapter how Michel de Certeau’s cultural policy 
engagement challenges this rather dichotomising vision. 
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Chapter Three. Michel de Certeau. 
 
 
 Michel de Certeau’s cultural policy thinking (and indeed his cultural 
thinking in general) developed through a sustained engagement in a range of 
institutional bodies and networks involved in the shaping of French cultural 
policy over the 1970s and 1980s. He was between 1970 and 1971 a member of 
the ‘long-term’ working group of the Commission for Cultural Affairs of the 
Sixth National Plan; he was between 1971 and 1973 a member of the Council 
for Cultural Development; he was asked to write a preparatory report and an 
introductory presentation for a colloquium on the future of cultural development 
held at Arc-et-Senans in April 1972, organised by French and European 
governmental bodies in order to help generate strategies for cultural 
development; he held for a while a position of ‘director of studies’ at the 
Ministry of Culture; between 1974 and 1977, he pursued a governmentally 
funded research programme set up in 1973 following on from the Sixth Plan and 
officially designed to clarify possible options for the cultural wing of the 
Seventh Plan; in 1982, he was asked to produce a report  on ‘the contents and 
tools of communication’  designed to inform the cultural policy of the newly 
elected Socialist government; his writings provided the main influence for the 
report of the ‘Long Term Culture’ working group of the Ninth Plan in 1983. 
 The work he produced in the context of these engagements will be 
analysed in detail below. The list above, however, while not being exhaustive, 
should suggest the degree to which Certeau’s cultural policy thinking was not 
purely theoretical, but was grounded by a familiarity with the effective processes 
of governmental decision-making. At the same time, one should not suppose 
that this thinking was conditioned by a technocratic subservience to succeeding 
governmental agendas. On the contrary, Pierre Mayol has commented on the 
caustic severity of his introductory talk at Arc-et-Senans in 1972, which was 
liable to unsettle the attendant audience of decision-makers and experts, and 
which Mayol sees as very unusual for such gatherings; Certeau (along with 
Françoise Choay) was the first member to resign from the Council of Cultural 
Development, impugning the ‘conservationist’ mentality and ‘political 
discrimination’ characterising policy at the time, and foreshadowing the 
resignation en masse of the entire Council some months later, faced with its 
increasing marginalisation; we will see below how the content of Certeau’s 
analyses tend to decentre the ambition of strategic decision-makers to mould the 
social body in the image of their policy programmes; finally, for all his 
commitment to the promise of a new socialist cultural policy at the beginning of 
the 1980s, the emphases of Certeau’s policy recommendations were always far 
removed from the fetichisation of professional art and spectacle that would 
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come to characterize Jack Lang’s administration (nothwithstanding the latter’s 
many positive achievements).1
 It seems clear, nevertheless, that Certeau had a considerable impact on the 
cultural policy circles within which he would work regularly from 1970 until his 
departure for the USA in 1978 (even after this date, this work would continue in 
various forms). François Dosse, having interviewed a substantial number of 
Certeau’s collaborators, suggests that Certeau’s thought has ‘irrigated in a very 
subterranean fashion post-Malraux cultural policy in France’.2 The precise 
nature of such influence (its vectors, its efficacy) is admittedly difficult to 
determine, but Certeau’s work has certainly come to constitute an established 
reference point in French cultural policy debate.3 This chapter will show, at an 
initial level, how Certeau’s reflection in this respect emerged through detailed 
engagement with the challenges of a particular historical period. Beyond that, it 
will look to uncover certain lines of force in this reflection that have up until 
now been insufficiently recognised, and that should consolidate its position as a 
resource for contemporary cultural policy thinking. These concern notably the 
key values that Certeau looks to pursue, questions of political ‘representation’, 
and above all modes of ‘articulation’ (or linkage) between cultural institutions 
and processes of experimentation. 
 
 
3.1  The Commission for Cultural Affairs of the Sixth Plan (1969-
1971) 
 
 Certeau was first drawn into the apparatuses of governmental cultural 
policy as such under the auspices of the newly devised Commission for Cultural 
Affairs of the Sixth National Plan. The ‘long-term’ working group of the 
Commission was charged with elaborating a set of overall aims for State cultural 
                                                 
1 On the Arc-et-Senans introductory talk, see Pierre Mayol, ‘Michel de Certeau, l’historien et 
la culture ordinaire’, in Esprit, March-April 2002, pp. 191-205 (p. 200);  on the dissolution of 
the Conseil de Développement Culturel, see Sophie Gautier Le Conseil de Développement 
Culturel: Une occasion manquée, Maîtrise dissertation, Université Paris VII Jussieu, October 
1992, pp. 134-53 (for Certeau’s position, see pp. 140, 145); a separate Annexes volume 
appended to Gautier’s dissertation includes a press dossier, containing an article from Le 
Monde, dated 5 October 1973, which cites a letter from Certeau to the Council’s President 
Pierre Emmanuel, explaining the terms of his dissatisfaction with the Council’s operation. 
2 François Dosse, Michel de Certeau: Le marcheur blessé (Paris: La Découverte, 2002) , p. 
460. 
3 See e.g. Jean-Louis Fabiani, ‘Peut-on encore parler de légitimité culturelle?’ in O. Donnat & 
P. Tolila (ed.), Le(s) Public(s) de la culture : Politiques publiques et équipements culturels 
(Paris : Presses de Sciences Po, 2003), pp. 305-317 (pp. 315-6), or the remarks of Fabiani and 
Antoine Hennion in volume 2 of that collection, in the concluding ‘Eléments de synthèse’, pp. 
309-23 (pp. 310, 311-12). 
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policy, and held four full meetings over November and December 1969, after 
which the Commission issued an interim report on the major options to be 
pursued. At its fifth meeting on 6 April 1970 it was decided to change the style 
of the group, calling notably on outside ‘experts’. These included Michel de 
Certeau (as a result, it seems, of a meeting with Augustin Girard, head of 
research at the Ministry of Culture, at the offices of Esprit, whose editor, Jean-
Marie Domenach, was also president of the long-term group4). Whereas some of 
these experts, such as Edgar Morin or Pierre Bourdieu, would come only to one 
session for the presentation of a paper, Certeau would become a regular member 
of the group, presenting at its last meeting on 7 January 1971 an overview of its 
work as well as his own views on the challenges facing cultural policy.5
 The collective deliberation pursued in this context appears to have 
functioned as a matrix for the crystallization of Certeau’s cultural policy 
thinking. In this respect, the interim ‘Major Options Report’ of the Commission 
for Cultural Affairs, circulated in February 1970 (i.e. two months before 
Certeau’s involvement in the long-term group), provides us with a helpful 
touchstone. On the one hand, it will forestall any naïve temptation to see Certeau 
as single-handedly overturning a Malrucian cultural policy agenda (my overall 
objective, as evoked in the introduction to this study, is to present Certeau’s 
work as one of the most probing and imaginative elaborations of the ‘cultural 
development’ or ‘cultural democracy’ strand in French cultural policy thought). 
On the other hand, laying out as it did the ‘state of the question’ for post-68 
reformist cultural policy theory in France, it articulated the key concerns and 
notions in relation to which Certeau’s cultural policy reflection would develop. 
 The report’s proposals were organised around a cluster of notions that 
readers of Certeau will recognise as underpinning his own reflection on cultural 
policy. It took up the ‘global’ understanding of culture already advocated in 
1965 for the Fifth Plan by the Commission’s predecessor, the Commission for 
cultural facilities and artistic heritage.6 In contrast to the Malrucian conception 
                                                 
4 Conversation with Geneviève Gentil, July 2002. 
5 Details concerning the group’s meetings are taken from its minutes, Département des études 
et de la prospective du ministère de la Culture, archives de la Commission des Affaires 
culturelles du VIe Plan, dossier no. 22, groupe Long Terme. For the interim report, see 
Commissariat Général du Plan, Commission des Affaires Culturelles VIème Plan, Rapport 
sur les grandes options, February 1970 (typed document available at the Ministry’s 
Département d’études et de la prospective).  I am very grateful to Geneviève Gentil for 
guiding me through the archival material pertaining to the Commission for Cultural Affairs. 
For a helpful overview of the Commission’s work, see Laurent Gayme, ‘La Commission des 
Affaires Culturelles du VIe Plan (1969-1971)’, in G. Gentil and A. Girard (ed.), Les Affaires 
culturelles au temps de Jacques Duhamel, 1971-1973 (Paris: La Documentation française, 
1995), pp. 57-82. 
6 For reference to the ‘global’ conception of cultural policy proposed over the Fifth Plan 
(which was not borne out in ministerial policy), see the final general report of the Sixth Plan’s 
Commission for Cultural Affairs, published as Commissariat Général du Plan, Rapport de la 
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of culture (the great works bequeathed as ‘the inheritance of the nobility of the 
world’), a ‘global’ approach to culture was deemed to take in a full range of 
activities, modes of expression, and social groups (scientific culture, technical 
culture, regional and popular cultures, television, education, urban planning, 
etc.). State cultural policy was thus given the task of building on a ‘pluralist 
national cultural life’ (p. 16). In order to do this, it should, as part of a 
‘decentralising’ approach (pp. 15-16), adapt to the aspirations of local 
populations (p. 7). Again, this contrasted with the flagship policy of Malraux’s 
administration, the Houses of Culture, which looked to set aside any 
manifestations ‘merely’ representing local culture in order to parachute in only 
instances of ‘universally’ valuable culture.7 The report urged the development of 
locally based ‘animateurs’ (p. 13), and, instead of the monolithic Houses of 
Culture, the deployment of ‘multipurpose’ cultural facilities that could cater in 
unintimidating fashion to a range of social groups (p. 19). It acknowledged the 
possible tensions between State planning and culture as the realm of liberty and 
creation (p. 3), and negotiated these by underlining the need to create the 
conditions in which the ‘creativity’, ‘autonomy’, and ‘initiative’ of citizens 
could flourish (p. 3), and by advocating organised support for ‘experimentation 
in all domains’ (p. 16 bis). It argued that the Ministry of Culture’s remit was too 
narrow, and that it therefore had little purchase on the major cultural forces 
reshaping society. It therefore needed to develop meaningful links with the 
national education system and television network (pp. 17-20), and government 
cultural action more generally needed to be ‘decompartmentalised’ (p. 11), 
notably through the creation of dedicated interministerial funding and 
consultative bodies (p. 23). 
 Such broad directives constituted in some ways a framework within 
which Certeau would develop his critical reflection, though one should 
remember that this reflection had already laid out its underlying orientations in 
La Prise de parole, significantly subtitled in its first edition Pour une nouvelle 
culture (‘For a New Culture’).8 They are explored notably in the presentation he 
himself gave to the long-term group in January 1971, where we can see in seed 
the key emphases of his own subsequent cultural policy thinking. I shall bring 
                                                                                                                                                        
commission Affaires Culturelles: l’action culturelle (Paris: La Documentation française, 
1971), p. 9. For the interim report’s advocacy of a ‘global approach to culture’, see Rapport 
sur les grandes options, p. 20. Subsequent page references in brackets in this paragraph refer 
to the latter document. 
7 See Philippe Urfalino, L’Invention de la politique culturelle (Paris : La Documentation 
française, 1996), pp. 101-59, 243-72. 
8 La Prise de parole. Pour une nouvelle culture (Paris : Desclée de Brouwer, 1968); 
references in this chapter will be to the posthumous collection of this text and other writings, 
La Prise de parole et autres écrits politiques, ed. Luce Giard (Paris: Seuil, 1994)  (referred to 
hereafter as PP). On these orientations, see above, 1.2. 
 81
out here just three elements of that presentation, whose formulation by Certeau 
is taken up more or less verbatim in the final report of the long-term group.9
 Firstly, Certeau sums up the programme advocated by the group in terms 
of two ‘essential principles’: to ‘unite cultural diffusion and cultural action’ and 
to give preference to a ‘culture of development’ over a ‘culture of consumption’ 
(CR 3; and see RGLT 388). This sounds vague in the extreme, but amounted, in 
the language of the time, to an endorsement of the shift from a Malrucian 
supply-led form of ‘cultural action’ to the new philosophy of ‘cultural 
development’ as inspired initially by Joffre Dumazedier.10 Whereas the scheme 
underlying Malraux’s cultural action was to project universally valid artistic 
goods into spaces imagined as a cultural desert, the scheme characterising 
‘cultural development’ was to build on the cultural activity already present in 
social groups. This activity was conceived in a broad way (reading, amateur 
artistic activity, cinema, gardening, local associations, etc), and the objectives 
were generally to wrest such activity from the alienating and levelling effects of 
‘mass culture’. This shift would soon be taken up at least nominally by the 
administration of Jacques Duhamel (1971-1973), although subsequent ministers 
would return over the rest of the decade to a more aggressively conservative 
conception of cultural policy. Certeau, however, was already drawing attention 
to the difficulties facing ‘cultural development’ programmes. Insofar as cultural 
development was imagined as a complement to or pocket alongside industrial 
and economic development, it was marginalised, becoming an ineffectual or 
utopian ‘residue’ whose discussion would at least keep intellectuals busy (CR 3). 
Insofar as the programme of cultural development straddled a number of 
administrations each jealous of its territory, little constructive and coordinated 
action was liable to emerge. Indeed, the very openness of the definition it gave 
to culture made it a slippery political category with insufficient guidelines for 
action (CR 3) – a difficulty to which, as we shall see, he would devote 
considerable attention. 
 Secondly, Certeau stressed at length the tension between the aspirations of 
these policy-makers to promote autonomy and the ‘fact’ of generalised passivity 
                                                 
9 The final report of the long term group was published as ‘Rapport du groupe long terme’, in 
Commission Générale du Plan, Commission des Affaires Culturelles (action culturelle), 
Rapports particuliers: Enseignements artistiques, création – diffusion (Paris: La 
Documentation française, 1971), pp. 375-402 (referred to immediately hereafter as RGLT). 
The detailed résumé of Certeau’s presentation constitutes the eleventh set of minutes (CR11) 
of the full meetings of the group (see Département des études et de la prospective du 
ministère de la Culture, archives de la Commission des Affaires culturelles du VIe Plan, 
dossier no. 22, groupe Long Terme ), entitled ‘Compte rendu de l’exposé de M. de Certeau – 
Réunion du 7 janvier’ (referred to immediately hereafter as CR). The group’s archives also 
contain Certeau’s manuscript notes for the presentation. 
10 See e.g. J. Dumazedier & A. Ripert, ‘Leisure and Culture’ [1966], in J. Ahearne (ed.), 
French Cultural Policy Debates: A Reader (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 45-54; and the 
contextualisation in J. Ahearne, ‘Introduction’, ibid., pp. 1-35 (pp. 6-18). 
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induced by standardised work procedures and the ‘ambiguous status’ of 
‘purchased and consumed leisure’ (CR 1-2; cf also RGLT 379, 382, 385-6). 
Certeau’s subsequent work, whose problematic is already taking shape here, 
would of course probe further that ‘ambiguity’ and challenge to some degree 
that ‘fact’. However, the mobilizing impetus behind his cultural policy 
engagement is already clear: ‘Cultural action presupposes that we give credit to 
each individual, considering them as capable of autonomy and destined to 
participate in the elaboration of a common language’ (CR 3). His abiding 
concern would be to explore the ways in which this theoretical postulate could 
be incarnated as a practical possibility. 
 Thirdly, Certeau proposes a ‘policy of experimentation’ in order to 
constitute a middle term between the grand but ungrounded designs of pure 
theory and the reactive subservience of empirically driven practice (CR 3; RGLT 
390-1). Methodically targeting strategically determined ‘key points’, this 
process would both generate practical results and provide a basis for further 
research (CR 3). This articulation between theory and practice, centred 
essentially on ‘the creation of groups at grass-roots level’ (ibid.), was designed 
in the medium term to turn ‘cultural development’ into a more credible policy 
programme. The final report of the long-term group took up Certeau’s 
formulations in this respect, confessing that it did not as yet dispose of properly 
‘operative principles’ (RGLT 390) for the implementation of its 
recommendations. 
 
 
3.2  Criteria for cultural action 
 
 Having been drawn into the networks of French cultural policy making, 
Certeau was asked by Augustin Girard to write a preparatory report and an 
introductory presentation for a colloquium on the future of cultural development 
held at Arc-et-Senans in April 1972.11 The work for this colloquium, organized 
by French and European governmental bodies in order to help generate 
strategies for cultural development, constituted a further ‘decisive step in the 
crystallization of his reflection on cultural practices’.12 The very problems 
                                                 
11 For these texts, see M. de Certeau, ‘La culture dans la société’ and ‘Le lieu d’où l’on traite 
de la culture’ in La Culture au pluriel (Paris: Seuil, 1993 [1974])), pp. 165-91 [101-21] and 
193-203 [123-31], referred to hereafter in this chapter as CAP. On Certeau’s preparation of 
this colloquium with Augustin Girard and Geneviève Gentil, see Dosse, Michel de Certeau. 
Le Marcheur blessé, pp. 445-6, 449. 
12 Luce Giard, ‘Histoire d’une recherche’, in M. de Certeau, L’Invention du quotidien, vol. 1, 
Arts de faire, ed. L. Giard (Paris: Gallimard, 1990 [1980]), pp. i-xxx (p. vii); Giard’s article 
can be found in translation as ‘History of a Research Project’ in M. de Certeau, L. Giard, P. 
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thrown up at this colloquium – in particular the hazily conceived but insistently 
felt rift between official cultural policy and most people’s cultural experience – 
would provide the stimulus for Certeau’s subsequent cultural policy thinking. 
 For the participants at Arc-et-Senans, the title of Certeau’ preparatory 
report – ‘Culture within Society’ – could in itself be read as a condensed 
‘manifesto’.13 This applied particularly to the opposition it expressed with regard 
to the founding mission of the Ministry for Cultural Affairs, which had 
originally set out precisely to transcend whatever culture could be found within 
existing society through the diffusion of works associated with a universal 
(predominantly French) cultural heritage. It is also possible, however, to detect 
in this title a desire to redirect somewhat the task assigned to the colloquium. 
The colloquium had been convened under the sign of futurology (la 
prospective), a discipline that was expected in this context to contribute to the 
centralized planning of society by constructing scenarios for future 
‘development’ on the basis of extrapolations from current trends and that would 
serve as models for the elaboration of long-term strategy. Perhaps due to his 
experience as a historian, Certeau was sceptical about the predictive validity of 
such models. In any case, he wanted to focus attention principally on the cultural 
rifts that could already be seen at work within society. The challenge was less to 
map out the future from a single strategic vantage point than to discern a number 
of those ‘operative principles’ invoked in the Long Term Group’s report in 1971 
that would enable constructive intervention in the present. 
 Certeau’s emphasis, therefore, after sketching out the key forces and 
divisions reconfiguring the contemporary cultural field, was on a limited number 
of ‘points’ of intervention with sufficient potential leverage for inhibiting or 
stimulating particular developments. I propose to gather together here the key 
principles that inform Certeau’s proposals for political-cultural intervention. 
These principles might also be called second-order values (or ‘metavalues’). 
They enable Certeau to constitute an operative framework for socio-cultural 
action, mediating, as Herman Glaser put it in the context of socio-culture 
policies in general, between the emptiness of theory without practice and the 
blindness of practice without theory.14
                                                                                                                                                        
Mayol, The Practice of Everyday Life, vol. 2, Living and Cooking (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1998), pp. xiii-xxxiii (p. xvii). 
13 The colloquium proceedings (essentially transcripts of those discussions plus Certeau’s two 
texts and a common ‘final declaration’) were published in a special number (hors-série) of 
Analyse et prévision entitled ‘Prospective du développement culturel’ in October 1973. For 
the view of Certeau’s title as a ‘manifesto’, see p. 6. 
14 Herman Glaser, ‘Joys and Sorrows of a Utopian Cultural Administrator’ (Copeland lecture 
at Amherst College, 1976), International Journal of Cultural Policy, 9/2 (2003), pp. 185-94 
(p. 185). Glaser is playing on Kant’s statement on the relations between conceptions and 
perceptions, presumably as found in the Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, 
(Houndmills: Macmillan, 1950), p. 93: ‘Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions 
without concepts are blind’. 
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 This invocation of values and principles might seem misplaced. Certeau 
speaks disparagingly elsewhere in La Culture au pluriel of the mystificatory 
‘decor’ supplied by ‘values’ in political discourse. He opened his preparatory 
report for Arc-et-Senans with the premise that ‘the disappearance of universal 
principles is one aspect of the current situation.’15 Yet, in the face of this cultural 
fact, Certeau developed a position more complex than the mere acceptance that 
henceforth ‘anything went’ and that the exercise of qualitative judgement could 
be left to the mechanisms of supply and demand. This position emerges perhaps 
most clearly in the colloquium proceedings, which show him responding to 
concerns such as those voiced  by the German philosopher Georg Picht over a 
‘relativism’ in his preparatory report that was ‘so to speak, absolute’. Certainly, 
Certeau maintained that, in the face of the prevailing ‘fragmentation’ or 
‘diversification’ affecting society’s systems of cultural reference, he did not 
believe it possible to define some common, binding set of values that a cultural 
policy could then set about diffusing throughout the social body. He did, 
however, then go on to say what ethical point there might be, given this 
fragmentation, of intervening in the cultural field at all. It was once he had done 
this that, as he noted by way of commentary on his own discourse, the question 
of value was ‘reintroduced’, albeit at a rather different level.16
 For if Certeau had any reason, as an intellectual authority, to intervene in 
the broad field of cultural policy, it was precisely, he said, through ‘respect for 
the ability [pouvoir] of each individual or of groups to create and intervene as 
authors in a society.’17 The policy-level intervention he posited was designed 
less to model society than to enable the individuals and groups that composed 
that society to intervene themselves more forcefully in the shaping of their own 
social world. The term author, used here in a broad sense, refers to the capacity 
to participate in the construction of a form of life that those concerned see as 
meaningful. I call the ‘respect’ referred to here a ‘second-order value’ insofar as 
it brackets, so to speak, questions regarding the value of those values that shape 
the actual forms of life constructed by the given individuals and groups.18 This is 
not to deny that these are important questions that need to be addressed at the 
appropriate level. 
 The supposition of generalised potential ‘authorship’ raises questions 
concerning the conditions that allow human subjects to develop the implied 
autonomy. It is here that one can see the value of plurality as such emerge in 
Certeau’s thought. A key question raised during the discussions at Arc-et-
                                                 
15 CAP 165 [101]. See also ‘The Language of Violence’, in CAP 73-82, esp. 73 [29-36, esp. 
29]. 
16 See the colloquium proceedings in Analyse et prévision (pp. 37, 136, 137). 
17 Ibid., p. 136. 
18 The term metavalue could also be used to denote this distinction of level. Just as a 
metalanguage is a language about languages, so, I want to suggest, are metavalues those 
values that engage with the question of values as such. 
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Senans was that of the individual human subject. As previously dominant 
collective systems of belief (represented by trade unions, churches, political 
parties, etc.) lost their capacity to integrate people quasi-automatically into 
social groups, as many existing social groups were fragmented by processes of 
urbanization and economic restructuring, the status of the individualised subject 
became, so to speak, exposed in its own right. It was in this sense that a notional 
individual became a major object of concern for these intellectuals as they 
endeavoured to chart a future course for cultural policy.19 Certeau looked to 
displace somewhat this rather ill-defined fixation by arguing that the only 
‘practical’ way in which such political considerations came up against the 
liberty of the individual subject lay in ‘the necessity of maintaining at the level 
of social organization a plurality of interpretative systems’. The straightforward 
illustration he offered in support of this position shows how, for Certeau, a 
properly cultural process based on plurality sets up the space of human 
subjectivity: ‘One could take the easy example … of education. Insofar as the 
child has only a one-to-one [univoque] relationship with a parent or with school, 
you suffocate him! Insofar as, on the contrary, he is situated within a plurality of 
relations, that is, with regard to his work, a teacher, parents, etc., this plurality 
leaves free a subject’s own space [l’espace propre d’un sujet] and does not 
determine it.’20 Fundamentally, Certeau thus conceives the subject’s conditional 
liberty here as an effect of the play (jeu) among heterogeneous interpretative 
systems, the a priori indeterminable room for manoeuvre instituted by their very 
plurality. The object with which a cultural policy should concern itself was not 
so much this liberty per se as its conditions. The cultivation of ‘plurality’ 
therefore emerged as a value in its own right. Again, it is what I would call a 
second-order value, insofar as it leaves open the value of those (often 
irreconciliable) values that together make up a plurality. This is not to deny that 
these represent vital questions – so vital, indeed, in Certeau’s account, that the 
relative autonomy constitutive of the human subject was liable to be seriously 
impaired if they were simply arbitrated by proxy. 
 The properly political responsibility to maintain a plurality of 
interpretative systems at work within a social organization may seem curiously 
redundant, given Certeau’s adherence to the thesis that French society of the 
early 1970s was moving of its own accord toward a ‘fragmentation’ and 
‘diversification’ of frames of reference.21 In a subsequent education report 
written for the OECD in the mid-1980s, he would even note how 
multiculturalism had become the new cultural ‘orthodoxy’.22 There was not 
necessarily a contradiction here. Certeau also emphasized in his 1972 paper a 
key rift emerging in French society between an ‘operative’ culture of decision-
                                                 
19 See, for example, Janne’s comments in Analyse et prévision, p. 79. 
20 See Certeau’s remarks in ibid., p. 105. 
21 Ibid., p. 136. 
22 See ‘Economies ethniques’ [1985], in PP 225-71 (p. 249) [141-74 (p. 160)]. 
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making concentrated in the hands of political and economic elites and a passive 
culture of ‘spectacle’ destined for the majority of the French people. That 
spectacle may have been variegated and mottled on the surface – it may have 
juxtaposed the dramatis personae of Marx, Freud, Astérix and France’s Mystic 
Meg – but insofar as this collage corresponded neither to the effective beliefs of 
those who produced and distributed it (for whom it was a profitable instrument) 
nor necessarily to those who consumed it (who had little direct input into its 
fabrication), Certeau suggested that it largely amounted to a simulacrum of 
plurality.23 In his 1985 OECD report, Certeau would borrow Smolicz’s term 
‘hybrid monism’ to suggest the single ‘substance’ (a certain economy of 
symbolic production) underlying a more visible hybridization of cultural 
artefacts (PP 250 [160]). Certainly, one could criticise this ‘flattening’ approach 
to the products of the cultural industries. Nevertheless, the terms of such 
analyses point us to the implied countermodel of effective plurality that was 
guiding Certeau’s reflection. From this perspective, the plurality of cultural 
models available to the subject only really became effective if those models 
ceased simply to float unattached, so to speak, in that middle distance evoked in 
our discussion of La Prise de parole (where, as anything goes, nothing finally 
touches us).24 And this was liable to happen only if such models were 
appropriated by subjects who saw in them the chance to recast their life-worlds. 
To use the terms of Certeau’s paper for the Long Term Group of the Sixth Plan 
in 1971, ‘the massive growth in information is tending to create a universal 
language, but this language, true for everyone, is no longer true for anyone. Its 
effect is neither to set up an encounter between interlocutors nor to transform an 
object; it falls into insignificance.’25 Hence Certeau insisted on the need to 
facilitate the creation of spaces for interlocutory exchange and the fashioning of 
small-scale collective projects (in the context of which people could come to 
think that what they said might matter).26 Such processes of appropriation 
consitute, moreover, a crucial link between cultural models and effective social 
structures. Indeed, I would locate at this point a further second-order value 
orientating Certeau’s cultural policy reflection: the need for meaningful 
interplay (or ‘interference’) between cultural models and social structures.27 
Such interplay, by which cultural models and social structures are reciprocally 
‘tested’, requires an ongoing commitment to experimentation (we shall explore 
                                                 
23 For Certeau’s evocation of such dramatis personae, see CAP 177 [110]. 
24 See above, 1.2. 
25 ‘Compte rendu de l’exposé de M. de Certeau – Réunion du 7 janvier [1971]’, p. 2, in 
Département des études et de la prospective du ministère de la Culture, archives de la 
Commission des Affaires culturelles du VIe Plan, dossier no. 22, groupe Long Terme. It 
should be noted that these are not Certeau’s own words, but those of the official résumé of his 
presentation as minuted in the group’s proceedings. 
26 See CAP 178 [111]. 
27 See CAP 184 [116]. 
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further in the final section of this chapter the centrality of this notion to 
Certeau’s thinking on culture). Leaving open the question of this interplay’s 
precise effects in given situations, Certeau’s reports suggested that unless it was 
deliberately cultivated, culture would deteriorate into an apparently free-floating 
symbolic magma with little constructive purchase on social reality, on the one 
hand, and an operative but invisible code for the management of populations, on 
the other. 
 I have gathered together thus far three second-order values constituting a 
framework for Certeau’s policy recommendations: respect for the ability of 
individuals and groups to intervene creatively in society; recognition of the 
subject’s need for a plurality of socially instituted interpretative systems; 
commitment to meaningful interaction between cultural models and effective 
social structures. One could add a fourth and final component to this set, defined 
as the need, from Certeau’s perspective, to mark a space for alterity in reflection 
upon cultural process. This also serves to delimit the role that politics (in the 
sense of policy implementation) should aim to play where culture is concerned. 
Without the prospect of ‘departures for elsewhere’ (real and metaphorical) and 
‘encounters’ (symbolized for Certeau by the idea of ‘festival’), the very ‘air’ of a 
given society comes to feel ‘stifling’.28 Certeau leaves the specific nature of 
these ‘departures’ and ‘encounters’ undetermined. Indeed, they must, by 
definition, remain to some extent unpredictable (think, for example, of a new 
musical experience). Any policy aiming to determine their form (along what 
Bourdieu might have called Zhdanovist lines) is liable to create a sense of 
suffocation instead. The sufficient conditions for such encounters exceed the 
realm of politics as understood in this context. This is not the case, however, for 
certain necessary conditions. 
 Certeau’s cultural policy framework is certainly ‘liberal’ in the sense that 
it is founded on respect for the autonomy of individuals and social groups. It is, 
however, opposed through and through to the ‘neo-liberal’ approach to cultural 
policy that would prevail under French right-wing governments in the mid to 
late 1970s, based on a withdrawal of the State and an acceptance of market 
forces. To use Pierre Gaudibert’s distinction, Certeau eschews a ‘laissez-faire’ 
version of market pluralism for an ‘unequal and conflictual pluralism’ conceived 
as a response to social and cultural inequalities.29 Some social groups are more 
bereft than others of the ‘necessary conditions’ for their cultural development, 
and he presents it as the responsibility of the State to make good such 
disadvantages. The purpose of such targetted actions was not primarily to enable 
these groups to appreciate Culture, but to allow them to define and shape more 
autonomously their place in society (Certeau’s approach was resolutely socio-
                                                 
28 CAP 187 [118]. 
29 See the postface to Pierre Gaudibert, Action culturelle: intégration et/ou subversion, 3rd ed. 
(Paris: Casterman, 1977), p. 165; a substantial extract from this postface can be found in J. 
Ahearne (ed.), French Cultural Policy Debates, pp. 91-101 (quotation p. 94). 
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cultural). Finally, the ‘liberal’ or ‘enabling’ nature of Certeau’s fundamental 
values did not preclude a properly governmental ambition to modify patterns of 
behaviour. On the contrary, this ambition could on occasion derive precisely 
from these values. In their 1982 report ‘The Everyday Nature of 
Communication’, written for the new Socialist cultural administration, Certeau 
and Giard addressed the hostility to immigrant groups that was prevalent 
particularly in popular working-class milieux (other classes came less directly 
into contact with them). They argued that only ‘co-ordinated, stubborn, and far-
reaching action’ could succeed in modifying the cultures as well as social 
conditions that reproduced this hostility; the nature of their proposal will best be 
understood if we remember that a ‘culture’ can be defined as a ‘frame of 
reference’(CAP 168 [103]): 
 
Only that [action] can slowly gnaw away the hard core of age-old 
bitterness and tenacious prejudices that make the foreigner an undesirable 
and menacing intruder. Work must be carried out to replace this bitterness 
and prejudice by other types of information, other images of reference, 
which, taken together, will finally give a new form of representation to 
the other.30
 
Cultural policy should actively work on society’s culture (frame of reference), 
therefore, not despite Certeau’s liberal values, but because of them. Official 
State policy, however, constituted only one pole of reference within that frame, 
and Certeau’s overall aspiration was to bring into play a multiplicity of other 
references, constituted by voices that had been disregarded or suppressed. This 
aspiration is best understood in the light of his thought on political and 
conceptual ‘representation’. 
 
 
3.3  Representation and Planning: Towards The Practice of 
Everyday Life 
 
 Régis Debray has defined the ‘intellectual’ in its French sense, as opposed 
to the scholar, the scientist or the teacher, in terms of a ‘project of influence’, a 
kind of will to shape events that brings him or her onto the political stage.31 And 
‘stage’ has generally been the appropriate term. The intellectual, in this model, 
stands on a public tribune and speaks truth to power. That tribune is situated 
more or less outside, against, and by implication above the political field. 
                                                 
30 See ‘L’ordinaire de la communication’ (1982), in PP 163-224 (pp. 219-20) [89-139 (p. 136 
– trans. mod.)]. 
31 See R. Debray, Le Pouvoir intellectuel en France (Paris: Ramsay, 1979), pp. 43, 147-8 [32, 
127-8]. 
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Certainly, many intellectuals in France have tended to adopt a stance of resolute 
hostility or at least suspicion with regard to the State.32 We have seen in chapter 
two how Bourdieu would exemplify but also complicate such an attitude. By 
contrast, we have seen how Certeau’s own ‘project of influence’ – for such it 
undoubtedly is – takes up a position within the machinery  of government, and 
more particularly within the apparatus of State planning. 
 This might understandably puzzle many readers of Certeau. For a certain 
reading of L’Invention du quotidien could dissuade prospective intellectuals 
from following up on any ‘project to influence’ at all, whatever the institutional 
basis for that project might be. The book is shot through with statements and, 
perhaps especially, figures designed to humiliate and bring low the claims of 
certified knowledge and authorised interpreters to model the social body. The 
practices that effectively constitute this body are given metaphorical 
representation as an irrepressible, unchartable ‘brownian motion’, a teeming 
plurality of ‘rumours’ and ‘murmurs’, a ‘night-side of societies, a night longer 
than their days, an obscure sea from which successive institutions emerge, a 
maritime immensity on which socioeconomic and political structures appear as 
ephemeral islands.’33 Such figures frame the book’s analyses, and account for an 
important part of its seductive force. They can be used, not implausibly, to 
authorize libertarian and/or populist (in Bourdieu’s sense) readings of the book. 
They also seem to adumbrate more generally, to borrow an evocative phrase 
from Ben Highmore, the ‘death of the planner’. More precisely, Highmore notes 
in a reading of L’Invention du quotidien that ‘planning […] is something that is 
sidestepped.’34
 On the face of it, this generates a paradox. L’Invention du quotidien 
originated, after all, as part of a governmentally funded research programme set 
up in 1973 following on from the Sixth Plan and officially designed to clarify 
possible options for the cultural wing of the Seventh Plan.35 When Augustin 
                                                 
32 See e.g. Keith Reader, Intellectuals and the Left in France (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1987), 
p. 138. 
33 M. de Certeau, L’Invention du quotidien, vol. 1, Arts de faire, ed. L. Giard (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1990 [1980]), p. 67 [41], referred to hereafter as IQ. It should be noted that I am 
focusing in this chapter on volume one of L’Invention du quotidien. Cf. also J. Ahearne, 
Michel de Certeau: Interpretation and its Other (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 154-6. 
34 Ben Highmore, ‘The Death of Planner? Paris circa 1968’, in J. Hughes and S. Saddler (eds), 
Plan/Non-Plan: Essays on Freedom, Participation and Change in Modern Architecture and 
Urbanism, Oxford: Architectural Press, 2000, pp. 156-65 (p. 165). 
35 For a detailed account, see Giard, ‘Histoire d’une recherche’, pp. viii-xi; ‘History of a 
Research Project’, pp. xviii-xx. The main results of this research programme were published 
in the dossier ‘Economie et culture’, presented by Augustin Girard and Jack Ligot, in Le 
Progrès Scientifique, 193,  
March-April 1978, pp. 25-82 (the journal of the Délégation générale à la recherche 
scientifique et technique, a body officially attached to the Prime Minister, and which had 
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Girard, head of research at the Ministry of Culture, reviewed in 1978 the results 
of this programme (of which Certeau’s project constituted one component), he 
underlined its strategic function for the planning of governmental action: 
 
From the beginning [in 1973], the general delegate for scientific and 
technical research had presented the programme of research as a means of 
aiding decision-making in the ministry responsible for culture, and the 
debates of the scientific committee focused both on the major axes of a 
cultural policy and on the potential ability of scientific research to reduce 
the margins of uncertainty in this new area for the action of public 
authorities [i.e.culture, which had only had a dedicated Ministry since 
1959, and had only been integrated into the Plan from 1962 onwards]. 
Thus it was not a question of supporting research projects selected from 
among those presented by researchers on the basis of their own 
problematics, but of asking researchers to  help elucidate points of 
cultural policy that were identified as both the most important and the 
least well understood.36
 
Girard presents here a model of the relationship between intellectuals and 
politics whereby Certeau the researcher is located within the cogs of the central 
governmental machinery, working at a strategic level to help ministerial 
decision-making and reduce the margins of uncertainty associated with the 
implementation of policy. 
 We have seen that Certeau’s policy writings were not produced according 
to the classic French ‘tribune’ model of intervention in politics. However, one 
can abstract from his work two models that seem to be mutually incompatible: 
on the one hand, the theorist, admirer, and perhaps aesthete of ‘tactics’ that 
elude any strategic control; on the other hand, the policy adviser, the active 
participant in strategic projects designed, in one way or another, to modify 
behaviour in the social body. At an initial level, a reader might perhaps be 
reminded of Sartre’s definition of bad faith: it is as though Certeau’s writings 
are what they are not and are not what they are. More neutrally, to take up his 
own terms, his writings seem explicitly to extol tactics while remaining 
implicitly conditioned by strategies.37 Such a description would not be wholly 
wrong, but would be somewhat inert. I want now to consider how the two poles 
I have contrived to separate (a non-directive attention to the ordinary and 
                                                                                                                                                        
issued Certeau’s research contract). The dossier contained texts by Michel de Certeau (pp. 45-
53) and Luce Giard (pp. 53-6). 
Certeau’s text was essentially what would become his general introduction to IQ (see IQ 
xxxv-liii [xi-xxiv]).  
36 A. Girard, in ‘Economie et culture’, p. 26. 
37 For Certeau’s classic distinction between institutional ‘strategies’ and users’ ‘tactics’, see 
IQ 57-63 [34-9]. 
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participation in strategic policy development) might be articulated in terms of a 
coherent overall praxis. 
 Daniel Bogner’s book Gebrochene Gegenwart. Mystik und Politik bei 
Michel de Certeau is primarily concerned with the relevance of Certeau to 
contemporary theological debate. Its problematic of ‘rupture and representation’, 
however, sheds light on other dimensions of Certeau’s thought. The last section 
of Bogner’s book is devoted to politics, and I shall use this as a starting point for 
discussion.38  Slightly problematically, Bogner concentrates on the 1968 text La 
Prise de parole as though it could stand metonymically for Certeau’s political 
thought as a whole. Nevertheless, his analysis of this text will throw into 
particular relief for us important subsequent changes in Certeau’s approach to 
issues of political representation. 
 Certeau analysed the crisis of May 1968 as a crisis in representation. 
Institutions that were supposed, in one way or another, to ‘represent’ society and 
its members had lost their credibility. Political parties, the University, trade 
unions, the Church, etc., were seen as functioning according to their own 
discrete logics, and cut off from the base that alone could legitimate them. 
Speech was something that had to be ‘captured’ at a grass-roots level because 
those that were supposed to be ‘speaking for’ the people they represented were 
perceived as ‘speaking in their place’ (the difference can be rendered in German 
as one between ‘Representation’ and ‘Stellvertretung’). However, and this was 
the crucial point for Certeau in 1968, speaking up in one’s own name was 
necessary but should not be an end in itself. It would simply be recuperated 
unless new representative mechanisms could be brought into play, giving 
collective, effective force to an otherwise dispersed collection of protests and 
demands. For Bogner, the fundamental normative reference underpinning  La 
Prise de parole is that of the ‘coherent social body’. May 1968 had revealed the 
social body to be incoherent, or out of joint, insofar as society’s ‘representative’ 
instances had become cut off from what they nominally represented. For 
Certeau, the ‘capture of speech’, as an event, signified the need for a longer term 
action: to aggregate forces and institute mechanisms whereby a social base that 
felt excluded or unconcerned could be brought into the loop of political 
representation. This would ensure a social body that was ‘coherent’, that fitted 
together at a certain level, precisely through the expression of its conflicts. 
 Bogner’s  analysis is useful both because it brings out a key thrust of La 
Prise de parole, and also because, bearing its emphases in mind, we can 
pinpoint a significant change in Certeau’s political thinking. By the mid-1970s – 
i.e. after an extended period of involvement in the French politico-administrative 
process – he dismisses the notion of a coherent social body as a category for 
                                                 
38 D. Bogner Gebrochene Gegenwart: Mystik und Politik bei Michel de Certeau (Mainz: 
Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 2002); for his analysis of La Prise de parole, see pp. 257-96. 
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informing effective political reflection. He opens an article published in 1974 as 
follows: 
 
There is a type of discourse that just goes round in circles […]; it is the 
discourse that would like to give expression to society in its entirety in the 
form of a ‘global project’ organising political or cultural actions into a 
coherent whole. This model had its moment of truth. Today, it is simply 
ideology. It expresses the nostalgia of yesterday’s political or religious 
churches. In this respect, it has become the verbal relic of yesterday’s 
engagements, based on the idea that they held a ‘meaning’ of history, and 
that they could administer both its representation and realisation.39
 
The ‘solution’ underpinning the credibility deficit analysed in The Capture of 
Speech had here itself lost its credibility for Certeau. Nevertheless, the basic 
problem – that of a dispersion of potentially creative but unrepresented or 
subinstitutional developments – remained, as a subsequent passage from the 
same article suggests: 
 
Whereas that discourse continues to go round in circles, a prisoner of the 
stage on which it circulates, practices themselves are dispersed on the 
streets. […]. On the one hand, one sees a folklorisation and repetition of 
global discourses; on the other hand, there is a dissemination of one-off 
actions solidly rooted in particular groups, separated from each other by 
technical and social differences, and thus escaping any overall directive. 
To return to institutions designed to integrate all these movements, or to 
strategic syntheses, would, I believe, be an outmoded reflex. But does the 
situation allow us to link up [articuler] these practices with each other, in 
a manner that does not reproduce structures that have become 
conservative or discourses that are now insignificant?40
 
Ironically, Certeau was supposed to be embarking at this time on, precisely, a 
strategic ‘synthesis’ of developments in the counter-cultural field integrating 
futurological research as part of his governmental contract.41 We should not 
therefore posit a link of direct subservience between his governmental remit and 
his actual research. Instead, it seems plausible to suggest that Certeau himself 
                                                 
39 M. de Certeau, ‘Actions culturelles et stratégie politique: sortir du cercle’, in La Revue 
nouvelle (Brussels), 59, April 1974, pp. 351-60 (p. 351). 
40 Ibid., p. 352. 
41 See Certeau’s summary of the original ‘general objective’ that had been assigned to him in 
M. de Certeau, ‘Manières de faire et pratiques quotidiennes’, in Le Progrès Scientifique, 193, 
March-April 1978, pp. 45-53 (p. 45). Cf. also Giard, ‘Histoire d’une recherche’, pp. viii-ix; 
‘History of a Research Project’, p. xviii. 
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made ‘tactical’ use of the ‘strategic’ resources he could secure in order to pursue 
an agenda developed in the terms of his own cultural policy thinking. 
 For Certeau, the basic problem facing the social practices he designated 
were that they were ‘dispersed’ or ‘atomized’. What were these practices, and 
why was this a problem? Certeau had in mind above all local micro-groupings 
that were relatively autonomous of centralised directives: local cultural 
gatherings or events, informal seminars in universities, workshops around this or 
that theme in factories or town halls, single-issue groupings around childcare, 
ecological issues, town planning, and so forth (in short, as retrospective analysis 
has shown – and this is not a criticism – the sorts of groupings that might often 
federate members of the working classes or peasantry, but that were generally 
driven by new fractions of an expanding middle class).42 Why was the 
dispersion of these practices potentially limiting? In the first instance because, as 
tactical groupings around this or that local issue or activity, they were ‘blind’ in 
an important sense. Looking to negotiate problems and demands thrown up by 
their immediate socio-cultural environment, they were largely unaware of how 
other groups were responding to analogous issues. They could not learn from 
mistakes made and solutions created elsewhere, and, just as importantly, they 
could not maximise local political leverage through the creation of strategic 
alliances. So whereas Certeau might, as it were, poeticise in L’Invention du 
quotidien the very blindness that constitutes tactics as tactics, we see him 
looking in this 1974 piece to enable groups to overcome the blindness of their 
localised tactics so that they can enter into coherent, concerted strategies of their 
own (one might note that at this stage, the terms had not yet been transformed by 
the coding they would receive in L’Invention du quotidien).43
 We have seen the irony that Bourdieu reserved for such practices of 
animation, though he would also come to evoke an ‘everyday political 
invention’ dispersed across the social body that demonstrated more 
resourcefulness and creativity than ‘two years of work carried out by a 
commission for the Plan’.44 Certeau, for his part, was looking from the 1970s 
actively to facilitate such everyday political invention, precisely through his 
                                                 
42 See e.g. Vincent Dubois and Pascale Laborier, ‘The « Social » in the Institutionalisation of 
Local Cultural Policies in France and Germany’, International Journal of Cultural Policy, 9/2 
(2003), pp. 195-206 (see especially the references collected under endnote 5) ; cf. also E. 
Ritaine, Les Stratèges de la culture (Paris : Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences 
Politiques, 1983), pp. 115-47. 
43 On the ‘blindness’ of tactics as represented in volume one of L’Invention du quotidien, see 
Ahearne, Michel de Certeau, pp. 177-8. On the ‘concerted strategies’ that Certeau was 
looking to promote among diverse socio-cultural groupings, see ‘Actions culturelles et 
stratégie politique’, pp. 355-60. 
44 P. Bourdieu, ‘Université: les rois sont nus’, interview with Didier Eribon, Le Nouvel 
Observateur, 2-8 November 1984, pp. 86-90, republished in P. Bourdieu, Interventions, 1961-
2001: Science sociale et action politique, ed. Poupeau & Discepolo (Marseille: Agone, 2002), 
pp. 189-98 (p. 198). 
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(marginal) position within the State planning apparatus. With this objective in 
mind, he suggested that a certain ‘formalization’ of these practices might help 
show what they had in common (it would abstract certain common forms of 
practice over and above the specific ‘material’ on which they operated). This 
would provide the basis for a politicization of these practices, for, as Certeau 
noted in a subsequent article, one can only politicize what one can formulate.45 
We can see here a driving force behind the project that would culminate in 
L’Invention du quotidien. For, in Certeau’s analysis, what these practices had in 
common were modes of appropriating a socio-cultural environment that they 
themselves had not constructed. If such groups could recognise themselves in a 
kind of common vocabulary for these techiques of reappropriation (and clearly, 
Certeau’s work provides something along these lines), this would facilitate a 
quasi-strategic process of association, based on the analysis, exchange, and 
wider diffusion of their experience. It would also provide tools enabling such 
groups to federate in order to articulate their own political representation – in 
other words, a visible and differenciated public grouping prominent enough to 
force other strategic players to take account of it. It should be stressed that the 
notion of ‘articulation’ – the combination of elements that retain their distinct 
identity – is a recurrent feature of Certeau’s thought as a whole.46
 When we consider in this light the reception of L’Invention du quotidien, 
however, we notice a disconcerting paradox. The book has been criticised for 
presenting an ‘atomized’ vision of ‘monadic’ individuals pursuing original but 
solitary paths across an unreadable urban jungle. And it is difficult to see this 
simply as a misreading. At the same time, we have seen how Certeau conceived 
its problematic as a response, precisely, to processes of atomization, as a kind of 
tool box designed to facilitate processes of association, ‘articulation’, and 
collective representation. In a 1978 article, he noted a ‘neo-fatalism’ spreading 
particularly among the young, and insists that ‘it is very important that a will for 
reappropriation reemerges at a grassroots level.’ It was for this reason that he 
stressed that ‘the modalities of reappropriation must be detached from the 
particular individuals that carry them.’47 It may be that the emphases of the first 
volume of L’Invention du quotidien attach, on the contrary, these forms of 
reappropriation to the individual subject. However, their political relevance, as 
potential tools for strategies of exchange and auto-representation, emerge when 
they are read as part of Certeau’s work as a whole. 
 Certeau’s governmental reports were thus not designed simply for 
governmental use. One could speak in terms of, at least, a double inscription. 
They were inscribed simultaneously in different political problematics. Beyond 
                                                 
45 Cf. M. de Certeau, ‘Mass media, culture, politique’, interview with G. Delavaud and P. 
Mayol, Education 2000, 9, April 1978, pp. 7-19 (p. 13). 
46 Cf. J. Ahearne, ‘The shattering of Christianity and the articulation of belief’, New 
Blackfriars, vol. 77 n. 909 (Nov 1996), pp. 493-504 (p. 498). 
47 M. de Certeau, ‘Mass media, culture, politique’, pp. 12-13. 
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what might be considered as their official readerships – the governmental agents 
that commissioned a putative ‘synthesis’ – they offer themselves up for ‘re-
employment’ by user-groups along the lines I have just indicated. Luce Giard is 
right here to stress at the beginning of her introduction to the second edition of 
L’Invention du quotidien that it is unusual for such a governmentally 
commissioned report – what the French call ‘grey literature’ – to appear 
straightaway in paperback form.48 Nevertheless, Certeau’s analyses did have to 
appear at some level as officially ‘useful’, if the strategic resources they 
depended on were not simply to disappear. At the same time, we can ask how 
Certeau, in his turn, might have ‘used’ the strategic site that was his (researcher 
attached to the Plan and to the Ministry of Culture), precisely to turn such sites 
toward their ‘other’. 
 The question of the official ‘usefulness’ of Certeau’s research cannot be 
answered simply, since ‘government’ here cannot be understood as a monolithic 
bloc. There were, in particular, clear conflicts in perspective between those 
agents who commissioned the project in 1973 (engaged in and sympathetic to 
the Cultural Commission of the Sixth Plan and the subsequent Council for 
Cultural Development), and those ultimately responsible for shaping cultural 
policy in the second half of the 1970s (the Cultural Commission of the Plan 
would be discontinued; the Minister of Culture would refuse even to 
acknowedge correspondence sent by the Council, which in its turn would resign 
en masse).49 In a nutshell, Certeau’s analyses could resonate among certain 
                                                 
48 Giard, ‘Histoire d’une recherche’, p. i; ‘History of a Research Project’, p. xiii. Antoine 
Hennion has noted more recently that the demand for the informational resources possessed 
by the Ministry of Culture’s research unit has tended to come more naturally from a grass-
roots level (regions, associations, trade unions) than from the Ministry’s own sectorial 
directorates (A. Hennion, ‘Le grand écart entre la recherche et l’administration’ (Paris: 
Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication, Département des Etudes et de la Prospective, 
June 1996), p. 17). 
49 Emblematic of the former might be Augustin Girard, head of research at the Ministry of 
Culture, who had played a key role in securing Certeau’s research contract between 1974 and 
1977 (see notably Philippe Urfalino’s discussion of the ‘secant marginality’ of the Ministry’s 
research unit, and of the kind of cultural policy framework to which Girard aspired, in 
Urfalino, ‘Laboratoire d’idées et utopies créatrices’, in Trente ans d’études au service de la 
vie culturelle, Table ronde organisée à l’occasion du départ à la retraite d’Augustin Girard, 
chef du Département des études et de la prospective du ministère de la culture de 1963 à 
1993 (Paris: Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication, 1993), pp. 77-81 (pp. 79-80)). 
Emblematic of the latter might be Maurice Druon, Minister of Culture between 1973 and 
1974, who had been instructed by President Pompidou to ‘tighten the screw’ on bodies such 
as the Council for Cultural Development, seen, no doubt like the Commission for Cultural 
Affairs of the Sixth Plan, as a kind of Trojan Horse bringing subversive cultural projects into 
the machinery of government (see Philippe Poirrier, L’Etat et la culture en France au XXe 
siècle (n.p.: Librairie Générale Française, 2000), pp. 143-4); Claude Fabrizio’s report on 
execution of Sixth Plan gives a clear sense of how the more experimental and innovative 
suggestions issuing from the Commission for Cultural Affairs had by the middle of the decade 
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groups of governmental agents, but not others. However, in order just to give an 
idea of a context in which Certeau’s thought could appear as relevant to high-
level administrators responsible for developing cultural policy, I shall quote a 
couple of paragraphs written by one such administrator, Jack Ligot. He is 
presenting, in 1978, the publication of summary reports from the research 
programme launched in 1973 that included Certeau’s project: 
 
From the start of this research programme, as the Seventh Plan was being 
elaborated, the idea of growth [economic growth was a fundamental 
concern of the Plan] acquired a more qualitative meaning. Corresponding 
to this new type of growth, there emerged a new conception of cultural 
development envisaged less as a programming of governmental action 
than as the establishment of conditions that would favour the expression 
of individual potential. 
 
And later on: 
 
There is a sense that […] in matters of cultural action, what is required 
now are interventions that take place at increasingly subtle levels, but 
which are difficult to programme, and located in increasingly diverse 
sectors in which forms of personal creativity can manifest themselves.50
 
Certeau’s deliberations were, then, clearly relevant to a public policy agenda 
shared by a certain number of policy administrators. This agenda was, however, 
by the late 1970s, not in the ascendancy, and effective policy options were 
decided ultimately by Giscard d’Estaing’s economically neo-liberal and 
culturally conservative government. 
 We can see what use certain sections of governmental institutions might 
have hoped to make of Certeau’s analyses. What use might Certeau have made 
of such institutions? I have already suggested how he could, so to speak, use 
their resources to produce tools that could be deployed elsewhere, notably in the 
strategies that subinstitutional groups dispersed throughout the social body  
might use to produce representations of themselves. At a more mundane level, 
of course, Certeau could use the institution to acquire for himself an official 
research position, which was less straightforward for him in the 1970s than the 
                                                                                                                                                        
been sidelined by political decision-makers (Fabrizio, Essai de bilan d’exécution du 6e Plan 
en matière de développement culturel, Secrétariat d’Etat à la Culture, Service des études et de 
la recherche, December 1975, typed document consulted at the Ministry of Culture’s 
Départment d’études et de la prospective). 
50 Jack Ligot, general rapporteur for the Research Council at the Ministry of Culture and 
Communication, introducing the dossier ‘Economie et Culture’, p. 25. 
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posthumous recognition of his oeuvre might lead us to believe.51 Finally, he 
could use his position to exert a certain kind of vicarious ‘representative’ role, 
standing in for others who were unlikely ever to have a seat at the kinds of 
meeting he could attend. 
 This was not necessarily the kind of representative function which 
Certeau would theoretically have endorsed. It corresponds to a function of 
Stellvertretung, taking somebody else’s place in the absence of any consistent 
self-representation of the kind I described above. In this perspective, the 
production of political representation and epistemic representations – i.e. the 
production of accepted, articulated knowledge – come together. For a long time, 
activities outside the realm of consecrated culture had scarcely figured in the 
field of perception characterizing the Ministry of Culture and its networks. 
Attempts to bring such activities under consideration had been organised 
essentially around negative categories. Francis Jeanson, director of an 
innovative House of Culture, had spoken famously in 1968 of a ‘non-public’ 
that should be distinguised from the ‘potential public’ of cultural institutions 
(whereas a ‘potential public’ might be attracted to such institutions through 
appropriate publicity, the ‘non-public’ felt simply unconcerned by what was 
happening there). The ‘Cultural Action’ report of the Sixth Plan took up 
Jeanson’s term to designate the Ministry’s ignorance  of the cultural aspirations 
of those who ‘represent numerically the most substantial part of our society, and 
no doubt also its destiny’. The talk at the 1972 Arc-et-Senans meeting discussed 
above was of a ‘no-man’s land’.52 These were hardly the categories in terms of 
which the interests of the relevant sections of the population could be effectively 
represented in sites of strategic decision-making. What Certeau’s analyses do, in 
politico-administrative terms, is take a dispersed, atomized distribution of 
isolated practices that were scarcely even perceived as such. It thickens them 
together, as it were (the most appropriate term would be the German 
verdichten), and constitutes them as a consistent representation. Scientifically 
speaking, the nature of this representation can be and has been challenged. In 
politico-administrative terms, as a kind of coup de force, it adds a new element 
                                                 
51 See Dosse, Le Marcheur blessé, pp. 361-425, 443-62; in a note accompanying Certeau’s 
postface for the Ministry’s survey of cultural practices (Pratiques culturelles des Français 
(Paris: Services des Etudes et de la Recherche du Ministère de la Culture, 1974), pp. 169-82 
(p. 169)), Certeau is described as having been a ‘director of study’ at the Ministry’s research 
department. Certeau’s postface was also published as the concluding chapter ‘Des espaces et 
des pratiques’ in La Culture au pluriel. 
52 For Francis Jeanson’s analysis in terms of a ‘non-public’, see ‘The Villeurbanne 
Declaration’ [1968] (largely written by Jeanson) and ‘Chalon: Four Years of Cultural Action’ 
[1971] in Ahearne (ed.), French Cultural Policy Debates, pp. 70-82. For the use of this term 
in the 1971 general report of the Commission for Cultural Affairs, see Commissariat Général 
du Plan, Rapport de la commission Affaires Culturelles: l’action culturelle , p. 16. For Edgar 
Morin’s reference to notions of cultural life beyond the realm of consecrated culture and the 
counter-cultural scene as a ‘no-man’s land’, see Analyse et prévision, p. 131. 
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to the set of mental categories in terms of which policy options are envisaged 
and managed, both at national and local levels. Processes of creative 
appropriation could find a place, as it were, as an autonomous representation on 
the policy map. Certeau might have remained ironic about the efficacy of such 
representation by proxy, but it does remain, I would suggest, one of his lasting 
contributions to cultural policy debates in France.53
 
 
3.4  Institutions and Experimentation 
 
 Certeau’s now classic analyses of the ordinary processes of creative 
appropriation are well-known. He develops in L’Invention du quotidien a series 
of models designed to bring into focus dispersed and unrecognised forms of 
creativity. Readers are shown not passively to receive a text, but to produce their 
own secondary ‘text’ on the basis of that primary text, recombining and 
‘metaphorizing’ (transporting) its elements so as to generate something new. 
Those who inhabit the towns built by planners and architects are shown, as it 
were, to create their own places within those spaces. The same might be said of 
those who visit the exhibitions of cultural institutions. Users ‘insinuate’ jarring 
or unpredictable elements into the cultural systems they negotiate (television 
schedules, literary canons, factory regulations, recipes), thereby overdetermining 
those elements and filling the systems with microscopic fissures and rifts. As 
speaking subjects take hold of a preexisting linguistic system and bend it to their 
purposes while simultaneously following its laws, so Certeau’s ordinary subjects 
are not simply moulded by the regulations and symbolic structures of social life. 
These constitute instead the material on which their creative practices of 
‘reemployment’, ‘metaphorization’, ‘insinuation’ and ‘utterance’ can be put to 
work, with greater or lesser effect.54
 I have already suggested how  the first volume of L’Invention du 
quotidien – Certeau’s best-known book for anglophone readers – tends to 
present these processes as essentially individualised practices (at one point 
Certeau even compares them to ‘wandering lines’ drawn by autistic children (IQ 
57 [34]). This is not, however, the whole story, and they need to be framed in 
the context of Certeau’s other writings if their significance for cultural policy 
                                                 
53 In particular, one could underline Certeau’s major contribution to the process by which 
cultural policy research now produces, as Antoine Hennion has put it, an ‘infinitely more 
varied and specific representation’ of diverse ‘publics’ than in the period when such 
representations were produced through ‘the combination of the theories of critical sociology 
[i.e., broadly speaking, the sociology of culture inspired by Bourdieu] and the results of global 
statistical surveys’ (Hennion, ‘Le grand écart’, p. 13). 
54 See the first volume of L’Invention du quotidien; for an overview, see Ahearne, Michel de 
Certeau, pp. 157-89. 
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thinking is to be grasped. In L’Ordinaire de la communication [‘The Everyday 
Nature of Communication’], a report commissioned by the Minister for Culture 
of the new Socialist government in 1982 and written in collaboration with Luce 
Giard, the agents of these practices of creative appropriation figure essentially as 
user-groups (members of informal musical associations, youth clubs, immigrant 
groups, local computer clubs, etc.), themselves subtly organised around and 
dynamised by particular members who function as informal cultural 
intermediaries.55 We have seen how Certeau aims both to facilitate such 
processes of self-organisation, and to ‘represent’ them in such a way that they 
become a graspable and credible object for governmental support at national and 
local levels (rather than a dimly perceived and nebulous ‘no-man’s land’ 
alongside the more manifest stars of the cultural world). This broader framing of  
the analytic models developed in L’Invention du quotidien also counters the 
alternately neo-liberal or anarchistic readings that the book can encourage when 
taken on its own. If individuals have the resources to create their own spaces 
within the social order, so such arguments run, then government interference is 
what must be resisted. L’Ordinaire de la communication, by contrast, stresses 
the difficulties that impede the formation of the groupings in question 
(administrative indifference, lack of facilities or appropriate publicity, lack of 
information, linguistic and cultural barriers), as well as the significant impact 
that relatively minor provision can make to the dynamics of their development 
(access to public spaces, local publications, user-friendly databases, consultancy, 
etc.). Governmental cultural policy thereby acquires in this respect a role that is 
both fundamental and ‘delicate’ (PP 195 [117]): 
 
The daily murmur of this secret creativity provides the necessary 
foundation, and the only chance of success, for any state intervention. But 
the existence of such an activity on the part of users can only be the 
postulate of  a policy of stimulation and not its effect, however desired the 
latter might be. Hence the importance of locating this creativity and of 
recognising its places and its role.56
 
If such creativity is not ‘located’ and materially ‘recognised’, it may wither 
away or be stifled. Equally, however, it may be rendered sterile and will not 
attract grass-roots participation if subjected to univocal governmental direction 
or symbolic exploitation. L’Ordinaire de la communication thus advocates 
‘compensatory and transitive interventions adjusted to given situations’.57 
                                                 
55 The letter of 28 October 1982 from Jacques Sallois (Jack Lang’s cabinet director) giving 
Certeau and Giard their brief is included at the beginning of the published report: L’Ordinaire 
de la communication (Paris: Dalloz, 1983). The sections of the report written by Certeau and 
Giard may be found at PP 163-224 [89-139].  
56 PP 172 [96 – trans. mod.]. 
57 PP 174 [97 – trans. mod.]. 
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While, as we will see below, its propositions are envisaged as part of an overall 
governmental strategy, it describes how 
 
The partial character, tactical in a certain sense, of the analyses and 
measures that are put forward here refers to the schema of a democratic 
society in which the state itself plays only a partial role, without for all 
that believing itself to be weakened or dispossessed of its legitimate 
powers. (PP 174 [97]). 
 
The practical considerations of L’Ordinaire de la communication thus 
complicate the famous distinction between the strategies of institutions and the 
tactics of ordinary users as developed in L’Invention du quotidien. In order to 
enable localised tacticians to consolidate their own (micro-)group strategies as 
described in the previous section, the ‘strategies’ of cultural policy-makers must 
themselves incorporate locally adjusted ‘tactics’. The relations between 
‘strategic’ cultural institutions and their ‘tactical’ users cannot in this framework 
be reduced to a clear-cut opposition. 
 Certeau’s underlying reflection on institutions has received less attention 
than his analyses of those creative practices that elude, resist or skip around 
institutional constraints.58 In the context of his cultural policy thinking, however, 
we must explore how those practices depend on the institutions against which 
they seem to work (they are, in a sense, parasitical upon the institutional 
configurations on which they feed). This will show the peculiar kind of 
institutional reponsibility that falls in Certeau’s framework to the architects of a 
national cultural policy. For the purposes of exposition, we can isolate three 
moments in Certeau’s thinking on institutions. 
 We have seen already how the events of May 1968 signified for Certeau a 
crisis whereby those institutions that were supposed to ‘represent’ the social 
body had ceased to do so: 
 
A schism between the irreducibility of conscience and the objectivity of 
social institutions appeared to me at once as the denounced and 
unacceptable fact, that is, as the current problem of thought and action.59
 
The protestors had in Certeau’s account demanded  a system of representation 
that would indeed be ‘representative’ insofar as it would ‘give speech to 
everyone’ and be ‘true’ (PP 75 [38]). Insofar as Certeau declares his solidarity 
                                                 
58 For some brief but helpful indications, see Luce Giard, ‘Mystique et politique, ou 
l’institution comme objet second’, in Giard, Martin & Revel, Histoire, mystique et politique. 
Michel de Certeau (Grenoble : Jérôme Millon, 1991), pp. 9-45 (Giard addresses the question 
of the ‘institution’ as such at pp. 42-4); and Pierre Mayol, ‘Michel de Certeau, l’historien et la 
culture ordinaire’, p. 201.  
59 PP 39 [10 – trans. mod.]. 
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with this question of ‘conscience’, we might describe this first moment in his 
reflection on institutions as an aspiration towards a more ‘coherent’ or 
transparent representative apparatus for the negotiation of political and cultural 
conflict. 
 As suggested above, Certeau’s subsequent experience of politico-cultural 
institutions would direct this aspiration towards less direct forms of expression. 
His work for the Ministry of Culture and the Cultural Commission of the Sixth 
Plan led him to contrast the explicit discourse of governmental bodies (an 
‘impotent language’) and their implicit functioning (obeying ‘powers that have 
become invisible’) (CAP 190 [121]).60 Universities likewise looked similarly 
unlikely to become transparently representative institutions, ‘managed by an 
anonymous and saturated administration – an enormous body, sick with inertia, 
opaque to itself, living a complex life that is nowhere ever explained, that has 
become insensitive to higher directives, to inoculations of theory, or to outside 
stimuli’ (CAP 114 [60]). The schism denounced in May 1968 as a political 
anomaly had come by the mid-1970s to appear as something altogether more 
structural. Indeed, inspired no doubt by the beleaguered predicament of the 
Ministry of Culture itself in the government, Certeau describes how the 
‘invisible powers’ of the State itself were fragmented into equally invisible 
competing units, taking effective decision-making away from politically 
accountable or even rationally technocratic directives.61 Simply to continue 
denouncing this state of affairs from a position of detached observation would 
be politically ineffectual. Within this ‘moment’ of his reflection, Certeau looks 
instead to consider this quasi-structural opacification of institutions as a 
framework within which to adjust forms of  action. Engagement in these 
institutions provided, at the very least, a tactical purchase on the ‘real’. This 
could be developed along more strategic lines through coordination in 
‘transversal networks’ with like-minded agents embedded in other institutions.62 
Working as a kind of discreet alien presence within established institutions, such 
networks could serve within limits to direct resources to particular projects and 
experiments, or to circumvent political and administrative obstacles. Clearly, 
this was a style of action developed in a political and institutional context (the 
conservatively and neo-liberally governed France of the 1970s) inimical to the 
cultural policy agenda nurtured by Certeau. Nevertheless, it is striking that he 
did not advocate any simple rejection of institutional engagement: on the 
contrary, this was seen as a condition of effective action (providing notably 
essential points of leverage, flows of information, and proxy ‘representation’ for 
those outside such institutions). 
                                                 
60 I develop further the contrast between ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ cultural policies in chapter 
four of the present study, with reference to the work of Régis Debray (see below, 4.1). 
61 M. de Certeau, ‘Actions culturelles et stratégie politique’, p. 353. 
62 Ibid., p. 357. 
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 But at a deeper level, institutions are not, in Certeau’s reflection, 
apparatuses that are simply used by a subject who remains external to them. On 
the contrary, institutions (language, the family, school, of course, but also the 
broad sphere of cultural policy institutions) are fundamental to the very self-
constitution of the human subject. Certeau underlines this ‘inaugural’ function in 
a report he wrote for the Pompidou Centre in Paris in 1984, and looks to ‘give 
back to the term “institution” the sense of that which sets up a place, creates, and 
enables, i.e. the active sense of that which institutes’.63 The key point in this 
respect, however, is that it is not a single institution that, for Certeau, ‘sets up a 
subject’s own space’.64 As we saw above with the example of the relations 
between a child, his school and his family, the subject’s conditional freedom 
emerges through the fact of being situated within a plurality of relations 
(Certeau would make the same point in a 1985 report for the OECD on the 
education of social minority groups).65 Autonomy is made possible through a 
play (jeu) among heterogeneous points of reference, the a priori indeterminable 
room for manoeuvre opened up by their very plurality. Institutions ‘in the plural’ 
are thus not, as a naïve belief in spontaneity might assert, opposed to human 
liberty, but are on the contrary conceived by Certeau as its necessary condition. 
It thus becomes a basic overall responsibility for cultural policy to foster what 
Certeau calls a ‘multilocation of culture’, maintaining ‘several types of cultural 
reference’, and developing a ‘play of different cultural authorities’ (ce jeu 
d’instances culturelles différentes).66 Human subjects are thereby given a 
multiplicity of sites or reference points through which to construct their 
itineraries and associations, and against which to situate themselves. 
 Certeau is not therefore, as some readings of his work might suggest, anti-
institutional in any simple sense (though he was clearly hostile to efforts by any 
single institution to secure a monopolistic hold over the subjective life of its 
members). He makes the point semi-ironically in a paper given at the Amiens 
House of Culture in 1978, underlining that, while institutions may stifle the type 
of creative practices he is looking to champion, they also have a necessary role 
to play in its recognition and representation: 
 
My goal is not to sack the libraries, to set fire to the museums and to shut 
the operas. But the overriding and sometimes exclusive importance given 
to the ‘great works’ and their diffusion in cultural animation is due to the 
fact that we are unable to discern the ‘creativity’ of the public, i.e. of  
‘consumers’. Insufficient recognition has been given to the anonymous, 
fragmentary and ephemeral works of the millions of ordinary authors who 
                                                 
63 This report was published posthumously as M. de Certeau, ‘Le Sabbat Encyclopédique du 
Voir’, Esprit, 123, Feb 1987, pp. 66-82 (quotation from p. 78). 
64 See Certeau’s remarks in Analyse et prévision, p. 105.  
65 See ‘Economies ethniques’ (1985), republished in PP 225-71 (p. 234) [141-74 (p. 149)]. 
66 CAP 121 [66 – trans. mod.]. 
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do not frequent the Houses of Culture. I would like us to ask not just how 
to circulate Picasso and Stockhausen among ‘the people’, but also how to 
introduce into the Houses of Culture the genius, the practical thought and 
the wily intelligence of all those unknown authors.67
 
For an analytic overview placing these issues within an overall Certalian 
strategy for State cultural policy, we can turn, as it happens, to a text not written 
by Certeau himself, but by Marc Guillaume in his report The Cultural 
Imperative summarizing the recommendations of the ‘Long Term Culture’ 
working group of the Ninth Plan.68 Guillaume notes at the beginning of the 
report how Certeau’s writings provided major guidelines for his analyses, and it 
does not seem inappropriate to read the report as a suggestive extrapolation of 
Certeau’s reflection for the purposes of strategic cultural planning.69 Guillaume 
distinguishes three broad modes of intervention for the State. Firstly, it must 
manage its own institutions and their traditional social missions insofar as these 
constitute fundamental reference points where cultural contradictions are 
‘crystallized’ and negotiated. Secondly, it must ‘attend to cultural diversity’ in 
such a way as to create the conditions in which a plurality of socio-cultural 
groupings set off from the structures of the State can pursue their own 
autonomous projects. Finally, in the context of political decentralisation, the 
republican State must remain an authority for appeal and arbitration when 
cultural professionals or associations are subject to ‘sectarian’ political pressure 
at local levels (an obvious case today would be the cultural policies pursued 
over the last decade by local authorities run by the extreme right National 
Front).70
 This section of Guillaume’s text can itself be read as crystallizing 
admirably a framework that can be induced from Certeau’s oeuvre. However, 
what is most interesting is perhaps less this tripartite model in itself than the 
kinds of relations between its parts developed by Certeau in his writings. For, as 
is clear above in Certeau’s proposal for new uses for a House of Culture, that 
domain of cultural policy concerned with managing institutions is in his 
reflection multiply interconnected with the domain attending to the ordinary 
                                                 
67 M. de Certeau, ‘Manières de faire: la culture ordinaire’, in Peuple et Culture (ed.), Pour un 
renouveau de la pensée sur l’action culturelle, Paris : Peuple et Culture and Amiens : Maison 
de la Culture d’Amiens, 1978, pp. 70-78 (p. 77). 
68 Commissariat Général du Plan (principal rapporteur – Marc Guillaume), L’Impératif 
culturel. Rapport du groupe long terme culture (Paris : La Documentation française, 1983). 
69 Ibid., p. 14; for further details concerning the collaboration between Guillaume and 
Certeau, see M. Guillaume ‘Vers l’autre’, in L. Giard (ed.), Le Voyage mystique. Michel de 
Certeau (Paris : Recherches de Science Religieuse/Cerf, 1988), pp. 181-6 (pp. 183-4); and 
Dosse, Le Marcheur blessé, pp. 458-60. 
70 L’Impératif culturel, pp. 78-83; these pages are available in English translation in Ahearne, 
French Cultural Policy Debates, pp. 121-6. On National Front local cultural policies, see e.g. 
P. Poirrier, L’Etat et la culture en France, pp. 216-7. 
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expanses of cultural diversity. These connections can best be brought out if we 
take as our guiding light the notion of experimentation, crucial to Certeau’s 
cultural policy thinking, and explore its relations with his thinking on cultural 
institutions. 
 Certeau’s abiding concern was ‘to bring closer together the cultural 
provision of the major facilities and the real practices of culture and 
communication’ that characterised the users of those facilities.71 When asked to 
propose remedies for structural blockages affecting major cultural institutions, 
he would propose institutional experimentations along these lines. One example 
of this can be seen in his analysis of the situation confronting French universities 
at the beginning of the 1970s. We have just seen how French universities at the 
time had become for Certeau the very symbol of opaque institutions, unable to 
represent the interests voiced by students or wider society. Faced with a new 
kind of ‘mass’ clientele (elite students in France do not as a rule attend 
universities, and undergraduate students that could secure places in other 
institutions of higher education would increasingly do so), Certeau argued that 
university teachers should cease trying to ‘reproduce’ the programme they 
themselves had inherited. Instead of measuring simply the degree of student 
‘resistance’ to this programme, they should use the questions and current 
interests of the students as the starting point for their teaching practice (what 
light can your knowledge shed on my questions about truth, political justice, 
economic activity, war, language, the cult of celebrity, understandings of nature, 
or whatever…). Crucially, this should not lead to an a priori identification with 
the students’ point of view (for otherwise the space of plurality opened up by the 
institution would collapse demagogically around a single pole). Instead, they 
should use these questions, born of current concerns, to ‘traverse’ 
experimentally with the students those corpuses of knowledge that the teachers 
had mastered as a result of their own studies. For Certeau, the massification of 
university recruitment did not therefore necessarily present a distraction from 
properly cultural concerns, but instead ‘designates for culture its proper 
definition by referring established knowledge to a practice of thought, and the 
conceptual objects it carries with it to the human subjects who produce them’.72 
In this sense, the resources of institutionally transmitted knowledge only become 
part of a live ‘culture’ (in a quasi-bacteriological sense) when they are taken up 
by non-specialists in relation to contemporary questions. This does not mean 
they should ‘answer’ these questions (their fundamental function is to reframe 
them), or that these questions should determine exclusively the avenues of 
research (what is deemed irrelevant today may not be so tomorrow). Moreover, 
Certeau stressed that such dispersed tactical classroom experiments would give 
                                                 
71 See L’Ordinaire de la communication, reprinted in PP 163-224 (p. 194) [89-139 (p. 115 – 
trans.mod.)]. 
72 CAP 89 [42-3 – trans. mod.]. 
 105
way to lassitude and discouragement if they were not strategically supported and 
coordinated at the politico-institutional level (CAP 117 [63]) – hard-pressed 
teachers will know what he means. In a theoretical and practical perspective, 
however, this example shows how (live) culture and experimentation are for 
Certeau indissociable: culture is the very process through which a social group 
applies the theoretical resources it has acquired (theorein – resources for seeing 
what you’re doing) to framing the practical and existential problems it faces. 
 On the one hand, then, where it was a question of the management of 
established institutions, Certeau’s reflex was to propose co-ordinated forms of 
institutional experimentation. On the other hand, where it was a question of 
attending to forms of cultural diversity set off from the apparatus of the State, he 
proposed support and encouragement for the creation of what one might call 
experimental micro-institutions. This is particularly evident in The Everyday 
Nature of Communication. Certeau and Giard look to the locally implanted 
‘associative movement’ in France as a kind of dispersed and informal ‘research 
laboratory’ for the development of such micro-institutions.73 These could 
comprise clubs for trying out new technologies, experimental writing workshops 
(organised particularly around less ‘noble’ forms of writing), groups producing 
local newssheets or school papers, groups constituted to protect or manage 
particular historic or aesthetic features of their environment, etc.74 The important 
point was that the State should not look itself to create such micro-institutions ex 
nihilo. Instead, it had for Certeau and Giard to presuppose a disseminated latent 
or actual ‘creativity’ in the social body, and look both to remove impediments 
and provide resources for what might be called its auto-organisation.75 Certeau 
and Giard focus in particular on what they call non-professional ‘cultural 
intermediaries’ – individuals with particular qualities of dynamism, curiosity, 
cross-cultural connections, familiarity with institutions, etc, who, experience 
shows, play a decisive role in the crystallization of such groups (PP 195-202 
[117-22]). The challenge they laid down for a socialist cultural policy was to 
help and stimulate such intermediaries without incorporating them into the 
apparatuses of the State. The effect of such micro-institutions is to reconfigure 
the sterile face-off between on the one hand imposing and opaque institutions, 
and on the other hand isolated and atomised individuals. Practical engagement in 
such groupings can bring individuals a politically instructive training with 
regard to the larger institutions with which they thereby come into contact (in 
                                                 
73 See PP 188 [111]. On the history and legal framework that regulates ‘associations’ in 
France (substantially equivalent to but legally more formalised than clubs, societies and social 
movements in the UK), see e.g. Jean Defrasne, La Vie associative en France (Paris: PUF, 
1995). 
74 See e.g. PP 188, 209-10, 221, 223-4 [110-11, 127-8, 137, 139]. 
75 On the ‘auto-organisational’ strategies of one such grass-roots movement, see e.g. J. 
Ahearne,  ‘“Vers un agir complexe”: the Mouvement des Réseaux d’Echanges Réciproques de 
Savoirs and the writings of Edgar Morin’, in French Cultural Studies, viii (1997), pp. 341-55. 
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negotiations for space, resources, policy changes, etc.). At the same time, they 
provide both a supplement and a crucial social grounding for that ‘plurality of 
reference points’ in terms of which subjects construct their autonomy. 
 Finally, one should note Certeau’s own involvement in a number of  
institutions that were at once official and experimental. We have already 
considered his involvement  both in the Cultural Commission of the Sixth Plan 
and the Council for Cultural Development – both one-off bodies that did not 
enjoy a sustained existence, due to the hostility and irritation they provoked 
among the right-wing governments of the 1970s. He was also involved in a 
number of projects based at the major experimental cultural centre built at 
Beaubourg in Paris and opened in 1977.76 Indeed, the internal consultancy report 
he wrote for the Centre in January 1984 will provide us with some concluding 
remarks concerning the relations between institutions and experimentation in his 
cultural policy thinking. 
 Beaubourg has been described as a reconceived and transformed House of 
Culture, a centre for contemporary creation designed to take account of the 
demands and social mood expressed in the wake of May 1968. Its ‘inside-out’ 
construction and architecturally induced porosity with regard to the urban space 
surrounding it were supposed to demystify the workings of culture. It combined 
on the same site a number of units – a museum of modern art, a general forum, 
diverse exhibition spaces, a public library, an avant-garde music centre, etc. – 
that were supposed to interact in a ‘decompartmentalised’ and ‘global’ whole (to 
recall the language of the Sixth Plan Cultural Commission). 
 Certeau was drawn to Beaubourg no doubt because it continued to 
function ‘like a laboratory as much as a cultural institution’.77 However, by the 
time of his report, the ‘globalising utopia’ (71) that characterised the Centre’s 
beginnings seemed to have exhausted itself. After extensive consultations with 
those working in the Centre’s various sections, and having studied Beaubourg’s 
own documentation, the purpose of Certeau’s ‘pre-report’ was to suggest new 
types of project and ‘styles’ of action that might give fresh impetus for the post-
foundational ‘second period’ (67) into which the Centre was now entering.78 I 
want to introduce into this discussion just two aspects of Certeau’s proposed 
framework for action. 
                                                 
76 For an account of Certeau’s sustained association with Beaubourg (also called the 
Pompidou Centre), see Dosse, Le Marcheur blessé, pp. 463-72. 
77 M. de Certeau, ‘Le Sabbat Encyclopédique du Voir’,  p. 67. Page references in brackets 
immediately hereafter refer to this report. 
78 Certeau felt able to write only a ‘pre-report’ rather than a full report, because he had not 
received as he had requested a collection of dedicated reports written by the different sections 
themselves, addressing the history of their work and their current orientations (see Luce 
Giard’s editorial note, p. 66). Given what employees had to say about their workload and 
working conditions, as well as the probable effects of certain interdepartmental rivalries, this 
was not perhaps surprising. 
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 Reading the report, one gains the impression that the people to whom 
Certeau talked were being ground down in a process of attrition: unable ever to 
‘escape’ from the flows of visitors to work in peace and quiet due to the 
‘progressive’ open-plan design of the premises, they had come to ‘hate the 
crowds’ (70); different sections were forever wrangling for spaces and facilities 
they were supposed spontaneously to ‘share’ in decompartmentalised fashion; 
individual units had no incentive to seek new outlets for their projects as they 
received no extra resources as a result of  particular successes or innovations; 
there was a relentless quality to the drive to put on ever more things to ‘show’ 
the public. Throughout the report, Certeau treats these as symptoms of 
institutional dysfunction rather than a simple failure on the part of individuals to 
live up to the generous but untested utopia that shaped the foundation of the 
Centre. 
 His first broad remedy for these dysfunctions may again seem surprising, 
given Certeau’s reputation as a champion of users’ ‘tactics’ against the 
impositions of institutional ‘strategies’. He suggested that the Centre’s problems 
derived from the very ideal of ‘fusional’ decompartmentalization that once 
mobilized it. He argued that it should deploy various strategies of 
‘differenciation’, allowing the various units to distinguish themselves more 
clearly from each other as well as from the public, and also distinguishing the 
different types of public. If each unit were more conscious of and confident in 
its own historically constituted identity, it would be more willing and able to 
enter into constructive dialogue with other units (and with subsections of the 
public, as opposed to unmanageable ‘crowds’). The result would be a more 
clearly articulated space comprising a plurality of reference points rather than an 
amalgam cramping all its members (we have seen above how the notion of 
‘articulation’ – the combination of elements that retain distinct identities – is a 
key feature of Certeau’s thought). Effectively, Certeau was suggesting that the 
institution delimit, clarify and consolidate its strategic identity. Indeed, he 
argued that it was crucial that it be given properly strategic resources to do so. 
Units had to be given the opportunity to turn past experiences into a form of 
‘capital’ (70, 74), allocating working time to reviewing previous ventures and 
experiments, and thereby building up a stock of relevant knowledge and a sense 
of historical orientation (thus countering the sense of being pushed haphazardly 
from one thing to another). 
 The second broad remedy I want to consider here follows on directly from 
this, and provides an interesting perspective on the style of Jack Lang’s overall 
cultural policy that would by 1984 have become clearly perceptible. Certeau 
suggested that the ongoing imperative to ‘exhibit’  had produced a hypertrophic 
‘exorbitation of the visible’ (70). It was as if the Centre had to be filled ever 
anew with things to see, in a one-sided process whereby its employees laid on 
displays which the public came to behold (one might compare this more 
generally with the relentlessly visual/televisual imperative organising Jack 
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Lang’s policy agenda at the same time).79 Certeau urged a less ‘ephiphanically’ 
orientated system of production (73). The Centre as a whole, he suggested, 
lacked any sense of experiential dimensions inaccessible to sight, effects of 
‘secret’ and ‘shadow’ (70-71). The employees themselves needed to be given 
working time to develop greater ‘intellectual ballast’ (73) for their projects to 
counter the inevitable drift towards superficiality induced by the stress on 
productivity and visibility. This  ‘interiorization’ of their work could only take 
place, Certeau emphasises repeatedly, if they were given the time and conditions 
to work through their experiences in writing. For Certeau notes, preechoing the 
reflection of Debray to be discussed in the next chapter, that whereas images 
‘fuse’ their constituent elements in a synchronic whole, the act of writing leads 
the subject to separate out and ‘articulate’ the relations between them (72). 
Moreover, the writings in question should concern not only the experiences of 
the Centre’s employees. If the one-directional vector of ‘exhibiting’ and 
‘spectating’ was to be enriched, then integrating into written accounts the 
experiences of  particular sectors of a differentiated public at the Centre might 
be a place to start (74). Such a controlled and considered collaboration with its 
public (with no pressure for any kind of fusion) could for Certeau bring the 
Centre back to its key concerns, i.e. the ‘social appropriation of technical 
knowledge and symbolic creations’ (75). Indeed, one could see Certeau as 
projecting, by no means unduly, into this institutional report his own 
fundamental cultural policy objectives: 
 
What is essential, in relation to the teeming proliferation of uses for which 
the Centre provides already both a site and a laboratory, is to work out on 
this basis a policy overcoming the division between the processes of 
production and those of appropriation, and offering a body of reflection 
on what a process of sociocultural democratization might look like today. 
(78) 
 
 
Bourdieu, as we saw in chapter two, pursued a ‘rational’ and ‘critical’ 
notion of cultural democratization, whereby the ‘highest’ achievements of 
humanity could be protected and also placed as emancipatory tools in the hands 
of the culturally dispossessed. Certeau did certainly not reject such a notion – he 
did not want to ‘sack the libraries [and] set fire to the museums’, nor to imprison 
people in the localised cultures into which they had been born. However, the 
constant drive of his cultural policy reflection was to challenge the clear divide 
between cultural ‘production’ and cultural ‘appropriation’ around which the 
scheme of cultural democratization is organised. The elaboration, ‘exhibition’, 
                                                 
79 See e.g. Régis Debray, L’Etat séducteur: les révolutions médiologiques du pouvoir (Paris : 
Gallimard, 1993), pp. 26-30, 109-17; and the discussion in 4.3 below. 
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and instrumentation of a ‘common language’ were not matters for cultural 
professionals alone, and Certeau sought to develop a cultural policy vocabulary 
that could do justice to that fact. This vocabulary could play a part in drawing up 
a ‘new probematic of cultural development’ as invoked by Augustin Girard (see 
the introduction to the present study). In the writings of Bourdieu and Certeau, 
we can observe particularly probing versions of, respectively, the ‘cultural 
democratization’ and ‘cultural development’ (or ‘cultural democracy’) strands in 
French cultural policy thinking. As we have seen, for Augustin Girard, the major 
destabilising force with which these strands of thought have been confronted 
over the last 45 years has been that of technology.80 I will thus turn now, as a 
supplement to the reflection of Bourdieu and Certeau, to the work of Régis 
Debray, insofar as this allows us to tackle head-on the relations between 
cultural-political programmes and technological mutations. 
 
                                                 
80 See Girard, ‘Un cas de partenariat entre administration et recherche scientifique’, in Menger 
and Passeron (ed.), L’Art de la recherche. Essais en l’honneur de Raymonde Moulin (Paris: 
La Documentation Française, 1994), pp. 138-47 (pp. 146-7), and ‘Une dynamique pour 
l’avenir’, in Trente ans d’études, pp. 89-99 (pp. 89-90).  
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Chapter Four. Régis Debray 
 
4.1  Cultural policy as a transhistorical function 
 
 It would be possible, if one selected one’s extracts carefully, to present 
Régis Debray in the mould of Marc Fumaroli as an outright critic and satirist of 
French cultural policy. In his political autobiography, Loués soient nos 
seigneurs. Une éducation politique, there is a long chapter where he semi-
humorously passes down to an imaginary young political shark the lessons that 
he has learnt at his own expense over his time in political life. With reference to 
his time as presidential adviser in the Elysée palace between 1981 and 1988, he 
draws up a hierarchy of measures that a government  can deploy in order to 
disguise inaction as action (all this in the hope of persuading Debray’s fictional 
protégé ‘not to be too subtle’). These are catalogued in ascending order as ‘the 
four degrees of bluff’ (‘les quatres degrés du bidon’). The first degree of bluff 
(B1) corresponds to the creation of a ‘crisis unit’ or ‘task-force’ (a crisis unit 
being a person in a Ministry office with a telephone receiving dispatches and 
telegrams on the requisite subject and wondering what to do with them). Degree 
B2 includes notably the sending of a ‘personal envoyé’ from the President 
(Debray no doubt spent more time than he would have wished playing this role). 
Degree B3 comprises the mounting of an ‘international summit’ followed by 
‘common declarations’, or the commissioning of a ‘major report’ on an issue 
that will be read by no-one, and especially not by those to whom it is addressed 
(President, Prime minister or minister). Finally, degree B4 requires the creation 
of 
 
a High Council for this, a Consultative Committee for that, a States-
General (this can cover anything), a Conference of Nobel Prize Winners 
in Paris around the President, an International College of Creators. 
Degree B4 is nearly always assigned to the Ministry for Culture and 
Communication. This is perfect as a source of hot air, cutting off culture 
from civilisation, whereas the former ought simply to be a staging post in 
the pursuit of the latter.1  
 
We have already seen in chapter 1 Debray’s ambivalence about the action of 
Malraux who, by separating at a governmental level Culture and Education, 
figured as both the inheritor and gravedigger of the long-term enlightenment 
ideal of political emancipation through popular education. This ambivalence 
                                                 
1 R. Debray, Loués soient nos seigneurs. Une éducation politique (Paris: Gallimard, 1996), 
pp. 375-6 (referred to hereafter as LS). 
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turns to a much clearer intellectual hostility when it comes to the style of the 
cultural policy pursued by the Lang administration over the 1980s (when, of 
course, Debray was also part of the government). Over this time, Debray sees 
what should be a ‘minor’ domain of government  being given undue prominence 
due to its capacity to supply the media with a regular supply of arresting 
images.2 If we were to focus exclusively on this critique - to which we will 
return at greater length below - we might think that for Debray, cultural policy 
functioned as a gaudy decoy designed to divert the attention of the public from 
the fact that little real government was taking place. 
 If we look elsewhere in Debray’s oeuvre, however, the concept of a 
cultural policy figures in significantly different terms. Far from being simply a 
decoy, it is presented as the quintessence of governmental activity. The point is 
perhaps most clearly grasped if we go to the beginning of Le Scribe: genèse du 
politique, where Debray resorts to calculated anachronism in order to recount an 
‘allegory’. Taking us back to the eighth century, he presents us with the picture 
of a Western Europe largely  fragmented since the fall of the Roman Empire into 
a patchwork of tiny chiefdoms. Domination was generally exercised in a direct 
and local manner, and there was comparatively little scope for more 
sophisticated techniques of manufacturing consent (the ruling Merovingian 
dynasty was notoriously unable to check the centrifugal forces honeycombing 
their domains). Such techniques came to the fore only with the expansionist and 
ultimately imperial drive of the Carolingian dynasty, when the consolidation and 
reproduction of authority required the diffusion of a common culture across the 
extent of empire. Political power required cultural authority for its exercise, and 
cultural authority required political power for its preservation (Charlemagne was 
finally consecrated by the Pope in AD 800 as the first Emperor of the West since 
476):3
 
The Carolingian Renaissance establishes a natural link between the 
resurrection of a centre of authority and the organisation of a culture. 
Imperial dominion skilfully fused the Catholic mission of the sovereign 
with the political sovereignty of the Church. The Carolingians had a 
cultural policy because they had a political culture [my underlining]. The 
requirements of administration reestablished the use of writing. Latin was 
restored as an ‘international’ tool of communication, shared by the 
Church and the chancellery. Kings and princes would be, along with 
clerics, the only people who would learn it. Vernacular dialects would 
become ‘vulgar tongues’ abandoned to the people [...]. A standardised 
form of writing [...] was substituted for uncial and visigothic script, for 
                                                 
2 See R. Debray, L’Etat séducteur. Les révolutions médiologiques du pouvoir (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1993), p. 31 (referred to hereafter as ES). 
3 For a succinct overview, see C. Jones, The Cambridge Illustrated History of France 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 48-73. 
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the centralisation and unification of immense domains presupposed to 
begin with the uniformisation and regularisation of the material means of 
transmission. A great power required great knowledge; a great leader, 
great scholars [clercs]. [...] These would be Charlemagne’s secretaries, 
intendants and ministers.4
 
When we return to the dawn of a culture, Debray tells us, the airs of false 
modesty it subsequently acquires disperse. The links between culture and 
political power are clear to see (the same is true for the links between rulers and 
their ‘scribes’ - our ‘intellectuals’). Any political order, in a Weberian 
perspective, needs the means to maintain its symbolic legitimacy, and nowhere 
are these means more prominent than when that symbolic legitimacy must first 
be instituted or salvaged. In this sense, we might say that ‘cultural policy’ 
represents a transhistorical imperative for all political orders. 
 So is cultural policy for Debray superficial or fundamental? One response 
to this apparent contradiction might be to underline appearance-management as 
an essential task in the preservation of political power. At another level, 
confusion can be avoided here if we separate two definitions of cultural policy. 
Let us call explicit or nominal cultural policy any cultural policy that a 
government labels as such. We can say with Philippe Urfalino that such policies 
were invented, in France, in 1959 (the founding date of the Ministry for Cultural 
Affairs). Let us call implicit or effective cultural policy any political strategy that 
looks to work on the culture of the territory over which it presides (or on that of 
its adversary). One might assume that such ‘policy’ is as old as political power 
itself. The danger of the second definition lies in its anachronism and its 
excessive historical sweep (though it is also this that provides us with a heuristic 
framework within which to plot significant variation). The danger of the first 
definition is its very nominalism. If the history of cultural policy is conceived 
only as the history through which that term came, expressis verbis, to demarcate 
an autonomous sector of public policy action, we then lose the use of the term 
for designating more broadly the reality of political action on culture.5 The 
deployment of these two terms might also help us notably to measure a modern 
government’s explicit cultural policy (what it proclaims that it is doing for 
culture through its official cultural administration) against its implicit cultural 
                                                 
4 R. Debray, Le Scribe: Genèse du politique (Paris : Grasset, 1980), pp. 24-5 (hereafter 
referred to as S). 
5 Two of the most stimulating studies of French cultural policy to have appeared recently have 
adopted - justifiably, given the results it produces - what I have defined here as a nominalist 
approach - see Philippe Urfalino, L’Invention de la politique culturelle (Paris: La 
Documentation française, 1996), and Vincent Dubois, La Politique culturelle. Genèse d’une 
catégorie d’intervention publique (Paris: Belin, 1999) (cf. notably pp. 7-8). This should not 
discourage us from using the term in a broader sense. 
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policy (the effective impact on the nation’s culture of its action as a whole, 
including educational, media, industrial, foreign policy, etc.). 
 I shall initially explore further the light Debray sheds on implicit cultural 
policy as a fundamental component of governmental action before proceeding in 
subsequent sections to examine his account of explicit cultural policy in France 
particularly over the 1980s and 1990s. We have seen already how the founding 
of a new political order requires the organisation of a culture. As a corollary of 
this, Debray supposes that the perpetuation of this order is only possible through 
the successful transmission across time of that culture. Now this transmission is 
a precarious business: any cultural corpus is subject to entropic dispersal and 
decomposition. It cannot be handed down as a discrete object, as its efficacy 
depends on its proper incorporation by the human subjects it is supposed to 
inform (these subjects being as a rule also exposed to hostile takeover by other 
cultural traditions...). Cultural transmission, then, is a complex political 
operation in its own right, and Debray looks to underline the hazards to which it 
is exposed (minimized as they are both by a common-sense model by which one 
generation simply hands over ‘something’ to a subsequent generation, and by 
sociological models of social reproduction). The issues are brought into relief in 
a comparison with genetic transmission, taken from Critique de la raison 
politique: 
 
Cultural heritage is distinct from genetic heritage in that the former is 
recorded in memory and the latter in the genome; and what is retained by 
DNA is infinitely more secure than what is retained by museum creators 
or university directors. The integrity of an entity is even more precarious 
in the sphere of ideas than it is in the biosphere. We do not have the 
genetic helix working for us here, and the structures of politico-cultural 
organisation do not benefit from the invariance and self-replicating 
capacity of organic structures. There is, therefore, on this terrain, no 
guaranteed transmission of what has been acquired, and the flipside of 
what we call progress is the permanent possibility of regression. Political 
defense mechanisms must hence compensate for this reversibility that in 
principle affects any acquired modification.6  
 
We saw in our discussion of Malraux in chapter one how, for Debray, if the 
members of a social group are to cohere ‘horizontally’ among themselves, they 
can only do so through common reference to a vertically ‘transcendent’ 
principle or figure that stands above them (becoming thereby a more or less 
lucidly held super-stition) (see above, 1.3). The function of a culture, politically 
speaking, is to transmit the reference to this transcendent principle (or cluster of 
                                                 
6 R. Debray, Critique de la raison politique, ou l’inconscient religieux (Paris: Gallimard, 
1981), pp. 389-90. 
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principles). If this reference is weakened beyond a certain degree, or challenged 
by the infiltration of other references, the political order in question will become 
vulnerable to a collapse or decisive mutation. In this sense, a vigorous and 
comprehensive cultural policy is a vital function of any political body. 
 Debray likes to dwell on two illustrations of the Realpolitik implied by 
this cultural policy imperative: the Catholic Church and the French State. He 
analyses (from a strictly materialist viewpoint) the extraordinary longevity of the 
Catholic Church as a political organisation in terms of  its expertise in ‘applied 
mediology’ - i.e. a pragmatic attention to the conditions that have to be fulfilled 
if a given message is going to be felicitously transmitted.7 More relevant to our 
purposes, however, is his attention to the implicit cultural policies that have 
characterized the French State over the early modern, modern and contemporary 
periods. 
 
 
4.2  Mediaspheres and the French State 
 
 A State, Debray reminds us in L’Etat séducteur, is not something visible 
to the naked eye: it is not the demarcated land one sees from an aeroplane; it is 
not the people dispersed across towns and villages on the ground; it is not the 
rulers in their splendour.8 It is a more abstract entity, something like an 
instituted set of relations between those three terms, ensuring that the people 
within those frontiers feel they belong together at some level, that they will, as a 
rule, obey the rules laid down by their rulers without the routine use of physical 
compulsion. A State, then, is not a visible object, it is a set of relations. Debray’s 
point, however, is that unless a State produces things that people can continually 
see - or hear - then that set of relations will break down, and the State will cease 
to be. The State is therefore under a cultural compulsion (Debray might say a 
mediological compulsion). It must busy itself with the locomotion, the physical 
transport of common symbols to all the corners of its territory. This function, as 
a function, does not change. It is transhistorical. In this sense, as we have 
indicated above, all states must have a cultural policy. 
 What do change, of course, are the vehicles of symbolic transmission. 
These may be horse-drawn carriages or people’s purses carrying portraits of 
Louis XIV across seventeenth-century rural France or written revolutionary 
decrees to be proclaimed orally across the new Republic in 1792. They may be 
steam engines transporting copies of popular daily newspapers in the 1870s or 
the airwaves carrying images of President de Gaulle on the single television 
                                                 
7 See e.g. Debray, Cours de médiologie générale (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), pp. 123-57 
(hereafter referred to as CMG); and Debray, Vie et mort de l’image. Une histoire du regard en 
Occident (Paris: Gallimard, 1992), pp. 75-107 (hereafter referred to as VMI). 
8 Cf. ES 65-6. 
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channel of the early 1960s. Indeed, for Debray, these technical transformations 
in the apparatus of transmission are of greater consequence than has commonly 
been supposed. They do not simply put new instruments of power at the disposal 
of identical rulers. They are not extraneous objects that a sovereign subject can 
take up and deploy as he sees fit. Instead, these technologies ‘occupy’ the 
subjects that they maintain in power, co-determining and modelling from within 
their projects and thought-processes. Indeed, Debray contends that, in the final 
anaysis, political authorities tend to become the instruments of these 
instruments.9 Successive media technologies, as they come to dominate 
preceding technologies, work to constitute structurally different politico-cultural 
regimes - or what Debray calls ‘mediaspheres’. These mediaspheres ‘format’ 
political and cultural life in such a way as to filter what groups can come to 
power, using what strategies, what programmes and what styles of government. 
 Some critics accuse Debray of overgeneralising when it comes to 
mapping out these mediaspheres. This particular objection seems to me ill-
founded. Apologists for detail and nuance sometimes forget that the perception 
of such finer points is logically only possible against the background of a more 
general framework. A virtue of Debray’s framework, it seems to me, is its 
capacity to ‘bring out’ such nuances in a way that complicates its initially 
dichotomous divisions.10 He has also been accused of engaging in a one-
dimensional techno-determinism that looks to explain the complexity of social 
change in terms of a single factor. This, again, represents an unwarranted 
simplification of his thought. Certainly, Debray wants to reassert the causal 
efficacy of technological development against the inveterate humanist tendency 
to posit techniques or technologies as something external to, rather than 
constitutive of, the human subject.11 However, as implied by his advocacy of a 
‘techno-ethic’ (see below, 4.4), this does not signify a fatalistic resignation to 
the ineluctable effects of a monolithically conceived technological advance upon 
political and cultural life. Moreover, ‘media technologies’ are not, for Debray, 
self-propelling vehicles: they can only take effect in societies when driven and 
mediated by corresponding institutions of transmission (the Church, a 
community of scholars, a national education system, a television company under 
a given system of regulation).12
                                                 
9 See CMG 75. 
10 For a critique that endorses the value of general periodisations, but suggests other modes of 
periodisation, see Roger Chartier, ‘Médiologie, sociologie et histoire du livre’, in Le Débat, 
85, May-August 1995, pp. 17-21. 
11 Debray refers in particular in this regard to the work of André Leroi-Gourhan, the 
anthropologist of prehistory, for whom primitive techniques and tools played a decisive role 
in the process of ‘hominisation’ of our biological predecessors (cf. Bernard Stiegler, ‘Leroi-
Gourhan: l’inorganique organisé’, Les Cahiers de médiologie, 6 (1998), pp. 187-94).  
12 Those familiar with Debray’s work will recognise here his distinction between ‘organised 
matter’ (produced broadly speaking by technologies) and ‘materialised organisation’ (broadly 
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 But we must begin with the general framework. The three now overlaid 
‘mediaspheres’ which Debray sees as informing French history are, in their stark 
succession, the ‘logosphere’, the ‘graphosphere’, and the ‘videosphere’. Each is 
defined by the dominance of a particular technology for symbolic encoding, and 
of a particular institutional apparatus for symbolic transmission. The 
‘logosphere’ corresponds to the primacy of the spoken word, the principal 
apparatus for the transmission of which was the Church. This does not mean that 
writing was not an important technical feature of this apparatus, simply that it 
came under the dominant gravitational pull of the spoken word - as the period’s 
Holy Scripture put it: ‘In the beginning was the word, and the word was with 
God, and the word was God.’ The graphosphere, which corresponds to the 
primacy of the printed word, emerges in Debray’s scheme over the early modern 
period (following the invention of printing), and finds clear expression notably 
by the French Revolution and the subsequent republican projects to shape 
society according to impersonal written constitutions and laws. The principal 
apparatus ensuring that the printed word would have an effective purchase on 
society was the sort of national education system that we see drafted over the 
Revoution and established gradually over the nineteenth century. The 
graphosphere was, finally, displaced by the ‘videosphere’, over which the 
principal means of symbolic encoding becomes the image, the principal 
apparatus for the transmission of which was television networks. By way of 
initial nuance, we might add that this corresponds also to the rise of a ‘secondary 
orality’ (a spoken word recorded and reproduced) which reemerges to swamp 
the printed word itself - the clearest symptom of this being the respective reach 
of the ten-second soundbite that no-one can escape and the forty-page manifesto 
that no-one reads.13
 These are three abstractions for charting the impact of successive media 
technologies on French and, more generally, with the requisite adjustments, 
Western societies: the logosphere, the graphosphere, the videosphere. 
Obviously, printing did not silence speech any more than television put an end 
to reading. The rise to structural dominance of a given medium does not 
eliminate its predecessors, but works to bring them into its gravitational pull 
(which they may resist with greater or lesser success). Subsequently, Debray has 
framed these three notions with two further concepts: a ‘mnemosphere’ 
characterising societies prior to the invention of writing, and a ‘numerosphere’ 
(or what Louise Merzeau calls a ‘hypersphere’) ushered in by the general 
digitilization of all signs.14
                                                                                                                                                        
speaking, institutions). Together, these constitute ‘the double body of the medium’ (see R. 
Debray, Transmettre (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1997), pp. 15-71 [1-44] (hereafter referred to as T)). 
13 On secondary orality, see Walter Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the 
Word (London: Routledge (1982), 1988). 
14 See T 183 [116], and also Louise Merzeau, ‘Ceci ne tuera pas cela’, in Les Cahiers de 
médiologie, 6 (1998), pp. 27-39. 
 118
 It is perhaps not surprising that such a mediological theory of the State 
and its effective cultural policy should emerge in France. As Debray puts it, ‘in 
France, mediological questions are always a matter for the State because, more 
so than elsewhere, the State has been (self-consciously and comprehensively) a 
mediological affair’ (ES 51). From its very beginnings, and particularly at its 
height over the seventeenth century, the royal French State looked to 
subordinate the circulation of symbols to strict discursive control: 
 
The regulatory environment for image and sound, which is still more 
restrictive in France today than in Italy or the United Kingdom, to say 
nothing of the United States, goes back to the origins of the French State. 
The absolutist monarchy (and in its wake the Revolution and Empire) 
took no less than the Roman Catholic Church meticulous care over the 
industries of the imagination. Nothing of what might strike the eyes or 
ears remained alien to it. The Great King [Louis XIV] did not even 
delegate to his superintendant the task of nominating his historiographer. 
He granted pensions to his academicians, and chose his fables. He 
controlled his painters just as he maintained under surveillance the book 
trade, the theatre, and the mail. It was not simply through chance or 
personal taste that Henri IV, Louis XIII and Louis XIV had themselves 
represented as Apollo, Hercules, or Jupiter. Such heroization through 
image - certainly paintings, but also and above all coins, medals, 
tapestries, prints, almanachs - was part of a programme. Faced with the 
printing press and engravings, vehicles of propaganda but also potential 
threats, Henri II and Charles IX had already instituted monopolies and 
official delegations for anything concerning effigies of the king. The 
public imagination was subsequently mapped and gridded, via the 
Academies, the manufactories, and other such workshops for the 
production of glory. (ES 53) 
 
Of course, such comprehensive royal cultural policies would in due course be 
undermined as they lost their grip over  the instruments of symbolic 
transmission. The advent of the French Revolution was marked - both as one of 
its principal causes and an amplificatory effect - by an unprecedented and 
uncontrolled explosion of printed matter.15 This transition from printed text as a 
rare good to a readily available and increasingly affordable object heralded the 
apogee of Debray’s graphosphere (though the jolting concatenation of 
                                                 
15 See e.g. Jeremy D. Popkin, Revolutionary News. The Press in France, 1789-1799 (Durham 
and London: Duke University Press, 1990). 
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nineteenth-century French regimes would ensure that this was neither a smooth 
nor linear process).16
 While Debray is at pains to propose his mediaspheres as value-free tools 
for the advancement of understanding, it is clear that certain of the concepts 
involved acquire strong affective charges of opposing polarity. This in itself is 
not a criticism, unless we were to adopt a truncated view of epistemic objectivity 
according to which social researchers should only enquire into matters about 
which they do not care. Nevertheless, it is as well to signal the fact. Thus the 
apogee of the graphosphere, insofar as it coincides with a specific post-
Enlightenment republican tradition in France, acquires not just a descriptive but 
a normative force in Debray’s writing. After what we might call the ‘restrictive’ 
graphosphere of the Absolute Monarchy, the implications, from a republican 
viewpoint, of an increasingly universal graphosphere were mapped out over the 
revolution by the philosopher Condorcet  (see ES 93-4).17 These are built on the 
foundation constituted by two new historical facts: the transfer of sovereignty 
from the king to the people, and the technical and economic possibility of 
diffusing printed material to ever wider sections of that people. Both 
developments imply a third element: the instruction of the people. For an 
ignorant ruler is a tyrant, and an ignorant people - according to classic 
Englightenment logic - would therefore be its own tyrant. And the people can 
only profit from the proliferation of printed material if it first receives universal 
instruction. Indeed, that printed material (textbooks etc.) can itself make the 
desired instruction possible. In this perspective, a national education system is a 
necessary and central component in the very concept of a Republic 
(distinguishing it from a notional system of majority despotism). 
 The nineteenth-century  French ‘graphosphere’, if we accept the term, 
could be seen as oscillating between restrictive moments where the quantity, 
content and readership of printed material were tightly controlled (Napoleon I, 
Napoleon III) and ‘universalising’ moments where all three terms expanded (the 
Second Republic, and the Third Republic by the 1880s). As is well-known, 
Condorcet’s blueprint for a national education system would have to wait almost 
a century before its systematic roll-out. When this occured with Jules Ferry’s 
classic educational reforms of 1879-82, the diffusion of Reason as such was 
pragmatically integrated into a more populist strategy of federating the nation 
around certain images of France (cf. ES 86-7). Even then, however, writing 
                                                 
16 As regards the press, see e.g. the overviews in Jean-Noël Jeanneney, Une histoire des 
médias des origines à nos jours (Seuil, 1996), chapters 3-5 ; or M. Martin, Médias et 
journalistes de la République (Paris : Odile Jacob, 1997), pp. 15-118. 
17 For Condorcet’s reflection in this regard, see e.g. the selection of his texts collected by 
Charles Coutel in Coutel (ed.), Politique de Condorcet (Paris: Payot & Rivages, 1996), part 
III, ch. 5, ‘Le progrès des Lumières comme préalable à la république’, or Condorcet, Cinq 
mémoires sur l’instruction publique, ed. C. Coutel and C. Kintzler (Paris: Flammarion, 1994), 
especially the first and third memoirs.  
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remained the dominant medium. And writing, as a technology, carries with it for 
Debray certain intrinsic virtues.18 It is a ‘good conductor of abstraction’ (CMG 
265) , which in turn is a good conductor of emancipation. That is to say, it can 
introduce into the concrete facticity of a situation (a village organised according 
to feudal custom, say) more universal norms and references against which to 
measure it (revolutionary decrees, say). It can negate a current state of affairs, in 
a way that the image cannot. It promotes a rational ordering of the world in 
terms of disjunctive incompatibilities (either A or B, but not both) and 
hypothetical projections (if C, then necessarily D) (VMI 347-8). As opposed to 
what Walter Ong sees as the tolerance of primary orality with regard to 
contradiction and inconsistency, and what Debray calls the ‘alogical’ nature of 
images, the spread of writing induces incrementally a more rationally orientated 
political body. This is, so to speak, the utopia Debray inherits from the French 
graphosphere. It was a ‘cultural policy’ that began with the ideal of a universal 
education system, and that spread to the entire range of cultural forms: theatre, 
universal exhibitions, village festivals, opinion-forming newspapers and 
seminars organised by political parties, public sculpure and architecture, 
cinema-clubs... (ES 89). All these gravitated around the notion of ‘popular 
education’, or, a term that was once its synonym, ‘popular culture’. While such 
projects would come to lose nearly all their momentum and resonance - for 
reasons to be explored below - they continue to represent both a descriptive 
comparator and, intermittently, a normative reference point in Debray’s attempts 
to make sense of cultural policies in the videosphere and hypersphere. 
 
 
4.3  Cultural policy in the videosphere 
 
 In the classic terminology of  the American logician C. S. Peirce, 
alphabetically based forms of writing are ‘symbolic’ activities. The relation of a 
‘symbol’, in his definition, to its object is one of arbitrary convention: there is no 
necessary connection between the sounds that make up the word ‘king’, or the 
letters designating those sounds, and the real entity they serve to signify. An 
‘icon’, by contrast, is a sign that stands in direct analogical relation to its object: 
a portrait of the king is thus an icon. The final type of sign in Peirce’s triad, and 
the one that will exercise Debray most in his thinking on cultural policy, is the 
‘index’. Unlike ‘symbols’, ‘indices’ have a necessary relation to their object; 
unlike ‘icons’, this relation is not one of pure analogy (they do not necessarily 
resemble their object), but one of continuity or contiguity. The classic example 
of an ‘index’ is the smoke that signals a fire. To continue in our vein of 
                                                 
18 On writing as a ‘technology’, see e.g. Jack Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), or Ong, Orality and Literacy. 
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illustrations, ‘indices’ of the king might be his crown, his seal on a letter (a 
direct trace of his bodily act), or the scrofula of his subjects cured as a result of 
his healing touch.19
 The most efficacious signs in ‘graphospheres’, as Debray conceives them, 
are symbols. Now different types of sign do not represent the world in an 
identical manner. They organise the world differently as a mental construct, and 
therefore imply different modes of action upon that world. Alphabetically-based 
writing is, as it were, doubly cut off from the reality it addresses: it has an 
‘artificial’ relation to the phonemes it designates, which in turn stand in a 
relation of artifice to the reality they designate. This double semiotic break (to 
which habit blinds us) serves the development of thought: insofar as the world is 
less directly received, greater work must be applied to organising a 
representation of that world. Moreover, the fixing of statements via inscription 
facilitates the controlling of new statements by confronting them with previous 
statements (for authors like Goody and Ong, the operation of logic as such 
corresponds less to an innate human faculty than to a capacity developed in the 
human mind through its interaction with the artifice of writing).20 Clearly, this is 
a major field of intellectual inquiry, and to develop it any further here might 
appear to take us away from our subject. Debray’s point is this: insofar as 
‘icons’ and, a fortiori, ‘indices’ are as signs more subservient to the appearances 
of the world, they tend to induce more ‘facile’ representations of the world. 
When, therefore, images in general (and specific types of ‘index’ in particular, 
to be discussed below) become the most efficacious types of sign in a social 
order, representations of that social order will become increasingly facile. More 
complex chains of causality will have, as it were, no element to conduct them. 
Debray sees in French ‘explicit’ cultural policy of the 1980s a symptom of this 
process (which also englobes the wider domain of ‘implicit’ cultural policy). 
 
 Before coming to these analyses, however, it will be as well to qualify 
them somewhat. A hasty reading of L’Etat séducteur (which the book does not 
perhaps sufficiently discourage) might conclude that it tells the story of the 
decadence of government-by-symbol, unable to survive the contagion of 
government-by-image. However, Debray’s work as a whole, ranging across the 
longue durée of European history, suggests that pure government-by-symbol is 
in any case impossible. If the condition of government  - that is, making peope 
behave in certain ways - is making people believe in certain things, then signs 
must inevitably be its tools. History would appear to teach us, however, that all 
effective government since the invention of writing combines the three types of 
                                                 
19 For Peirce’s formulations, see e.g.  C. S. Peirce, ‘Prolegomena to an Apology for 
Pragmaticism’ (1906), in Peirce on Signs, ed. J. Hoopes (Chapel Hill and London: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1991), pp. 249-52 (pp. 251-2); or, for the original division 
(with some different terms), ‘On a New List of Categories’ (1867), ibid., pp. 22-33.  
20 See Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind; Ong; Orality and Literacy. 
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sign distinguished by Peirce. Debray’s account in Vie et mort de l’image of the 
spread and consolidation of the early Christian Church is instructive in this 
regard. Early Christians set out to discredit the ‘false idols’ of a pagan empire 
and to replace them with reference to a single and invisible divinity. Against the 
prevaling idolatry, they were iconophobic. As their proselytising mission spread, 
however, and they looked to consolidate an attachment to the new religion 
among new social groups, a more iconodulist tendency asserted itself. This 
reversal is what Debray calls Christianity’s ‘subversion within the iconophobic 
subversion of its origins’ (VMI 93): 
 
The more the Church came to terms with worldly existence, the more 
compromises it made with regard to images. As it gradually won over the 
Empire, it was won over in its turn by images and Empire - as if it had not 
been able to do without images in its efforts to inculcate and seduce. As if 
one could only respond to images through images, since oral and written 
discourse had not sufficed to break down the cultural walls of the Ancient 
World. As if it was impossible, after ten centuries of triumphant idolatry, 
to unify territories and nations  without the support of a visual minimum, 
the vital minimum for institutionalisation. A system of casuistry was put 
in place. Saint Basil admits, against his own inclinations, that an image of 
Christ can engage the Christian on the path of virtue, as long as it is 
“joined to the eloquence of the preacher”. Good uses of the image began 
to be distinguished (that the scholastic doctrines of the Middle Ages 
would systematize as didactic, memorative, and devotional). The purpose 
was to gain a purchase on the simple and credulous, to bring the faithful 
to participate in the liturgies. (VMI 92) 
 
For the Catholic Church, images, like Christ himself, became a mediation 
between humankind and the divinity. Indeed, Debray sees this decision, made 
officially at the Council of Nicaea in 787, as momentous: in asserting that the 
phenomena of the world bore a relation to the Godhead (rather than cutting off 
phenomena from an absolute transcendence, as other religions did), it served to 
authorise the serious study and exploration of those phenomena. This in due 
course would serve to permit the development of the Western traditions of 
science and art (based as they are on controlled and meticulous observation). Be 
that as it may, the early Catholic Church’s conversion to the virtues of the image 
leads Debray to formulate a more general law: 
 
This constitutes a recurrent fact in transmissions of doctrine: when the 
Word or true text engenders the corresponding institution, when the 
message of Salvation or Revolution (the profane equivalent of the 
millenium) is propagated beyond its native intellectual perimeter, 
practices of imagery reemerge and spread. It is as though the transition to 
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praxis obliges the upholders of a doctrine to satisfy the optical libido of 
the masses. (VMI 94-5) 
 
In the case of the Catholic Church, as its political ambition increased, it 
‘regressed, in Peirce’s sense, from the “symbol” to the “index”’ (VMI 93). Signs 
of the cross would become images of a crucifix (a first-degree ‘regression’, as it 
were, from residually iconic symbol to fully-fledged icon); processions and 
pilgrimages would be organised around relics, indices of saintly figures whose 
bodily presence they continued; images themselves would effectively become, 
in popular worship, idols secreting a sacred presence, ‘indexically’ related to the 
otherwise impalpable figures of doctrine. 
 Why this rapid detour through the mediologically conceived rudiments of 
Church history? For two reasons: to avoid giving the impression that the turn of 
French socialist governments over the 1980s to particular ‘practices of imagery’ 
represented in itself a betrayal of politics, when it can be seen in a longer 
perspective as following the very dynamic of politics; but also to help us see just 
what was historically specific about such developments in the videosphere as 
compared to previous mediaspheres. 
 
 When the socialist candidate François Mitterand won the presidency in 
1981, the hopes of Régis Debray (along with much of the rest of France) were 
high. High enough, as we have seen, to lead him to secure a post as a full-time 
presidential adviser in the Elysée palace. Officially assigned to ‘international 
relations’ (and more intermittently to cultural matters as such), his attention was 
never far removed from that effective or ‘implicit’ cultural policy evoked above 
- the effect of government action as a whole on French culture. This 
preoccupation would in due course, once relieved of the reservations imposed by 
public office, lead him to take issue with the ‘explicit’ cultural policy of 
Mitterand’s government. The signs of this intellecual divergence were present, if 
we are to believe Debray’s political memoirs, from an early stage. Over his first 
two years at the Elysée, Debray organised regular ‘working lunches’ for the 
president, bringing together the head of the French State and the leading 
intellectual figures of the time (Fernand Braudel, Simone de Beauvoir, Louis 
Dumont, Pierre Nora, Claude Lanzmann, Pierre Vidal-Nacquet, Michel 
Foucault...), or experts in complex issues (India, the USSR, Islam...).21 The 
programme, as he recounts, turned into a chore for this most anti-intellectual and 
pragmatic of politicians. Cagey, defensive, the urbane Mitterand would keep 
these interlocutors at a distance. In purely political terms, they would never be 
as profitable as the evening receptions organised by Jack Lang bringing together 
the Parisian world of arts and letters (famous authors, film stars, musicians, 
along with the inevitable television cameras and photographers). We saw above 
                                                 
21 See LS 323-4. 
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how, over the post-revolutionary graphosphere, cultural projects came under the 
gravitational pull of an educational ideal. In the anecdote recounted here, we see 
the result of a fission producing two now separate worlds, with arts and 
entertainment coming centre-stage as the operations of intellectual abstraction 
were sidelined and attributed a status of fastidious marginality. 
  The Catholic Church invested in imagery to maintain contact between a 
human congregation and a doctrine. Where it ‘lapsed’ to the level of the index, 
such indices participated in the transcendent referent of that doctrine (through a 
relic, the faithful could touch or at least see the body of a saint). The mode of 
contemporary government described by Debray in L’Etat séducteur cultivates 
image to maintain contact not between an electorate and a doctrine, but simply 
between the government and the electorate as such (the point now was to show 
that the government was itself ‘in touch’ with the body of a public deemed a 
priori to be more interested in other things). It was not that the ‘doctrine’ has 
changed; rather, in Debray’s reading, the term ‘doctrine’ (from doctrina - 
teaching) had fallen away. The public was both the addressee and the ‘content’ 
of messages designed first and foremost to reduce any perceived differences 
between the government and itself. The substance of governmental action 
thereby became its appearance. Of course, it is possible to see this dissolution of 
a transcendent doctrine ‘above’ a polity in favour of the immanent desires of a 
people as the doctrine of democracy itself (that ‘worst form of government 
except for all the others’). Let us first, however, consider how Debray uses the 
notion of ‘public as message’ as a key to interpreting explicit French cultural 
policy of the 1980s and early 1990s. 
 Jack Lang famously looked over his time in office to break down the 
barriers between culture and ‘life itself’.22 Instead of a rarefied domain of 
distinction set apart from ordinary life, the operative definition of culture at the 
Ministry expanded to take on all cultural genres with a clientele in French 
society (from comic strip to fashion, from rap to advertising). Certainly, within 
the framework of a generalised increase in State cultural expenditure, budgetary 
priorities  did not change as much as appearances might have suggested (with 
classical genres like opera, orchestral music, and theatre continuing to absorb 
substantial proportions of the budget).23 Nevertheless, at the level that concerns 
us here, Lang’s accession to the Ministry of Culture represented a clear break as 
regards the perception of nominal cultural policy within France. It became 
between 1981 and 1993 one of the most high-profile of government 
administrations, with Lang himself regularly appearing in opinion polls (even 
during a brief period of opposition between 1986 and 1988) as one of the most 
                                                 
22 See e.g. the speech given by Lang in 1982 at Mexico City, in J. Ahearne (ed.) French 
Cultural Policy Debates: A Reader (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 111-20; and also the 1987 
text ‘A Cultural Elan’ by Jacques Renard, Lang’s cabinet director (ibid., pp. 127-34). 
23 See e.g. O. Donnat, ‘Cultural democratization: the end of a myth’ (1991), in French 
Cultural Policy Debates, pp. 135-47 (p. 146). 
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popular politicians in the country. The ongoing dismantling of those frontiers 
that had once circumscribed the cultural domain gave in itself a sense of 
momentum to Lang’s programme, while also giving to ever wider sections of 
the population the sense that they had a stake in that programme. Certainly, the 
momentum to be derived from such a process was finite, and there had evolved 
the sense towards the end of Lang’s administration in the early 1990s of a 
certain exhaustion, with the same gestures of decompartmentalisation and 
transgression being repeated even though virtually all conceivable forms of 
cultural expression had already at least nominally been integrated into policy. 
Indeed, a new French cultural genre evolved at around this time: that of the 
critique, emerging from both the political left and right, of the populist excesses 
of Lang’s policies, usually conducted with reference to a tradional and 
restrictive ‘fine-arts’ definition of the cultural domain.24 It would be fair to say 
that such polemics finally overshadowed the substantial technical achievements 
of Lang’s administration (as regards, say, film policy, book publishing, or the 
issue of the cultural industries more generally).25
 L’Etat séducteur would no doubt have a place in the corpus of critiques 
attaching to Lang’s administration. Having said that, there is in Debray’s writing 
little of the personal animus attaching to Lang that one finds elsewhere. On the 
contrary, Debray singles out Lang in Loués soient nos seigneurs as one of the 
rare ministers who, in contrast to professional career politicians, actually 
devoted himself wholeheartedly over a sustained period to the specific issues 
confronting his Ministry, thereby making a lasting mark on that Ministry (LS 
364-5). Where it is most penetrating, Debray’s critique is ‘technical’. He 
analyses Lang’s administration as an arm of government perfectly adjusted to 
the demands of the videosphere. This cultural policy was thus calibrated 
according to a relatively new set of technically defined norms. It was, for 
Debray, a symptom of the primacy of technical determinants over political will. 
 What were the demands of the videosphere? Debray argues in Cours de 
médiologie générale that 
 
the dominant medium, with regard to previous media, is that with the 
highest performance, i.e. that which demonstrates the optimal relation 
between its cost and its effectiveness. In other words, it is the medium that 
provides the widest and most rapid coverage, at the least cost for the 
transmitter, and with the least effort (i.e. greatest comfort) for the 
receiver. The television, in this sense at least, dominates radio, which 
                                                 
24 Examples of these were Alain Finkielkraut, La Défaite de la pensée (Paris: Gallimard, 
1987), Marc Fumaroli, L’Etat culturel. Essai sur une religion moderne (Paris: Fallois, 1992), 
Michel Schneider, La Comédie de la culture (Paris : Seuil, 1993); Vincent Dubois refers to 
these as forming a ‘new journalistico-literary genre’ (in La politique culturelle, p. 293). 
25 For a measured overview, see David Looseley, The Politics of Fun: Cultural Policy and 
Debate in Contemporary France (Oxford and Washington D.C.: Berg, 1995). 
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dominates newspapers, which dominate brochures, which dominate 
books, which dominate manuscripts, etc. (CMG 301) 
 
It is a matter of prime strategic importance for a government in a given 
mediasphere to ‘occupy’, in one way or another, the dominant medium of that 
mediasphere (for if it is occupied more effectively by another agent, that agent 
will have greater leverage over the beliefs of the population). Different media, 
however, cannot be occupied in the same manner. They have to be ‘fed’ 
differently. Clearly, television lives on a diet of images - and images, moreover, 
of a particular kind. 
 This presents those in charge of the State with a problem. For the essential 
activities of a State are by their very nature organised around writing. In this 
essentially ‘scriptural’ universe, data is collected, reports are drafted, decrees are 
formulated, particular cases are judged according to written bodies of law. All 
this supplies little in terms of image that can feed the dominant medium of the 
age: 
 
Ushers coming and going in corridors, envelopes being opened and shut, 
piles of paper moving from right to left in a thousand offices, impersonal 
meetings being held without any shouting or screaming, a State that is 
working well has in audiovisual terms a rating of zero; it is desperately 
banal in dramatic terms, and it is not easy to stage its austerity (to find a 
way of instilling narrative interest, emotion, heroism, or surprise). How 
can this State apparatus be brought into a storyline with images when it is 
basically, as far as its output is concerned, a machine designed to produce  
anonymously code, law and regulation, i.e. kilometers of printed material 
every day? (ES  29-30) 
 
The apparently intrinsic tedium of State activity is liable to be more keenly felt 
in the videosphere than in the graphosphere, as the capacity of an item to project 
itself into a saturated image market becomes the criterion by which its interest is 
evaluated. In such a climate, the classic post-revolutionary justifications for the 
‘abstractions’ of a republican State (redressing regional imbalances, countering 
local fiefdoms, checking the natural drift of society towards inequality, applying 
law equally to all...) become harder to transmit. By contrast, the interest, in 
governmental terms, of a cultural policy such as Lang’s becomes clearly visible. 
It could supply week in, week out, images (a fashion exhibition in the Louvre 
museum, the award of a cultural honour to a famous tennis star...) that were 
arresting enough to allow the government to occupy the requisite slots in a 
television-dominated system of news coverage. 
 Moreover, these images were of a particular kind. As we saw with regard 
to Malraux in chapter one, images are not efficacious in themselves, particularly 
when they appear as more or less alien to the population on which they are 
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supposed to act (see above, 1.3). The images orchestrated by Lang’s 
administration stood, by contrast, in an ‘indexical’ relation to their target 
population - they had to emerge directly from the tastes and practices of this 
population as a photographic image emerges through the direct impact of light 
upon photosensitive film.  The overriding concern in their deployment was to 
display a government ‘in touch’ with a population. This was reflected, for 
example, in the succession of  ‘festivals’ that proliferated under Lang, 
generating images for subsequent retransmission of spontaneity, expressivity 
and creativity emerging directly from the body of the people. Likewise, a new 
practical hierarchy of cultural genres evolved, informed by two criteria: firstly, 
their capacity to signify ‘contact’ with the effective tastes and practices of a 
given population; secondly, their capacity to short-circuit or subordinate 
discursive elaboration. Thus genres like dance, events organised around film 
stars, fashion, advertising, or industrial design became the vehicles through 
which the government  could make an ostentatious display, as it were, of its 
participation in the public (a videospherical ersatz for public participation in 
government). The overall rhetorical strategy might be conceived as a kind of 
argument-by-index: as there is no smoke without fire, the subliminal message 
might have suggested, so this government cannot so spectacularly share our 
tastes without sharing our concerns. 
 As a rhetorical strategy (and notwithstanding its more fundamental 
achievements), Langian cultural policy wore thin. Like a worn-out talk-show 
formula, its moves came to seem monotonous, tedious and unsurprising. It 
would fall victim to the evolutionary dynamic of the videosphere that had 
initially ‘selected’ it as a viable species of political spectacle: 
 
As for the cultural scenario, it is too luxurious, it remains an [...] 
interchangeable ceremony. This inauguration of a new opera-house, that 
awarding of a Legion of Honour to a great American actor, a world 
festival of the popular song or comic-strip - they can all be amusing, 
valorizing, and even sublime. The problem is that it would not have made 
any difference if they had taken place yesterday or tomorrow; and they 
give us nothing to anticipate, to fear or hope for. Whether it is a site, a 
centre, a ‘house’, a hall, a palace, a room, there is nothing to see around 
the officials except space, a new space for consumption, with a dazzling 
array of beautiful ‘people’ for our delectation, with a handful of stars 
glorifying the Minister they surround, but our ecstasy remains static, with 
no temporal horizon to engage it. We admire, we envy, we covet - but we 
do not thrill to it. The comedy of culture, mimesis without diegesis, a 
representation with no story, provides fantastic spectacles but 
unsatisfactory television series. (ES 123-4). 
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One might say that in due course the ‘nominal’ cultural policy pursued by Jack 
Lang ceased to be a viable model of ‘effective’ cultural policy for government in 
the videosphere: it no longer gave the means to occupy the dominant medium of 
the age. 
 This strategic imperative would no doubt have been felt particularly 
keenly by French governments of the 1980s and 1990s. Until 1982, television in 
France had been entirely owned and controlled by the State, and the first 
commercial television channels would only emerge from 1984 onwards. After 
1987, when Chirac’s government privatised the leading national channel TF1, 
the commercial pole in French television clearly dominated the remaining public 
channels (we saw in chapter two Bourdieu’s proposals for challenging this 
domination).26 Writing his first explicity ‘mediological’ study in 1979, Debray 
could present the ‘informational apparatus’ (the media) in Althusserian terms as 
a more or less direct tool of the State in the reproduction of its hegemonic 
domination:  
 
The strength of a system of political domination lies in its not showing its 
strength, and one is more ready to obey a State that one can love without 
realizing it is a State. In our part of the world, active consent to the 
domination of one class is organised by what have been called, since 
Althusser, the ‘State Ideological Apparatuses’, which allow existing 
social relations to be reproduced as painlessly as possible.27
 
Some fifteen years later, by contrast, the real locus of power appeared to have 
shifted. The relations between the media and the State had inverted, to the extent 
that Debray suggested conceiving the State as an ‘Ideological Apparatus of the 
Media Market’ (ES 98). If television was the most powerful tool of effective 
cultural policy, the French government was no longer in control of that tool (the 
two substantial public channels that did exist (FR2 and FR3) were removed from 
direct governmental control, were dependent on advertising, and had to compete 
in terms of viewing figures in a market dominated massively by commercial 
channels). In order to seduce its electorate, it had to seduce in the first instance 
those responsible for television schedules and news agenda (who themselves had 
to obey the technico-economic exigencies of the television market, the effective 
vectors modelling a government’s overall cultural policy). Debray thus 
compares the head of government to the president of a commercial public 
television channel, who must generate day after day a quota of mass audience 
programming that can stand up to the products of its entirely private-sector 
competitors. Like the head of such public channels, the head of government 
must combine ‘the discourse of Jean Vilar’ (a now mythical symbol of the 
                                                 
26 See e.g. Raymond Kuhn, The Media in France (London: Routledge, 1995), and above, 2.3. 
27 R. Debray, Le Pouvoir intellectuel en France (Paris: Ramsay, 1979), p. 219 [194]. 
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heroic ambitions of explicit cultural policy in France) and ‘the practice of TF1’ 
(the biggest and most commercially agressive of French privately-owned 
television companies) (ES 99).28 Unlike the head of a channel, however, the 
government has no free access to transmitters, and no television studio under its 
control. The architects of its effective cultural policy, the scriptwriters and 
producers that stage its initiatives, look to insinuate their products, via 
television, into the general culture of the nation. But the cultural policy they 
frame is itself framed at another level. They propose, but they do not dispose. 
Every day, television producers sift through the primary material delivered by 
various suppliers of storyline (of which government is one) (ES 101). 
Gatekeepers of a kind of anonymous mega-cultural-policy that transcends them, 
they apply the criteria they must obey to the items before them, deciding which 
to place first, which last, and which to deprive of effective existence altogether. 
In this perspective, to accuse a government in such a mediasphere of ‘spin’ is 
superficial. It is not responsible for the conditions of its survival. These are 
determined, in Debray’s account, by the requirements of a technical system once 
it has become deployed, a ‘vast panoply itself organised by and around the 
central medium’ (ES 153). 
 
 
4.4  A  techno-ethics 
 
‘Humankind is therefore the animal species that 
produces by technical means a culture.’ 
 
‘Will a techno-ethics represent one day for cultural 
policies what bio-ethics represent today for health 
policies?’29
 
 It may be that Debray’s mediology adopts an excessively dyspeptic 
response to the cultural apparatus of the present. Its first move is to inspect what 
might be lost when a new medium establishes its dominance over previously 
established technologies (such as print). As ‘surprise before Being’ is an age-old 
trigger for philosophical reflection, so ‘anxiety before the prospect of decline’ 
provided an initial impulse for Debray’s mediological reflection.30 A system of 
transmission that had seemed self-evident (the graphosphere) enters a phase of 
                                                 
28 For Jean Vilar’s vision of cultural policy, see J. Vilar, ‘Theatre: A Public Service’ (1960), 
in Ahearne, French Cultural Policy Debates, pp. 39-44. 
29 First quotation from T 121 [79 – trans. mod.]; second quotation from Debray, Introduction 
à la médiologie (Paris : PUF, 2000), p. 214 (hereafter referred to as IM). 
30 R. Debray, Par amour de l’art: une éducation intellectuelle (Paris : Gallimard, 1998), p. 
330. 
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decomposition, its elements reorganised along the gravitational force-fields of 
other systems (the videosphere, and the subsequent extension or absorption of 
this into a ‘numerosphere’ or ‘hypersphere’). A certain nostalgia is thus at the 
root of Debray’s mediology - even if its avowed goal is to sublimate this affect 
in a properly epistemic endeavour to understand the processes of transmission as 
such. 
 As a corrective to this approach, it is worth underlining the extent to 
which the evolution of cultural technology has constituted a vehicle for the 
democratization of culture and learning. In a now classic example, the former 
head of research at the French Ministry of Culture, Augustin Girard, showed in 
1978 how the spread of such technology (television, hi-fi, etc.) had done 
between twenty and a thousand times more than official cultural policy since 
1959 to multiply contacts between works of art and the public.31 Debray himself 
notes in Cours de médiologie générale the secular trend of this cultural 
democratization through communicational technology: 
 
Each new medium short-circuits the class of mediators that had issued 
from the previous medium. Along with the Bible in vulgar tongues and 
justification through faith, the printed presses short-circuited the Catholic 
[...] priesthood, allowing the faithful to assuage directly their ‘immense 
appetite for the divine’ (L. Febvre). Thenceforth, it would be the case that 
‘everyone is a priest’. Along with satellites and press agencies, television 
short-circuited the intelligentsia and the professionals of print, allowing 
consumers to assuage directly their immense appetite for culture. 
Henceforth, ‘everyone is informed’. Everyone can see and hear the 
authors, artists, and knowledge-bearers - and make a judgment on what 
they see. (CMG 219) 
 
Likewise, the powers-that-be in France have always sought to maintain control 
over new communicational technology before finally succumbing to a dynamic 
that takes it out of their hands (CMG 313). This process can be seen in the 
relations between the monarchy and the book trade, the authoritarian regimes of 
the nineteenth century and the political press, or post-war French governments 
and television. Certainly this dynamic can be explained as much in terms of 
capitalistic expansion as of democratic progress.32 Nevertheless, it entitles us to 
ask the question: is Debray, in what is as much a critique as a description of the 
videosphere and numerosphere, simply defending the interests of a deskilled 
‘class of mediators’ from a previous mediasphere? And is this a legitimate 
exercise, or does it resemble the Catholic hierarchy’s erstwhile suspicion of the 
                                                 
31 Augustin Girard, ‘Cultural Industries’, in Ahearne, French Cultural Policy Debates, pp. 
102-8 (p. 102). 
32 Cf. Cyril Lemieux, Mauvaise Presse : une sociologie compréhensive du travail 
journalistique et de ses critiques (Paris : Métailié, 2000), pp. 23-69. 
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printed press - or even Plato’s anxiety about the vulgarizing capacity of 
disseminated writing? 
 The first point to be made in defense of Debray’s fundamental 
interrogation is that there is no intrinsic relation between the increasing 
sophistication of communicational equipment and the level of sophistication of a 
social group’s intellectual evolution. Clearly, there have been instances 
throughout history of a mutually reinforcing loop connecting these two factors, 
but one cannot necessarily be inferred from the other. In Debray’s words, 
‘technical progress has as its flipside the permanent possibility of a cultural 
regression’ (CMG 231). Communicational technology is not a neutral conduit 
for intellectual content. According to the type of symbolic encoding that it 
privileges (oral or written discourse, printed or electronic image, etc.), it 
organises, hierarchises, modalizes, and eliminates possible content in specific 
manners. We have already seen how, for Debray, the videosphere constitutes a 
poor milieu for the ‘conduction’ of intellectual abstraction. It is undoubtedly the 
case that the communicational apparatus of the videosphere is more 
sophisticated than that of the graphosphere. Given that the signs it disseminates 
are, however, of a more ‘primary’ nature (images rather than concepts), it is not 
out of the question that its long-term effect might be to an induce an intellectual 
regression. Insofar, then, as a simple link between technical progress and 
intellectual progress (or even homeostasis) cannot be taken for granted, relations 
between these processes must be thought through in specific terms for each new 
historical configuration. The implications of these relations constitute, in 
Debray’s terms, a ‘civilizational issue’ (un enjeu de civilisation) (IM 207, 210). 
 Less clear-cut than a comparison between the print of the graphosphere 
and the images of the videosphere, but just as interesting, would be the 
comparison between the text transported digitally in the ‘numerosphere’ (labile, 
screen-based, synchronically ‘connected’ to a host of other texts, but liable to 
disappear from one day to the next, tending towards ‘contact’ and euphoria) and 
the text transported via the printed page since the graphosphere (fixed, page- and 
codex-based, synchronically ‘disconnected’ but enjoying greater diachronic 
fixity - one can be more certain that it will be available for subsequent 
reconsultation – and tending towards detachment and recollection). It seems 
eminently probable that these different technologies of writing (or differing 
combinations of the two) will induce differing intellectual economies. One 
might also note that the closed formal ‘architecture’ of a book requires the 
selection, condensation and ordering of information, whereas the superabundant 
expanses of hypertext permit and encourage a more ‘facile’ and indefinite 
accumulation of data at the expense of articulated knowledge.  Debray makes 
occasional reference to such a comparison, though  it is not systematically 
developed - indeed, he has been criticized for failing to integrate our 
contemporary ‘numerosphere’ fully into his reflection. It may be, however, that 
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his very discomfort in this sphere – a kind of Unbehagen in der Kultur – has 
sharpened his perception and generated many of his insights.33
 Debray compares such ‘civilizational’ issues to those addressed by 
ecology. Ecology studies the effects of  a milieu (a localized niche and a more 
general biosphere) upon living species, and the retroactive effects of species on 
their milieu. We saw in chapter two how Bourdieu deployed this metaphor to 
designate the level at which the protection of an ‘autonomous’ culture must be 
organised, though he was concerned with the logic of social fields rather than 
specifically technical determinations (see above, 2.4). Debray’s ‘mediological’ 
focus can in this respect be seen as a supplement to the sociological framework 
of Bourdieu. Mediology studies in the first instance the effect of a given 
mediasphere (a systematic configuration of technologies and institutions of 
transmission) on human cultures - and, in the second instance, the means by 
which such cultures might consciously ‘retroact’ on their mediaspheres, should 
they deem it desirable. For, as with mutations in the biosphere, not all symbolic 
entities can survive the demise of their native mediasphere: 
 
There exist in a single milieu species with a very short lifespan, but with a 
great capacity for reproduction, and others that manifest a high degree of 
inertia, but also with a longer lifespan. Living, as far as ideas are 
concerned, is always a question of surviving. Civilised societies protect 
species that are threatened with extinction, which cannot resist exisiting 
competition, and which, left to themselves, would be eliminated by rivals 
more suited to prevailing conditions. National parks are set aside for 
them, in the form of specialised schools, groupings, learned reviews, 
sects, and duly authorised associations. (CMG 235) 
 
Clearly, the legitimate object of much nominal cultural policy is the preservation 
of ‘species’ that would otherwise face extinction in the contemporary 
mediasphere. Art itself, in its traditional understanding, is presented in Vie et 
mort de l’image as one such endangered species. Unable to impose its existence 
in a space-time modelled by incessant visual flux and inimical to sustained 
contemplation, it is ‘assigned to museums, the object of  properly ecological 
care and attention, and of ever more anxious concern on the part of the 
authorities’ (VMI 214). Art, the medium that in Malraux’s vision would bring 
meaning to life, is itself now under artificial respiration. 
 The ‘techno-ethical’ and properly politicial responsibility to preserve the 
results of previous cultural technologies is of more than narrowly 
conservationist import. It goes beyond a (legitimate) principle of charity through 
                                                 
33 Freud’s classic study Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (1930) [literally: 
‘Uneasiness/disquiet/discomfort within Culture’] is translated in the standard edition of his 
works as Civilization and its Discontents (The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological  Works of Sigmund Freud (London: 1953-73), vol. 21). 
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which a political order devotes resources to what it might not strictly require 
(say, ‘art’). In Debray’s videosphere, automatic survival is granted to those 
messages (of short individual life-span, but generically recurrent) that are 
‘fittest’ according to its criteria of selection: image-based, consensual or 
consensually shocking, directly connected to primary appetites, immediately 
decodable. But the dominance of such criteria, that separate out in an altogether 
relative sense ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ messages, is not necessarily in the interest of 
the social body as such. For without the preservation of processes of mediation 
that are of necessity slow, deferred, abstract, resistant to ambient pressures, the 
foundations of that social body will become seriously weakened (if culture is a 
system of references, what happens when all references become volatile and 
transitory?). Such processes require the necessary forms of cultural technology 
to be embedded in corresponding institutions: 
 
Schools, like parliament (now short-circuited by the culture of figures and 
images), or the form of the [old-style] political party, constitute bases for 
intellectual operations that are necessarily slow. How can such pockets for 
difficult and decelerated modes of mediation be preserved in a milieu of 
easy and ultra-rapid mediations? The contemporary crisis in schools 
proceeds, among other factors, from the divergence and imbalance 
between the natural slowness inherent in the process of instruction, which 
is a form of maturation and blossoming, and the technical acceleration of 
ambient modes of diffusion. It is an imbalance between the written word 
and the screen, between a letter-based technology that follows slow 
rhythms and ultra-rapid images and sounds. (CMG 244) 
 
It is essential to grasp that Debray does not contest the effects of contemporary 
technology in the name of a non-technical ‘humanity’, or a faculty of reason 
inherent in that humanity that technology might corrupt. For Debray, as for the 
anthropologist of prehistory André Leroi-Gourhan, humanity is constituted as 
such by its very techniques - from the tools and their traces that set paleolithic 
humankind apart from other mammals to the invention of writing that, in 
interaction with the human brain, gives rise to rigorous forms of logical thought. 
It is this ‘constituting’ capacity that makes the question of techniques so 
important. At an initial level, older ‘letter-based technologies’ and 
corresponding institutions may appear of secondary political importance. These 
technologies of transmission, operating diachronically across generations, may 
appear less vital and of lower yield than the high-performance and high-speed 
technologies of communication that rake synchronically across a society (IM 
207). The political point of Debray’s mediology can be summarized as a 
warning against an overall cultural policy that neglects our stratified techno-
cultural heritage in favour of a monolithic and short-sighted conception of what 
constitutes technological ‘performance’. 
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 As a final precaution, it is worth demarcating Debray’s position as 
outlined above from a purely formal concern with heritage as such. Indeed, he 
discerns what we might call a certain ‘heritage panic’ generated by the very 
volatility that gathered pace under the videosphere, and looks to maintain a 
resolute distance with regard to this response. Mitterand’s ‘great projects’ 
(grands projets), the series of vast and vastly expensive constructions that were 
supposed to represent an enduring heritage of the present for the future, are 
regarded with suspicion: ‘everyone looks for their own way of rising above the 
televisual flux, the ephemeral flicker of electron and pixel. When you’ve given 
up on making History, there’s always the Great Projects’ (LS 518). Certainly, in 
retrospect, there is something resonantly empty about Mitterand’s projects: if 
monuments are, etymologically at least, supposed to remind the onlooker of 
something, these monuments remind us of nothing so much as one man’s desire 
to institute monuments. Likewise, Debray designates as ‘heritage abuse’ the 
prevailing aspiration to preserve as monuments traces of all conceivable forms 
of human activity before they disappear.34 Not only has such a ‘Noah’s Ark 
syndrome’ been portrayed as politically unsustainable in the long run (both 
financially and topographically - once areas have been designated as protected 
sites, they remains so indefinitely, thereby immobilizing future developments in 
the name of a fetichised past).35 It can also be understood as a mere symptom of 
the generalised flux it looks to resist: if everything that is solid is melting into 
air, so the logic goes, let us preserve anything solid that we can. Anything that 
lets us remain ‘in touch’ with the past becomes valuable when everything seems 
to be taking us away from that past. It may be that Debray is unduly Malthusian 
in his analysis of this understandable and perfectly legitimate grass-roots 
response to the very dynamic he himself designates in the contemporary 
mediasphere. At the same time, it is fair to say that this purely ‘indexical’ 
relation to the past (where we aspire to be in touch with the past simply as past) 
short-circuits more arduous but ultimately more constructive symbolic 
mediations of history. For the accumulation of past vestiges itself degenerates 
into one more flux of images. It is a representation of history that follows the 
logic of the videosphere (juxtaposition without hierarchisation and 
conceptualisation). Instead of asking the difficult but essential questions of what 
                                                 
34 See R. Debray, ‘Le monument ou la transmission comme tragédie’, in L’Abus monumental? 
Entretiens du Patrimoine, Théâtre national de Chaillot, Paris, 23, 24 et 25 novembre 1998, 
sous la présidence de Régis Debray (Paris Fayard/Editions du Patrimoine, 1999), pp. 11-32 
(p. 12).  The term ‘abus monumental’, the title of this collective volume, acquired fairly wide 
currency, and it is worth signalling that Debray explicitly rejects it as far as his own reflection 
is concerned, preferring to speak of ‘a monument-deficit against the backdrop of heritage 
abuse’ (ibid.). 
35 See Maryvonne de Saint-Pulgent, ‘Le patrimoine au risque de l’instant’, in Les Cahiers de 
médiologie, 11 (2001), pp. 303-9. 
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meaningful entities should be selected, ordered and transmitted to subsequent 
generations, and through which institutions these can be effectively transmitted, 
it simply seeks to transmit everything it can lay its hands on. In this perspective, 
it may be that the most valuable legacy worth cultivating are precisely the low-
speed ‘technologies of the letter’ that have lost their ascendancy, but that remain 
the most efficient devices yet invented for creating existential order out of 
chaos. 
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Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 
  
 The relations between intellectuals and cultural policy have taken on 
distinctive forms in France. On the one hand, France saw in 1959 the foundation 
of the first Ministry for Cultural Affairs in the Western world, to which was 
attached from the 1960s a research apparatus that Mark Schuster describes in 
international terms as ‘unique in this field’ due to its accumulated expertise.1 On 
the other hand, the majority of French intellectuals over the Fifth Republic have 
entertained what Keith Reader has called ‘non-Statist’ conceptions of political 
action. The present study has brought together three atypical thinkers in this 
regard, who, while not bound by the constraints of purely instrumental 
governmental research, have cultivated in different ways, as Tony Bennett 
writes of Raymond Williams, a ‘real entanglement with those agendas of social, 
political and cultural reform which define the effective horizon of presently 
existing policy processes and concerns’.2
I traced how the cultural policy thought of these figures emerges against 
that of André Malraux, an abiding reference in French cultural policy debate. In 
his 1960s writings on cultural policy, Bourdieu attacked the ‘charismatic 
ideology of art’ at the heart of Malraux’s thought, and argued in effect for a 
sociologically ‘rational’ cultural policy. I traced in particular the relation of this 
work to governmental institutions, and interrogated the ‘rationalism’ that aspired 
to bring all cultural policy institutions under the sway of the educational 
establishment. Certeau’s challenge to the Malrucian policy model was rather 
differently directed. He analysed May 1968 as a swarm of ‘uncertified’ voices 
overrunning the barriers of both cultural and educational institutions. Whatever 
their political fallout, the events had for Certeau given ephemeral but dazzling 
visibility to a dispersed, anonymous creative potential, and his cultural policy 
reflection would set out initially to develop the practical and theoretical 
consequences of this revelation. Together, the critiques formulated by Bourdieu 
and Certeau would become classic reference points in French cultural policy 
debates, and as such could be taken for granted in Debray’s writings of the 
1990s. This allowed him to explore the ‘admirable’ if erratic insights of 
Malraux’s reflection, which could thereby be represented as a resource for 
cultural policy thought, rather than simply an inert foundation or foil. Of 
particular relevance in this regard was Malraux’s reflection around the 
‘Imaginary Museum’, insofar as this foregrounds the multiple technical 
                                                 
1 Mark Schuster, Informing Cultural Policy: The Research and Information Infrastructure 
(New Brunswick, New Jersey: Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers, State University of 
New Jersey/Pew Charitable Trusts, 2002), p. 59. 
2 Tony Bennett, Culture: A Reformer’s Science (London: Sage, 1998), p. 35. 
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mediations that condition both the subjective experience and the political 
deployment of culture. 
I then looked to draw out the apparently contradictory strands of 
Bourdieu’s cultural policy reflection, building up a general model of a ‘cultural 
policy field’ in which culture itself fulfils a multiplicity of functions. His already 
critical view of exisiting policies and policy discourses hardened over the 1970s, 
as he analysed how such discourses functioned as part of a ‘dominant ideology’  
serving the interests of the dominant classes. In a series of ‘barbaric’ operations, 
he consciously discredited what one might call the cultural policy game. His 
critique takes in at once the objects of that game (legitimate and/or popular 
cultures), its agents (policy strategists, animateurs, artists), and its supposed and 
disavowed effects. However, there occurred an interesting filtering process 
when Bourdieu provisionally set aside in the 1980s the unchecked tide of 
critique for the normative prescriptions of policy discourse. In the educational 
reports Bourdieu produced for Socialist governments over that decade, cultural 
policy moves that he had previously derided (such as the artificial creation of 
cultural needs) were integrated into his recommendations, and he developed an 
altogether less ‘pedagogocratic’ model of the relationship between the education 
system and other institutions and modes of cultural action. Such explicit 
governmental collaboration would prove the exception for Bourdieu. His 
habitual move, developed particularly over the 1990s, would increasingly be to 
mobilize those in the cultural field in order to institute autonomous cultural 
‘counter-policies’. In a field polarized around a dominant pole of transnational 
cultural industries and a ‘dominated dominant’ pole of Nation-State cultural 
policies, I suggested he introduced supplementary platforms from which to 
broach issues such as television regulations or the GATS negotiations. Again, 
such deliberately normative interventions produced interesting displacements of 
his previous analyses. He forthrightly defended the conditions necessary for 
producing humanity’s ‘highest’ cultural achievements (while not revoking his 
earlier exposure of the high cultural game); his earlier hostility to the State was 
overlaid by a more complex negotiation of the ‘antinomies’ produced by a will 
for autonomy that could not escape dependency. This negotiation nonetheless 
stopped short of endorsing engagement in the (non-academic) apparatuses of 
that State. 
If Bourdieu mapped out with admirable clarity the elements that allowed 
me to construct a ‘cultural policy field’, Certeau’s work suggested how that field 
is also swarming with a dispersed political and cultural creativity that Bourdieu 
would come to recognise, but was less adept at representing. Certainly, as 
Certeau’s anglophone readers would expect, he locates and analyses that 
creativity as it is to be found in the thick of ‘ordinary’ social groups. He also, 
however, shows by example how such creativity can work its effects within the 
bureaucratic apparatuses of cultural policy planning. In particular, we saw how 
Certeau linked up over the period 1970-1985 the apparently antinomic poles of 
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engagement in such strategic bodies and his well-known championing of the 
tactics through which ordinary users and user-groups can empower themselves. 
His cultural policy reflection was driven notably by three key concerns: criteria 
for cultural action (what kind of ‘tactics’ might a progressive cultural policy 
favour?); issues of ‘representation’ (how might tactical groupings of various 
kinds be ‘represented’ in such a way that strategic players are forced to take 
account of them?); and the kinds of experimental institutions and institutional 
experiments that create an interface between the often polarised worlds of 
‘strategies’ and ‘tactics’, or cultural production and cultural appropriation. 
Debray’s work allowed me to introduce a further dimension into the 
represention of the cultural policy field and its functioning. This was constituted 
by the effects of specifically technical determinations on processes of cultural 
transmission. The existence of any State requires the diffusion across space and 
the transmission through time of cultural symbols – in this sense a cultural 
policy is a ‘transhistorical’ function, whether or not it is explicitly formulated as 
such. However, the technical instruments for such diffusion and transmission 
vary through history. Debray therefore posits a series of ‘mediaspheres’ defined 
by the successive dominance of different instruments and institutions of 
transmission (the mnemosphere, logosphere, graphosphere, videosphere, and 
numerosphere). Emerging mediaspheres do not eliminate the elements of 
previous mediaspheres, but bring them into their gravitational pull. They figure 
in his reflection not as ‘objects’ with which policy-makers must deal, but as 
englobing spheres which filter out unviable strategies, while modelling those 
strategies they select as ‘fittest’. The motive force behind these analyses was not 
purely academic, but derived, I suggested, from a frustration with both ‘implicit’ 
and ‘explicit’ socialist cultural policies over the 1980s (when he was a full-time 
advisor to President Mitterand). In particular, the innovative but in many 
respects demagogic policy of Jack Lang over the 1980s was described largely as 
a symptom of that videosphere in which it both swam and finally sank (like a 
worn-out talk-show formula). Debray’s account was questioned in some 
respects: he passes over precisely some of the more lasting ‘technical’ 
achievements of Lang’s administration (such as book pricing, and other 
innovations with regard to the cultural industries), and is no doubt overly 
dyspeptic with regard to the often democratizing effects of new cultural 
technologies. More fundamentally, however, it must be stressed that Debray is 
not a techno-determinist in a facile sense (one should not associate him too 
closely with McLuhan). Certainly, following authors like Leroi-Gourhan, 
Goody, Ong, and also Derrida, he sees techniques (such as writing) as 
constitutive of rather than opposed to humanity. But this does not mean that, for 
Debray, the challenge posed by technology for cultural policy is simply a 
summons to ‘adapt or perish’. On the contrary, the distinctive policy challenge 
that he articulates is the requirement to preserve the resources of a plural and 
stratified techno-cultural heritage (including pockets for the ‘slow mediation’ of 
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ideas, tastes, and programmes) against more superficial but seductive notions of 
technical ‘performance’. 
 
The three bodies of cultural policy reflection analysed in this study are 
clearly very different in their emphases and orientations. Having said that, an 
anglophone reader may well be struck overwhelmingly by what they have in 
common – both the critical energy which they bring to the issue of ‘cultural 
policy’ (broadly defined), and the elaboration of their thought in relation to the 
common references of a cultural policy discourse as it has evolved in France. I 
have already suggested in the introduction to this study how we can triangulate 
their reflection with regard to three key ‘moments’ of cultural policy reflection 
in France as articulated by Augustin Girard:  the problematic of cultural 
democratization (Bourdieu), the problematic of cultural development or cultural 
democracy (Certeau), and the challenges posed for cultural policy formation by 
technological mutation (Debray). These ‘moments’ constitute, as it were, the 
centre of gravity of each writer’s cultural policy thinking. What is important, 
however, are also the links elaborated between these poles of reflection – thus 
Bourdieu also elaborates a critique of ‘ideologies’ of cultural development; 
Certeau, in addition to his critique of classic cultural democratization projects, 
makes important points concerning the uses of cultural technology that would be 
of particular relevance for the adjustment of policy to the demands of the 
‘numerosphere’; Debray underlines how the nature of what is being 
‘democratized’ or ‘developed’ is liable to change as the englobing 
‘mediasphere’ in which cultural works and practices partake mutates.  
These three bodies of reflection also allow us to build up a complex vision 
of the ‘field’ in which cultural policies evolve and operate. Bourdieu’s work 
allowed us to lay out the broad geometry of such a cultural policy field, as well 
as the diverse functions fulfilled by ‘legitimate’ culture within it. In his 
explicitly normative interventions, he aspired to introduce a further position into 
that field from which to negotiate (sometimes rather rigidly) the antinomies of 
cultural policy. His key priority became to protect the autonomy of the cultural 
field. As regards this fundamental ‘field analysis’, I would not set the work of 
Certeau or Debray directly against that of Bourdieu, for there is little in them 
that falsifies the basic structures of his analyses. However, they do introduce 
certain principles of ‘heteronomy’ that can be grafted on to Bourdieu’s work as 
supplementary dimensions of cultural policy reflection. These supplementary 
dimensions can substantially alter the style, emphases and orientations of 
cultural policy reflection. Focusing perpetually on the ‘other’ of professionally 
autonomous cultural production, without for all that lapsing into unqualified 
populism, Certeau looks for ways in which this domain might be more 
adequately ‘represented’ in the cultural policy field. Debray, on the other hand, 
focuses on those techniques and technologies that have often been construed as 
the ‘other’ of culture, or (in Bourdieu’s work) as secondary to social 
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determinations. Debray supposes that such technologies work to model and 
constitute human subjectivity and cultures, and that their deployment sets in 
motion certain concatenations of consequences. In fact, Debray actually 
questions the value of the term ‘field’ for his mediological analyses, preferring 
the more ‘tactile’ and englobing notions of ‘milieu’ or ‘sphere’.3 One might thus 
conceive the cultural policy field as itself existing within the ‘element’ of a 
given mediasphere (as a structured web of life develops in the ‘element’ of the 
sea). 
  
Such an overall framework, as well as much of its constituent detail, may 
appear remote from the day-to-day or year-to-year demands of policy formation. 
Yet, as René Rizzardo has suggested, the role of research in such domains is not 
necessarily ‘directly to propose decisions: it is there to augment our intelligence, 
our aptitude and capacity to take a decision when we have to.’4 Indeed, Antoine 
Hennion has gone further with regard to understandable demands from 
politicians and administrators that research supply direct policy-relevant 
‘results’: 
 
Those responsible for cultural policies and actions would like to make the 
DEP [the research unit at the Ministry of Culture] responsible for 
supplying them simply, on demand, with an accessible and synthetic 
résumé of the stock of available knowledge with regard to the precise 
problem they must resolve. 
 
But the common stock of research results from which they would like to 
benefit in this way does not exist. Research moves along in the wake of 
evolving situations and problematics, and is itself part of the swirls and 
eddies which ceaselessly displace words and problems…5
 
I have already discussed in the introduction to this study the distinctive ‘research 
ecology’ that has emerged around cultural policy issues in France, and that has 
worked, as Hennion has put it, as ‘a sort of machine that takes up again and 
transforms the questions that it reformulates.’6 It has produced a collectively 
                                                 
3 See e.g. R. Debray et al., ‘105 entrées dans la médiologie’, in Les Cahiers de médiologie, 6 
(1998), pp. 263-83 (p. 278). 
4 R. Rizzardo, ‘Valorisation de la recherche, évaluation et aide à la décision’, in Trente ans 
d’études au service de la vie culturelle, Table ronde organisée à l’occasion du départ à la 
retraite d’Augustin Girard, chef du Département des études et de la prospective du ministère 
de la culture de 1963 à 1993 (Paris: Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication, 1993), 
pp. 55-9 (p. 55). 
5 A. Hennion, ‘Le grand écart entre la recherche et l’administration’ (Paris: Ministère de la 
Culture et de la Communication, Département des Etudes et de la Prospective, June 1996), 19 
pp., p. 1. 
6 Ibid. 
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organised testing and probing of cultural policy programmes and horizons. The 
present study has, for reasons explained, set apart in a kind of artificial echo 
chamber the cultural policy deliberations of three particular thinkers. Certainly, 
we can gain by setting aside and scrutinizing in this way specific oeuvres. In the 
end, however, it is important not to reify them simply as individual stars in our 
mental firmament, but to refer them to that collective process of intellection that 
can both develop and delimit them. 
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